A Detour to Delaplane, Virginia: The First Bull Run Campaign and the Manassas Gap Railroad

This past weekend I decided to take the family for an outing in the countryside.  On Saturday morning we put the boys in their car seats, jumped into the SUV, and headed to Sky Meadows State Park in Fauquier County.  My wife and I first visited the park back in 2010.  The historic home of Mt. Bleak, located on the grounds of Sky Meadows, has several connections to Mosby's Rangers and the Civil War.  (I wrote a post about my previous visit here.)  Of course, I couldn't resist taking a little detour to another Civil War site on the way to Sky Meadows. 

Near the confluence of Goose Creek and Crooked Run we pulled off Rt. 17 and stopped at Delaplane.  This tiny hamlet, known as Piedmont Station during the Civil War, appears much as it did in the mid-nineteenth century.  The Manassas Gap Railroad reached the area in 1852.  The company decided to place a new station near the point where the railroad crossed the vital transportation link of the Dumfries-Winchester Road (now Rt. 17).  The town grew up around the station, and by the start of the Civil War, had become an important rail center in Fauquier County.  Piedmont Station was renamed Delaplane in 1874 and today is designated as a Historic District on the National Register of Historic Places.

Civil War Trails marker on Delaplane Grade Rd., just to the south of the old Manassas Gap Railroad line.  Today the tracks are part of the Norfolk Southern system. 

Piedmont Station played a key role in the First Bull Run Campaign.  Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, received an urgent order on July 18, 1861 to join forces with Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction.  The general, worried that his volunteer army would take too long to march to Beauregard's assistance, opted instead to send his army by rail.  Johnston proceeded to Piedmont Station and oversaw preparations for the transportation of his men to Manassas Junction.

Close-up of the Civil War Trails marker.  (More information can be found here on the Historical Marker Database.)  The marker makes the claim that "[h]ere. . . trains were used for the first time in history to move troops to impending battle." 

Meanwhile, Johnston's army was on the move out of the Shenandoah Valley.  Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's brigade left the Winchester area around noon on July 18.  After marching all day and night, they passed through Ashby's Gap and stopped in Paris at two in the morning of July 19.  (Incidentally, I wrote about Paris and Jackson-related sites a few years ago.)  Jackson allowed his men a few hours of rest before they set out to complete the remaining six miles to Piedmont Station. They arrived at six in the morning.  Patriotic civilians greeted Jackson's troops at the station and offered them food and drink.  Jackson's men, likely basking in the glow of admirers, ate their breakfast and then boarded the train of freight and cattle cars for Manassas.  Progress was slow.  The 34-mile trip took an incredible eight hours.  Jackson, of course, would go on to earn the nickname "Stonewall" on the battlefield of Manassas on July 21. 

Two original railroad buildings dating to 1852.  These structures have been used as depots, warehouses, and stores.  The National Register of Historic Places Registration Form for Delaplane notes that "[t]he survival of these two large antebellum brick structures associated with the railroad is a rare occurrence in Virginia since few antebellum brick buildings of this scale can be documented anywhere else in Virginia."  (p. 16.)

Despite logistical difficulties, regiments from the brigades of Col. Francis Bartow and Gen. Barnard Bee followed Jackson over the course of the next day or so.  The brigade of Col. Arnold Elzey, under the temporary command of Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, did not leave Piedmont Station until the early morning hours of July 21.  The men arrived at Manassas mid-day and marched quickly to the sounds of battle.  Elzey's troops smashed into the Federal right on Chinn Ridge and helped to secure the Confederate victory.

Another view of the antebellum railroad buildings, taken from Rokeby Rd.  The railroad line runs in front of the buildings.



Looking west down the old Manassas Gap Railroad tracks from Rokeby Rd. in Delaplane.  A Virginia State Historical Marker on Piedmont Station and First Manassas sits to the right.  (See here for text.)  The white SUV is traveling south on Rt. 17, the old Dumfries-Winchester Rd. 

Today Delaplane sits almost untouched by time.  You'll find no Starbucks, McDonald's, or strip malls there.  It isn't hard to imagine Jackson's troops mounting the rail cars and starting their journey towards Manassas and fame.  Walking next to the tracks, I was reminded of the contribution that this village made to modern military history.  Railroads played an important part in the Civil War, and Johnston's operation at Piedmont Station stood near the very start of it all.  Although the means of transportation proved a little slower than Johnston may have liked, his actions at Piedmont Station demonstrated the value of harnessing railroad technology to military advantage.  That's big stuff for such a small place, and well worth a stop to look around and ponder.

