The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part I: What to Do with a "Decimated" Division?

This blog has frequently featured stories on the Pennsylvania Reserves.  The division, also known as the Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, was encamped around Langley, Virginia during the first winter of the war.  In spring 1862 the Reserves relocated to Alexandria before marching south to Falmouth.  They eventually joined the Army of the Potomac just in time for the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula.  The Reserves also saw intense combat at Second Manassas, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.  As the bloody second year of the war drew to a close, the Union Army's high command debated the future of the battered division and finally decided to move the Reserves back to the Washington area.  In the next few posts, I will take a look at the return of the storied Pennsylvania Reserves to Northern Virginia. 

Even before the costly engagements at Antietam and Fredericksburg, brigade commander George G. Meade had begun to worry about the state of the Reserves.  The general wrote to his wife on September 4, 1862 that "[o]ur division, the Reserves, is pretty well used up, and ought, strictly speaking, to be withdrawn, reorganized, filled up with recruits, and put in efficient condition."   (Meade 308.)   Meade led the Reserves through the carnage at Antietam, where the division suffered causalities of around 20 percent. (OR, 1:19:1, 270-71.)  After the battle, Meade discussed the "decimated condition" of the division with George B. McClellan, head of the Army of the Potomac.  As he wrote to his wife:

I. . . told [McClellan] that I had no idea they would ever be filled up by recruiting officers, and the only course I saw to adopt was to send them in a body back to Pennsylvania, and ask the Governor and State to fill them up within a specified time; but if it could not be done, they were to be mustered out of service.  (Meade 315.)

Around the same time, Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin attempted to enlist political support for the reorganization of the Reserves.  In a September 30 letter to President Abraham Lincoln, Curtin suggested that the heavily depleted division be returned temporarily to the Keystone State.  The governor explained to the President:

The brilliant history of the Reserve Corps in the war, and the State pride which has followed them since they entered the service, together with the circumstances surrounding their organization, would, I have no doubt, prove such incentives to enlistment that the Corps could be filled to the maximum in a short space of time. (in Sypher 398.) 

Lincoln forwarded Curtin's letter to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for consideration.  The General-in-Chief "entirely disapprov[ed] of withdrawing regiments in the field" for purposes of filling the ranks with new recruits.  (OR, 3:2, 625.)  Curtin also wrote to McClellan, who "thought favorably of the plan, but having immediate use for the troops, was unwilling to retire them at that time."  (Sypher 398; OR, 1:21, 878.)   The division would stay at the front for now.

Gen. George G. Meade (courtesy of Civil War Wiki.Net)

After the fight at Fredericksburg in December, Meade tried once again to deal with the poor condition of the Pennsylvania Reserves.  On December 23, he sent a report on the state of the unit to Gen. William B. Franklin, commander of the Left Grand Division.  As Meade told Franklin, only 195 officers and 4,249 enlisted men were present for duty.  Another 159 officers and 3,740 men were absent with permission.  Meade noted that "to fill these regiments to the maximum authorized, will require 153 officers and 4,864 men."  (OR, 1:21, 877-78.)   However, he cautioned that "of the number reported as absent, a very large proportion are the wounded, most of whom are so maimed and disabled that no expectation need be formed of their returning to active duty."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  Meade felt that in reality a reorganization of the Pennsylvania Reserves "required the appointment of over 200 officers and the enlistment of over 7,000 men."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)

The general proposed a course of action to revitalize the Reserves.  Recruiters had gone to Pennsylvania three different times to fill the ranks, but their efforts had met little success.  Meade recognized that the Army could "consolidate the existing force into a number of regiments equal to the officers and men for duty."  He disliked this plan, since it would "destroy[] the organization, and the prestige which the good conduct of the corps has acquired for it."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  Instead, Meade recommended that the Reserves be withdrawn temporarily from the field and sent to Pennsylvania for two or three months, "where, it is believed, from the great reputation the corps has acquired, the pride the State takes in it, and the enthusiasm its return would create, that in a short time its ranks would be filled, after pruning them of all useless members."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)

Gen. John F. Reynolds, head of the First Corps and a former commander of the Reserves, forwarded Meade's proposal to Franklin on January 10, 1863.  Reynolds "concur[red] most heartily" in Meade's recommendation to send the division back home to recover and recruit.  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  The next day, Franklin sent Meade's plan to Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Army of the Potomac.  Complimenting the Reserves on their "excellent service," Franklin endorsed Meade's proposal.  (OR, 1:21, 878-79.)