Sources

William C. Davis, Battle at Bull Run (1985 ed.); Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of First Bull Run (2009); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, Delaplane Historic District (2003); Ethan Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas (2002).

The Pennsylvania Reserves at Manassas: A Drunken State of Mind

As I discussed last week, the Pennsylvania Reserves left the outskirts of Alexandria during the second week of April 1862 and established camp near Manassas Junction.  The division was on the move along with the rest of Gen. Irvin McDowell's command, which President Lincoln had recently detached from the Army of the Potomac.  Although their stay at Manassas was a short one, the Pennsylvanians found plenty of ways to pass the time. 

Consumption of intoxicating beverages apparently ranked near the top of the list.  The more I read regimental histories, memoirs, and newspapers accounts, the more I am convinced that if the soldiers weren't fighting and marching, they were drinking.  And nothing stood in the way of the men procuring their own supply of liquor at Manassas.  As Archibald Hill of the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves recalled:

[F]rom some source, a considerable quantity of spirits had made its way among the boys. Upon inquiring "whence such great good-fortune," I was informed that a train of cars laden with whiskey, bound for [Nathaniel] Banks' Division, via Manassas Gap, had broken down just beyond the junction, and that OUR BOYS had flocked over, and unhesitatingly appropriated said whiskey to their own use. (Hill 226-27.)

The men of Hill's regiment took full advantage of their discovery:

Scarcely a man was there who had not his canteen full; the most of the boys had already become inebriated, and were making an unwarrantable amount of noise. . . .  Before the close of that eventful day there may possibly have been ten sober men remaining in the regiment; but I doubt it.   (Hill 227-28.) 

Likewise, a few Bucktails pried open a boxcar and discovered about a dozen bottles of whiskey that were intended for use by the Pennsylvania Reserves' medical director.  The story, unfortunately, had a less than happy ending.  The Bucktails began to drink from other bottles in the stash.  A soldier tried to warn his companions that what they were drinking was "no bitters at all," but they continued to imbibe.  (Thomson & Rauch 92.)  The bottles actually contained laudanum, and two men died the next day from ingesting the bitter-tasting narcotic.

"Drunken Soldier" by A.R. Waud (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The sketch is a bit light, but I couldn't resist using the image.

A New York Times reporter visiting the Pennsylvania Reserves was appalled by the soliders' bad behavior:

It is to be regretted that at Manassas Junction the most lamentable misrule prevails. Stragglers or drunken soldiers are the only objects of interest to be seen in the vicinity. . . .  (N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1862.)

He singled out the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves for particular scorn:

Your correspondent, passing through the place this morning, saw a First Lieutenant and Sergeant of the Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve arm in arm, staggering together over the rail track, in a state of disgraceful inebriety. It is stated that the Colonel of the Fifth Pennsylvania Reserve serves out whisky to his men twice daily and that this morning the Conductor of a train opened six barrels of the beverage, and gave the soldiers free access thereto. . . .  It is certain that over a hundred drunken gorillas, with the number of that regiment on their caps, were occupying the place, threatening to shoot peaceful contrabands as being prime causes of the war -- insulting peaceful travelers -- subject to no rule whatever. It is to be hoped that a speedy stop will be put to such disgraceful proceedings.  (N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1862.)

Maj. George Dare from the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves rushed to defend his regiment's honor in a letter submitted to the Philadelphia Press.  He admitted that upon arriving at Manassas on April 10, "some of the men found there a lot of whiskey in some of the open cars."  (Phila. Press, Apr. 25, 1862.)  However, Dare denied the allegations of drunkenness and misbehavior.  He rebuked the Times for publishing an article which "vilifies a thousand of Pennsylvania's best young men, and a colonel who has occupied various positions in our regular army for the past twenty-five years. . . ."  (Phila. Press, Apr. 25, 1862.) 

The Columbia (Pa.) Spy also entered the fray.  In an article published on April 26, 1862, the Spy explained:

We have not seen the paper, and only learn the charge through Lieut. [Sam] Evans, Quartermaster of the Fifth, who authorizes us to deny it as altogether false.  (Columbia Spy, Apr. 26, 1862.)

The Spy informed readers of Evans' version of events:

He says in explanation of the origin of the report, that Government has been supplying the men with a whiskey ration in bad weather.  The Division Commissary had brought on the cars from Alexandria several barrels of whiskey, which the "Bucktails" discovered, and knocking in the heads, they, with assistance from a New York Regiment, finished it.  Of course there was a disgraceful frolic, in which we are sorry to learn, two men from the Fifth participated, one of whom got drunk.  The only officers drunk (and there were several) were of the New York regiment.  (Columbia Spy, Apr. 26, 1862.)*

The paper took aim at war correspondents from the Empire State:

The New York dailies employ a reckless set of reporters, who, deprived of their past facilities for betraying the movements of the army to the enemy, resort to the safer and equally congenial occupation for their mischievous pens--blackening the character of Pennsylvania soldiers.  No repetition of warning will ever teach these slanderous scribblers caution. . . until a half dozen of them are shot as wholesome examples.  (Columbia Spy, Apr. 26, 1862.)

The actual version of events is probably lost to history, but the seemingly trivial debate over the behavior of the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves tells us something about moral attitudes towards alcohol consumption and drunkenness in the army.  Soldiers drank to escape the realities of war (and because it was fun), but knew that intoxication could also bring contempt from the outside world.  Such an awareness goes a long way to explaining why Hill felt a bit guilty about his own drinking at Manassas and tried to ease his conscience:

Readers, perhaps you are an advocate of the temperance cause; I hope you are—I am. But I beg you will not censure me for drinking on this occasion. You may be a civilian—a lady, perhaps—and you don't know how a man feels when exposed to the inclemency of the weather—his feet wet and cold—his clothes damp, and a chill wind penetrating them! Under circumstances like these "something," dear reader, is of inconceivable service, warming one up, and making one feel good generally.  (Hill 227.)

Wartime view of officers drinking in a sutler's tent by Arthur Lumley (courtesy of Library of Congress).

Not all liquor was taken from army trains at the railroad junction.  One sutler smuggled hard cider into camp and offered the drink at a price of ten cents a glass.  Even this supply was not safe from the Pennsylvania boys.  A few enterprising men cut a hole in the sutler's tent from behind, tapped the back side of the barrel, and sold two times the cider for half the price.  According to Evan Woodward of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves, these soldiers were "liberally patronized" and soon drained the barrel of cider.  (Woodward 92.)

Thankfully for the sake of military discipline and sobriety, the Pennsylvania Reserves soon resumed their march.  On April 17, John F. Reynold's brigade struck camp and moved along the Orange & Alexandria Railroad towards Catlett's Station.  (OR, 1:12:3, 80; Sypher 174.)  The brigades of George Meade and E.O.C. Ord joined the advance the next day.  (OR, 1:12:3, 85; Sypher 174.)  By the start of May, the Pennsylvania Reserves had marched to Falmouth, across the Rappahannock from Fredericksburg.  In June, the men would join the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula. Amidst the carnage of the Seven Days, many soldiers from the Reserves would probably have given anything to be back in Manassas, enjoying a bottle of whiskey with their comrades.

Note
*The whiskey supply mentioned here was likely the same one discussed above in connection with the Bucktails episode.

Sources
Columbia Spy, Apr. 26, 1862; A.F. Hill, Our Boys: The Personal Experiences of a Soldier in the Army of the Potomac (1864); New York Times, Apr. 11, 1862; Philadelphia Press, Apr. 25, 1862; J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Edward Morrison Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

The Pennsylvania Reserves on the Move (Again): McCall's Division Heads to Manassas

The last time we visited Gen. George McCall's Pennsylvania Reserves, they had just settled into camp near Alexandria after passing several months in Langley. As part of Gen. Irvin McDowell's First Corps, the Reserves waited for orders to go to the Peninsula with the rest of the Army of the Potomac.  Instead, on April 4, 1862, the First Corps was detached from Gen. George McClellan's command and retained for the defenses of Washington as part of the newly-created Department of the Rappahannock.  McDowell, who was placed in charge of the department, wasted little time in sending his troops south along the Orange & Alexandria (O&A) Railroad.