Col. Horatio G. Sickel, who assumed command of the Pennsylvania Reserves upon Meade's promotion at the end of 1862, soon weighed in on the future of the division.  The colonel hoped to enlist Governor Curtin's support in reorganizing the Pennsylvania Reserves.  Sickel sent a copy of Meade's report to Curtin and got the desired response.  The governor readily took up his old cause and forwarded Sickel's correspondence to the War Department.  Secretary of War Stanton, however, had no appetite for Meade's proposal.  According to a history of the Reserves, the Secretary informed Curtin "that numerous similar applications were on file from other States, that all could not be granted without greatly reducing the strength of the army, and that therefore all must be refused."  (Sypher 436.)

The Pennsylvania Reserves had the misfortune of remaining at the front long enough to take part in Burnside's disastrous "Mud March."  But change was in the air by the end of January.  Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac and worked with General-in-Chief Halleck to effect a transfer of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The division, however, was far from homeward bound.

Up Next: The Pennsylvania Reserves bid farewell to Hooker's army and board transports for Alexandria.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

John H. Eicher & David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (2001); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); George G. Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1 (1913); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865).

Living History at Ft. Ward: The Union Army's Balloon Corps

This past weekend my parents were visiting and helping me with the boys while my wife was out of town.  I was looking for a family-friendly activity to fill Saturday morning.  (Believe me, with 22 month-old twins, it's best to get out and about.)  Lucky for us, the Ft. Ward Museum and Historic Site in Alexandria was holding a "Civil War Balloon Corps Living History Event."  So we packed into the SUV and headed to one of my favorite Civil War sites in the Washington area.

The event featured a reenactor portraying Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, the head of the Union Army's Balloon Corps.  Kevin Knapp, a retired Army officer and professional balloonist, has established a name for himself as an expert on Lowe and the military use of balloons during the Civil War.  He set up a balloon on the grounds of Ft. Ward, complete with replica gas generators and a basket draped in patriotic bunting.  The balloon is actually a 1941 Navy trainer, but bears a resemblance to the type of netted gas balloons used by Lowe and other period aeronauts.  Incidentally, Knapp is the same reenactor who made a widely-publicized appearance on the the National Mall last summer as part of a reenactmet of Lowe's June 1861 balloon demonstration for President Abraham Lincoln. 

Thaddeus S.C. Lowe (Kevin Knapp) poses in front of his balloon.  Knapp, a professional balloon pilot, brings first-hand flying experience to his interpretation of Civil War aviation.

View of the balloon attached to replica gas generators on the grounds of Ft. Ward.  Knapp explained to me that the actual balloon was used by the Navy to transition pilots from light-than-air flight to airships.  The Genesee County Village & Museum in Mumford, New York is currently building an exact replica of one of Lowe's balloons and will offer rides to visitors.

Lowe inflating his balloon Intrepid at Fair Oaks, Virginia.  Note the gas generators mounted on wagons.  The event at Ft. Ward replicated a wartime scene like the one above (courtesy of Smithsonian Air & Space Museum).

Knapp could not fully inflate the balloon due in part to the airspace restrictions around the nation's capital. That's too bad, because many spectators surely had come to see the balloon floating high above the fort and museum.  On the other hand, Knapp was on the ground and available to answer questions.  I spoke with the reenactor for a few minutes and learned quite a bit about the Balloon Corps in such a short amount of time.  I am not too familiar with the subject, and Knapp whetted my appetite to learn more.  His enthusiasm for the topic was contagious.