Rufus King's division marched first on April 4.  McCall was not far behind.  On April 8, McDowell ordered McCall's division to advance to Manassas the following day.  The artillery and cavalry were to proceed "via Fairfax Court-House and Centreville," while the infantry was to move "by rail."  (OR, 1:12:3, 61.)

Gen. John F. Reynolds, commander of the First Brigade, Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (courtesy of Wikipedia).  Reynolds would rise to lead the First Corps, Army of the Potomac.  He was killed at Gettysburg on July 1, 1863.

Gen. John F. Reynold's brigade was chosen to go first.  On the morning of April 9, his men struck camp and marched "in the midst of a furious storm of mingled rain and hail" to a point along the O&A Railroad outside of Alexandria.  (Soger Boy, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)  As Orrin Stebbins of the Bucktail regiment (13th Pennsylvania Reserves) wrote to his local paper:

We traveled three miles [from camp] in the mud boot deep and the cold wind beating the frozen rain into our faces, and wetting our clothes to freeze during the day.  We arrived at the cars about noon--stood in the storm and mud two hours, then piled into or on them five or seven deep, sat there two hours longer, then the old engine gave a few snorts and began to move off.  (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)*

Some of Reynold's soldiers were unlucky enough to ride in open cars, where they were exposed to the harsh weather on the way to Manassas.  Still others, including some men from the 5th and 8th Pennsylvania Reserves, were forced to spend the night waiting for additional transportation to arrive.  As Maj. George Dare of the 5th Pennsylvania Reserves recalled, the men sought "what comforts they could find in a few vacant houses, while others were without any other shelter than their blankets."  (Phila. Press, Apr. 25, 1862.)

The soldiers who managed to find space on the rail cars complained of the slow, arduous journey to Manassas.  Stebbins felt that the railroad was "the poorest and. . . steepest grade of any I ever saw." (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)  Another Bucktail going by the pen name "Soger Boy" told the Wellsboro Agitator:

I have seen and been on what were considered slow coaches in the railroad line, but the Orange and Alexandria road can take my hat.  This must have been the Railroad the chap referred to when he said they had to put the cow-catcher on behind to keep the cattle from running over the train.  (Soger Boy, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)

The bad weather continued unchecked as the train crawled towards its destination.  Snow was falling at a rapid clip.  By the time the trains arrived near Manassas late that night, the men had suffered through damp, freezing weather for hours on end.  As Stebbins recalled, "[t]his was the harshest storm I ever saw in the South."  (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)  He was nonetheless confident that the army brass had not made the men suffer unnecessarily:

It is useless to say that there was some tall swearing at those high in command for moving an army in such a storm to lie idle in good weather, but of course they had good reasons for doing so, for I have no reason to think that they wish to expose our lives and health without an object.  (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)

Reynold's men gladly left the train cars about two miles beyond Bull Run.  Here the soldiers discovered winter huts that the Confederates had abandoned when they left Manassas back in March.  As Evan Woodward of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves remembered:

We had anticipated a hard night of it, in the open fields without fires, so these proved a perfect god-send to us, as the snow was deep and the storm was raging with fury, and many of the men had been exposed through the day on platform cars, so closely huddled together that they could hardly move. We were in the cabins but a few moments before bright crackling fires were burning in the ample chimney-places and we were partaking of a bountiful supper of hot coffee, crackers and junk.  (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 90.)

The snowfall continued overnight and by the next morning, five inches coated the ground.  Reynolds men formed at 8 a.m. and marched three miles south along the O&A Railroad.  Passing through Manassas Junction, the soldiers observed the ruin that the Confederates had left behind.  Stebbins described the scene of what he perceived as a hasty retreat:

The whole country was one vast field of destruction--one barren desert, covered only with sham forts, rifle pits, barrels filled with sand, old wagons, broken down engines and cars, chimneys and walls of burnt buildings, dead horses, piles of burned cracker barrels, coffins, tomb stones and monuments of every kind and description that a panic-stricken would value less than life. . . .  (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862.)

The men continued their march and finally set up camp near the edge of a pine forest outside of the railroad junction.  The units who were left behind in Alexandria boarded cars that day for Manassas and joined their fellow soldiers in camp.

Meanwhile, McCall's Second Brigade under Gen. George G. Meade and Third Brigade under Gen. E.O.C. Ord learned that they would be advancing to Manassas by foot.  Meade, seemingly pleased with the news, wrote to his wife:

The bad storm we have had has ceased, and the weather looks favorable, so that the change from being cooped up in cars to marching is agreeable.  (Meade 258.)

Considering the logistical difficulties of going by rail, the change in plans was a wise one.  On April 11, the two brigades left Alexandria and marched down the Little River Turnpike.**  That night the men encamped about three miles beyond Fairfax Court House.  The next day the two brigades moved through Centreville and prepared their dinner along Bull Run. They joined the rest of the division outside Manassas that evening.  McCall's men would remain in the area for almost a week before bidding the region good-bye. 

Up Next
My next post will look at the the Pennsylvania Reserves in camp at Manassas.  I hope readers will indulge my recent obsession with the Reserves.  I have followed their adventures and exploits while at Langley, so it was only natural that I picked up the trail once they left.  Of course, this blog is not just about the Reserves, so my next post will be the last one on McCall's men for the time being, until they move back into the geographic space covered by this blog.

Notes
*Sources indicate that Reynold's brigade set out from Alexandria some time between  three and five that afternoon.  (Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862; Meade 257; Phila. Press, Apr. 25, 1862; Woodward, Our Campaigns, 89.) 

**J.R. Sypher's classic history of the Pennsylvania Reserves indicates that the entire division moved to Manassas on April 9, 1862, but most sources, including letters written around the time of the advance, confirm that Meade and Ord's men marched from camp near Alexandria on April 11, 1862 and arrived in Manassas the next day.  (Hardin 23; Meade 258-59; Soger Boy, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862; Sypher 172-73; Woodward, Third Reserve, 68.)

Sources
Col. Crockett, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862; M.D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); A.F. Hill, Our Boys: The Personal Experiences of a Soldier in the Army of the Potomac (1864); George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1 (1913); Alan T. Nolan, The Iron Brigade: A Military History (1994 ed.); Phila. Press, Apr. 25, 1862; Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); Soger Boy, Wellsboro Agitator, Apr. 23, 1862; J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Edward Morrison Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Edward Morrison Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

Farewell to Centreville: Johnston Takes the Army South

Last week I examined the extensive preparations that Gen. Joseph Johnston made to evacuate the Confederate lines around Centreville.  Concerned about enemy activity in the region, and facing a multitude of logistical challenges, Johnston began to transport supplies to Gordonsville on February 22, 1862.  His efforts continued into March.  Johnston was consumed with worry that he might not be able to pull it all off before Gen. George McClellan had the opportunity to strike first, and he made sure that President Jefferson Davis heard about the numerous difficulties that plagued his every move.

Johnston Finally Issues the Order to Withdraw

On March 5, Johnston got word of increased Union activity across the Potomac from Gen. W.H.C. Whiting's division at Dumfries.  This was all that Johnston needed to hear.  The cautious general was convinced that a Union attempt to turn his right flank was a real and imminent possibility.  (In fact, Confederate scouts had merely picked up on movement associated with an aborted plan to attack the Confederate batteries blockading the lower Potomac.) Johnston issued orders for the army to withdraw from Northern Virginia.  As for any stores remaining in Manassas and elsewhere, the commander felt that "the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.) 

Johnston directed Whiting to fall back to Fredericksburg on the morning of March 7.  D.H. Hill was to take his brigade from Leesburg on the same day and move south of the Rappahannock River.  The four divisions encamped around Centreville received orders to withdraw on the morning of Saturday, March 8.  Given the large amount of supplies remaining at Manassas Junction, Johnston decided to delay the evacuation so that the army had a little more time to collect as much as possible from the depots before moving out.  The baggage trains were sent ahead of the divisions, and on Sunday evening, March 9, the divisions finally got underway and slipped into the night.  (OR, 1:5, 526-27; Johnston, Narrative, 102-03.)

Despite Johnston's efforts, a large amount of provisions and other supplies remained at Manassas.  The soldiers were given permission to take what they could carry as they moved through the railroad junction.  Many soldiers helped themselves to food and whiskey for the long march ahead.  Civilians were also invited to come in and take what they could before the remainder was destroyed.  