View of a replica gas generator used to inflate balloons in the field.  Balloonists mixed sulfuric acid and iron filings to produce hydrogen gas.  The gas flowed from the generator to the balloon.  Of course, authenticity only goes so far, and Knapp uses a cold air fan to inflate his balloon.  The two replica generators at the event were somewhat smaller than the originals because Knapp built them to fit on wagons provided to him for last year's reenactment on the Mall.

The event featured a miniature replica of a Civil War balloon, which floated above the trees at Ft. Ward.  At least spectators were able to see something in the air without Knapp and museum staff drawing the ire of the Federal authorities.

The West End of Alexandria, where Ft. Ward is located, was no stranger to military ballooning during the Civil War.  In the fall of 1861, John LaMountain, one of Lowe's rivals, obtained a job with Gen. William B. Franklin's division at Cloud's Mill, not far from Ft. Ward.  Earlier in 1861, La Mountain had served with Gen. Benjamin Butler at Ft. Monroe, but a new Federal commander there had little appreciation for aerial technology and sent LaMountain to Washington. 

John LaMountain, period engraving (courtesy of U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission)

Unlike Lowe, who tethered his balloons to the ground, La Mountain believed in free flight reconnaissance.  LaMountain may have possessed an on-site gas generator, but he also filled his balloons at a lighting gas plant in Alexandria.  LaMountain ascended at least seven times while based in Alexandria.  As he floated over Northern Virginia, LaMountain was able to observe the Confederate lines around Centreville, Manassas, and other spots.  LaMountain never fully accepted Lowe's appointment as head of the Balloon Corps and incessantly criticized his rival.  Gen. George B. McClellan eventually dismissed LaMountain for insubordination in February 1862.  (I'd like to take a closer look at La Mountain's activities in future posts.)

The fact that there is a reenactor portraying Lowe, and not LaMountain, says a lot about how we've come to remember the wartime balloonists.  I discussed with Knapp why Lowe still captures the public's imagination, while other aeronauts, like LaMountain, have drifted into obscurity. (No pun intended.)  The fact that Lowe had correspondents following his every move, and that he had friends in high places may have had something to do with ensuring Lowe's place in history.  Wartime photographers also seemed obsessed with Lowe's military operations and left a remarkable visual record for future generations.  In any event, it's refreshing to see living history events aside from battle reenactments, and Knapp's impression of Lowe helps to focus public attention on an interesting aspect of the Civil War and technology. 

Sources

Timothy J. Dennee, "John LaMountain and the Alexandria Balloon Ascensions," Historic Alexandria Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3, Fall 1997; U.S. Centennial of Flight Commission, "Balloons in the American Civil War;" Brett Zongker, Associated Press, "Smithsonian Recounts Balloon Flights of Civil War," June 10, 2011. 

A Time of Skirmishing: Pohick Church, August 18, 1861

Leafing through my volume of the OR covering the summer and fall of 1861 after First Manassas, I am struck by the number of skirmishes that took place across Northern Virginia. Pick a place, and chances are, something happened there during the last half of 1861. Locations that are better known today for strip malls, soccer fields, and housing developments were the scene of minor but intense clashes between small Union and Confederate forces. 

This upcoming Thursday marks the 150th anniversary of the cavalry skirmish at Pohick Church in Fairfax County involving troopers from the 1st New York Cavalry Regiment.  Pohick Church, about twelves miles south of Alexandria, sat near two roads leading in the direction of Fairfax and Centreville. The Confederates, worried about a Union flanking movement along these roads, always made sure to to guard the area around the church.  The stage was set for an encounter.

Company C of the 1st New York Cavalry left Philadelphia for Washington City on July 22, 1861, the day after the disastrous Federal defeat at Manassas.  The 1st New York Cavalry, also known as the "Lincoln Cavalry," was organized by Carl Schurz, a former German revolutionary of 1848 and confidant of President Lincoln.  Company C, led by Captain William H. Boyd, was comprised of men from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  Nine other companies were raised in New York City, and four of them were composed entirely of Germans, Poles, and Hungarians.  The two remaining companies came from Grand Rapids, Michigan and Syracuse, New York.