The Confederates Move Out and "Little Mac" Moves In

The divisions of James Longstreet and G.W. Smith moved southwest along the Warrenton Turnpike, while divisions under Richard Ewell and Jubal Early followed the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.  Longstreet's division alone stretched "4 or 5 miles," and the wagon train "was at least three miles in length."  (in Cutrer 82.)

Johnston dispatched Jeb Stuart's cavalry to screen the retreat and act as a rear guard.  The troopers made sure that nothing at Manassas remained for the Union Army.  They wasted no time in torching the storehouses and other railroad buildings.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, wrote home about the losses:

You can form no idea of the amount of stores, etc. that could not be moved back, and which it was necessary to destroy, not only public but private stores.  There was at least one million dollars worth of heavy baggage belonging to the soldiers which it was impossible to get away.

We burned several thousand barrels of flour, a great deal of corn, hay, etc., and at least one million pounds of bacon. . . . (in Cutrer 81.)

Trooper William Blackford, who played a role in destroying the remaining supplies, remembered that "the smell of fried bacon was wafted for twenty miles."  (Blackford 60.)  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia spoke for many men when he lamented that "[o]ur regiment, although it could ill afford the loss, had to give up most of its baggage."  (Warfield 67.)

"Bull Run, Virginia. Ruins of Stone Bridge," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Barnard and James Gibson, who worked for Matthew Brady's studio in Washington, headed to Manassas and Centreville following the Confederate evacuation.  The two men and their assistants have left a priceless photographic record of the destruction associated with the withdrawal.

"Centreville, Virginia. Quaker Gun," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Union forces occupying Centreville after the retreat found that the Confederates had armed some fortifications with wooden cannon.  The story of the so-called "Quaker guns" reached the Northern papers and proved an embarrassment to McClellan.

The Confederate losses were not confined to Centreville and Manassas.  Johnston destroyed a meat packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap whose existence had given him a bit of heartburn as he prepared to evacuate.  The Confederates also blew up the Stone Bridge at Bull Run to delay any Yankees who dared to pursue.  Most significantly, Johnston was forced to abandon the heavy artillery along the lower Potomac.  Many of the guns were destroyed by the retreating Confederates, although the Union Army later managed to salvage some of the pieces.

"Manassas, Va. Orange and Alexandria Railroad Wrecked by Retreating Confederates," by George Barnard & James Gibson (courtesy of Library of Congress).  According to photographer Alexander Gardner, the Confederates burned a railroad bridge south of Manassas before two trains were moved to safety.  The Confederates set fire to the trains, and only six cars survived.  This photograph shows one of the damaged locomotives, as well as the remaining cars.   Ruins of various buildings are visible to the left.

Before long, McClellan received news about an alleged Confederate withdrawal and ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance.  Johnston, however, was long gone when the Union Army entered Centreville and Manassas on March 10.  The New York Times reported that the junction "presented a scene of the utmost desolation, a mass of charred and blackened ruins."  (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)  Burned railcars smoldered on the tracks.  Union soldiers found abandoned knives, sabers, clothing, tents, and other equipment.  The Philadelphia Press observed that "[b]etween Centreville and Manassas the road was strewn with hundreds of dead horses, who had evidently died of starvation."  (Phila. Press, March 13, 1862.)  The Confederates were soon replaced by fugitive slaves, who fled in "droves" to the newly established Union lines around Manassas. (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)

Johnston Surprises President Davis

As Union troops occupied Manassas, Johnston's men continued their march unmolested.  Goree told his mother that "we had a great deal of bad weather," but at least the men experienced "very little sickness."  (in Cutrer 82.)  The four divisions that had set out from Centreville finally crossed the Rappahannock on March 11.  Longstreet and Smith pushed on to Culpeper Court House, while Ewell and Early set up camp close to the river on either side of the O&A Railroad.  (Johnston, Narrative, 103-04.)

On March 13, Johnston finally informed Davis of the withdrawal of his army from Centreville.  Perhaps Johnston's tardiness in reporting the date of the evacuation stemmed from his fears about a leak, but his behavior also smacks of passive-aggressiveness.  The news took the Confederate President by surprise.  In fact, on the very day after the evacuation, he had written to Johnston that reinforcements were on the way.  (OR, 1:5, 1096.)  Davis appeared particularly upset by the abandonment of supplies:

'Tis true I have many of alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat; but, having heard of no cause of such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. (OR, 1:5, 527.)