Company C initially encamped on Capitol Hill, but at the start of August, the troopers left Washington and moved across the Long Bridge to Alexandria  The men settled at Camp Elizabeth on the western side of the town.  The unit reported to Brig. Gen. William B. Franklin, who would later serve as a corps commander in the Army of the Potomac.

On the morning of August 18, 1861, Franklin ordered Boyd  "to proceed on a scout down the Mount Vernon road and vicinity of Accotink, to capture, if possible, 27 cavalry of the enemy."  (OR, Series 1, Vol. 5, Part 1, p. 113.)  The wording of the order is a bit strange and begs the question of why 27? -- presumably an earlier reconnaissance had reported precise numbers of the enemy in that direction.  Boyd set out at 10 a.m. with 46 men, as well as Lt. William Hanson, a Lt. Gibson of Franklin's staff, and Dr. Herrick, a surgeon.

An 1862 sketch of Pohick Church by Union soldier Robert Sneden (courtesy of Virginia Historical Society).   Pohick Church was founded sometime prior to 1724 and served as the first permanent church in colonial Virginia north of the Occoquan River.  The structure standing during the Civil War, and still standing today, was completed in 1774.  George Washington, who supervised the construction, worshipped at Pohick Church.  For more information on the church's history, see here.

The scouting party moved in the direction of Accotink, "interrogating all pedestrians and examining all houses and outbuildings on our way thither." (OR, 1:5:1, p. 114.) At Accotink, Boyd learned that Confederate cavalry had been seen a bit farther west at Pohick Church. Company C rode immediately in the direction of the church. One of the company's advance pickets came rushing back to the main body, shouting to the men that a whole Confederate army was up ahead. This misinformation caused a "stampede" among the men. (OR, 1:5:1, p. 114.) Soon, "another of the advance came on, and his excited manner tended to quicken the pace of the retreating men." (William Harrison Beach, The First New York (Lincoln) Cavalry, from April 19, 1861 to July 7, 1865, p. 36 (1902)). A third picket raced back to inform Boyd, who was now in the rear, that "he had been near enough the rebels to see them all" and that in fact, "[t]here were no more of them than there were in their own company, and he felt sure that our men could whip them." (Beach, p. 36.)

Detail of 1862 Union map of Northeastern Virginia, showing Accotink, Pohick Church, and the surrounding area.  Alexandria is located off the map to the northeast, or upper right.  The full map can be found here (courtesy of Library of Congress).

Learning that his troopers had a fighting chance, Boyd rallied his men, who wheeled around and rode back towards the Confederate cavalry force, about 20 in number.  When he caught site of the enemy along the road, the captain ordered his men forward, and they "shouted, cheered, and charged."  (OR, 1:5:1, p. 114.)  The Union cavalrymen rode towards the enemy, firing their revolvers as they went.  The Rebels got off one volley and fell back.  Company C pursued the retreating Confederates down three separate roads just beyond Pohick Church, but as Boyd reported to Franklin after the skirmish, the enemy cavalrymen "were well mounted, had very superior horses, and were enable to outfoot us."  (OR, 1:5:1, p. 114.) 

Company C experienced light casualties.  Trooper Jacob Erwin was killed and two others were missing after being thrown from their horses.  Erwin is supposedly the first Union volunteer cavalryman killed in the Army of the Potomac. (Beach, p. 37.)  The OR contains no Confederate account of the encounter, and Boyd was not certain of the enemy casualties.  No prisoners were taken.  (The Southern cavalry unit also remains unidentified in the sources I have reviewed.)  Boyd took home a lesson from the skirmish at Pohick Church. As he reported to Franklin,  "[i]t is my opinion that had we some infantry with us we would have been able to outflank them and taken some prisoners." (OR, 1:5:1, p. 114.)