Johnston refused to shoulder any of the blame for the supplies that he left behind.  After all, he had warned Richmond about stockpiling massive amounts of provisions at the front.  When all was said and done, out of more than 5 million pounds of provisions, "[a]bout one million pounds . . . was abandoned, and half as much more was spoiled for want of shelter."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.)   In any event, the Confederate government had "collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted" and was "responsible for the losses." (Johnston, B&L, 257.)  Goree privately agreed, writing on March 23, 1862 that "the authorities at Richmond are to blame for permitting such a vast amount of stores to accumulate upon us," despite Johnston's protests "time and again."  (in Cutrer 82.)

The Confederate Army's adventures around Washington were finished for now.  At one time, the lines had extended all the way to Munson's Hill, where the advanced outposts could see the unfinished dome of the Capitol.  Johnston pulled his men back once, and then again, where they settled down for a long winter in Centreville.  As spring approached, Johnston left the region altogether, and prepared to defend Richmond from a more feasible location.  The ball was now in Little Mac's court.

Sources
George B. Abdill, Civil War Railroads: A Pictorial Story of the War Between the States, 1861-1865 (1999 ed.); Gary E. Aldeman, Manassas Battlefield Then & Now: Historic Photography at Bull Run (2011); Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); W.W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart (1993); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas H. Goree (1995); Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); New York Times, March 12, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 13, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 14, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 17, 1862; Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox (1996): Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993); Mary Alice Wills, The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C., 1861-1862 (1975).

Johnston Prepares to Leave Centreville: The Logistical Challenges of Withdrawal

Confederate commander Joseph Johnston was summoned to Richmond to confer with President Jefferson Davis in mid-February 1862.  The Confederate President wanted to discuss "the question of withdrawing the army to a less exposed position."  (Johnston, Narrative, 96.)  Johnston left the Confederate lines at Centreville and traveled to Richmond, where on February 19 (or 20, depending on the account), Johnston joined a meeting of Davis and his Cabinet.  Johnston and Davis agreed that the army should fall back to a more defensible position before Federal commander George McClellan launched his anticipated advance into Virginia.   The general, however, argued that current winter conditions were less than optimal for such a move.  The roads were deep with mud and in no shape to transport men and materiel.  The heavy artillery pieces along the lower Potomac at Evansport and other locations presented particular difficulties.  Johnston also worried about the ability of the Orange & Alexandria (O&A) Railroad to move his vast supplies from Manassas Junction to a safer location.

The meeting allegedly lasted around seven hours.  When all was said and done, Johnston left the President's office "with the understanding. . . that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable."  (Johnston, Narrative, 96.)  Davis walked away with a somewhat different interpretation of what was agreed.  He had given Johnston the discretion as to the exact timing of a general withdrawal, but seemed to think that an evacuation of Centreville was not in the works any time soon.  Instead, he felt that Johnston should wait until a withdrawal was "absolutely necessary."  (Symonds 145.)  It later became evident that Davis even imagined that he might find a way to pull together enough reinforcements to enable Johnston to take the offensive.  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Back at his hotel, Johnston ran into an officer who asked him if  he knew that "the cabinet had been discussing that day the question of withdrawing the army from the line then occupied."  (Johnston, Narrative, 97.)  Likewise, during his return trip, Johnston ran into "an acquaintance from the county of Fauquier, too deaf to hear conversation not intended for his ear, who gave me the same information."  (Johnston, Narrative, 97.)  Johnston was alarmed by the leak and likely feared that McClellan would get word of the Confederate plans before he had time to act.

Arriving in Centreville on February 21, Johnston immediately set to work preparing for the evacuation of the Centreville line.  On February 22, he issued orders to "the chiefs of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments to remove the military property in the depots at Manassas Junction and its dependencies, to Gordonsville, as quickly as possible. . . ."  (Johnston, Narrative 97.)  Johnston also directed the president and superintendent of the O&A Railroad to work the network "to its utmost capacity" for the purpose of transporting the army's supplies. (Johnston, Narrative 97.)  At the same time, Johnston informed his divisional commanders to prepare "in a quiet way" for the evacuation.  (Early 53.)

Johnston faced a daunting task.  The Confederates had accumulated mountains of supplies while staying a Centreville.  Johnston only needed around 1.5 million pounds of provisions on hand, enough to feed his army for fifteen days.  He tried throughout January 1862 to limit the food that Richmond was sending his way, but to no avail.  Now he had stores of around 3 million pounds.  The government had also constructed a meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap without Johnston's knowledge.  That facility possessed 2 million pounds of cured meat, as well as extensive herds of cattle and pigs, that were in danger of falling into Union hands if not shipped away or destroyed.   

Aside from Confederate commissary and quartermaster stores, Johnston had to deal with the clothing and provisions that state governments had forwarded to the front at Centreville.  Private baggage presented another difficulty.  As Gen. Jubal Early recalled:

Owing to the fact that our army had remained stationary so long, and the inexperience in campaigning of our troops, there had been a vast accumulation of private baggage by both officers and men. . . .

After the confidential instructions for the evacuation were given, I tried to persuade all my officers to send all their baggage not capable of being easily transported and for which they did not have immediate necessary use, on the railroad to some place in the rear out of all danger, but the most that I could accomplish was to get them to send it to Manassas Junction. This was generally the case with the whole army, and the consequence was that a vast amount of trunks and other private baggage was accumulated at the Junction at the last moment, for which it was impossible to find any transportation. (Early 53.)

Johnston soon vented to Davis about the situation.  On February 25, he wrote:

The accumulation of subsistence stores at Manassas is now a great evil. The Commissary-General was requested more than once to suspend those supplies. A very extensive meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare is also a great incumbrance. The great quantities of personal property in our camps is a still greater one. Much of both kinds of property must be sacrificed in the contemplated movements.  (OR, 1:5, 1081.)

Davis sent Johnston a pointed response on February 28:

The subsistence stores should, when removed, be placed in position to answer your future wants; those cannot be determined until you have furnished definite information as to your plans, especially the line to which you would remove in the contingency of retiring. The Commissary-General had previously stopped further shipments to your army, and gives satisfactory reasons for the establishment of a packing establishment at Thoroughfare.  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

Given the state of the muddy roads, the rails were the best option for moving the large quantity of supplies from Centreville.  Johnston, however, worried that the railroad was not up to the task.  The commander complained to Davis of the "wretched mismanagement" of the line.  (OR, 1:5, 1083)  By the start of March, Johnston expressed his concern to Davis that "[t]he removal of public property goes on with painful slowness, because, as the officers employed in it report, sufficient number of cars and engines cannot be had."  (OR, 1:5, 1088.)  A.C. Myers, the Quartermaster General, disputed Johnston's claim.  He told Davis that all cars and engines from the O&A Railroad, the Manassas Gap Railroad, and the Virginia Central Railroad were "in use at Manassas," and that "no further increase can be made."  (OR, 1:5, 1093.)  In any event, the system was stretched to capacity, causing innumerable delays, and could not handle much more.

Johnston also remained concerned about his ability to remove the big guns blockading the Potomac and feared that the army would be forced to abandon them in the withdrawal.  Davis was obviously dissatisfied with the commanding general's assessment.  He urged Johnston that "[w]hatever can be should be done to avoid the loss of those guns."  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

To make matters worse, Johnston's scouts were picking up increased Union activity.  On February 22, he reported to Davis:

The enemy may not allow us much time for changes of position. He has been more active than usual lately. It is reported that a picket of 8 men was captured this morning near Fairfax Court-House. Reconnaissances on the Lower Occoquan and on the Potomac have been frequent, the latter in balloons as well as boats. (OR, 1:5, 1079).

A few days later, on February 28, Johnston learned that "the enemy is in force at Harper's Ferry, having crossed the Potomac on a pontoon bridge."  (OR, 1:5, 1083.)  He warned Davis that "[s]hould they move directly upon Winchester from that point as well as Hancock, our left would be so threatened as to compel the movement you have ordered without further delay."  (OR, 1:5, 1083.)  Johnston's now sensed danger on both his flanks.  As March got underway, the cautious general surely felt the pressure to complete his plans for withdrawal as expeditiously as possible.  If only those pesky logsitics weren't so difficult!

Sources
Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run,"  Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campagin (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993).