A regimental historian also recalled:

The men of this company never in the four years that followed forgot the lesson of their first fight [at Pohick Church]. In a fight of cavalry against cavalry the advantage is with the party that moves first. It is difficult to withstand the impetus and momentum of a well-directed cavalry charge. There was always a stimulus in a lusty and hearty cheer. The men of the regiment learned that in a charge, the sabre was more effective than the revolver or the carbine. (Beach, p. 37.)

Company C gathered Erwin's body and returned to camp at Alexandria.  The cavalrymen's performance did not go unnoticed.  A few days later, on August 22, Maj. Gen. George B.McClellan praised the men of Company C at a review of Franklin's troops.  By the middle of September, the remainder of the 1st New York Cavalry was in the field around Washington, but Company C would have the honor of being the first to fight.

Note on Additional Sources:

The Glories of War: Small Battles and Early Heroes of 1861, by local historian Charles P. Poland, Jr. has a discussion of the focus of the armies on Pohick Church.

For more information on the 1st New York Cavalry, see the Civil War in the East website (here) and the New York State Military Museum website (here).

Chain Bridge: The Rebels are Coming! The Rebels are Coming!

Chain Bridge seems to be the location that keeps on giving.  Who knew that a bridge could hold so many stories about the Civil War?  As mentioned in my first post on the subject, Chain Bridge saw no real action during the Civil War.  However, at various times throughout the conflict, concerns about a possible Confederate threat to the nation's capital loomed large, and the garrison at Chain Bridge got caught up in events.  One of the most notable episodes occurred in August 1862 during the Second Manassas Campaign.

After General McClellan's failed Peninsula Campaign in the spring and summer of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was ordered to move off the Virginia Peninsula and closer to Washington.  McClellan objected, but to no avail.  The Federal general certainly did not relish the prospect of helping the newly-formed Army of Virginia under Major General John Pope, a pompous general brought East from the Western theater.  By the time McClellan got his army moving towards Washington in mid-August,  General Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia was moving to destroy the Army of Virginia before McClellan could provide reinforcements. When McClellan arrived in Alexandria on August 26, two of his army corps (the Third and Fifth) were on their way to Pope.  The Sixth Corps under Major General William B. Franklin had just arrived, and the Second Corps under Major General Edwin V. Sumner would disembark in Alexandria a couple of days later. McClellan, who stepped into an ill-defined command situation, began to bicker with General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck over control of his two remaining corps.

Major General Edwin V. Sumner, head of the Second Corps, Army of the Potomac (Library of Congress)

Major General Henry W. Halleck, General-in-Chief of the Union Army (Library of Congress)

Chain Bridge soon became the focus of attention.  On August 28, McClellan informed Halleck that various sources reported that "the enemy with 120,000 men intend advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with a view of attacking Washington & Baltimore."  As McClellan confirmed in a subsequent letter to his wife, "there was a terrible scare in Washington" that night when "[a] rumor got out that Lee was advancing rapidly on the Chain Bridge with 150,000 men....I did not get 5 minutes consecutive sleep all night--so thick were the telegrams!"  McClellan, always cautious and inclined to imagine worst case scenarios, believed that Lee might be trying to get his army between Pope and Washington.  He made the defense of the capital his top priority.  Pope would have to wait for the Second and Sixth Corps.

General McClellan and his wife, Mary Ellen (Library of Congress)

Early on the morning of August 29, McClellan reacted to the alleged Confederate advance.  He ordered two regiments and an artillery battery from the Second Corps to march to the vicinity of Chain Bridge on the Virginia side.  By the morning of August 30, three of Sumner's brigades were on both sides of Chain Bridge, and the rest of his corps was in Arlington, including the area around Fort Corcoran.  Lee and Pope, however, were engaged in a ferocious fight around the old battlefield of Bull Run.  Around 2 pm, Halleck ordered Sumner's entire corps, along with the Sixth Corps, to be "pushed forward with all possible dispatch" to the front.  The threat to Washington by way of Chain Bridge had just been as McClellan described it -- a mere "rumor."  Unfortunately for the Union Army, the remainder of McClellan's army was too late to make any difference.  Lee's army soundly defeated Pope's forces and would soon launch an invasion of Maryland.