The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia: The Path to Gettysburg

This past spring I wrote a four-part series on the return of the Pennsylvania Reserves to Northern Virginia at the start of 1863. This storied division had experienced heavy losses during the previous year's fighting, and after political intervention by top-ranking generals and Pennsylvania's own governor, the Reserves were sent to the defenses of Washington to rest and recruit. As June 1863 began, the division was scattered across Northern Virginia and Washington City. The month would end with two-thirds of the division on the march north to join the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederates.

A New Commander and a Return to the Old Dominion

On June 1, 1863, Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington, named Gen. Samuel W. Crawford to replace Col. Horatio G. Sickel at the head of the First and Third Brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (OR, 1:51:1, 1043.) The Second Brigade was to remain attached to the Military District of Alexandria. Heintzelman ordered Crawford to make his headquarters at Fairfax Station, where the First Brigade was encamped. The Third Brigade, which was performing provost duty in Washington City, was directed to cross the Potomac and proceed to Upton's Hill, not far from Falls Church.*

Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford (courtesy of Library of Congress). Crawford was born in Franklin County, Pennsylvania in 1829. He was the surgeon in charge at Ft. Sumter during the bombardment in April 1861. Crawford joined the Union infantry and rose to brigade command by spring of 1862. He briefly led a Twelfth Corps division at Antietam until being wounded in the thigh. Following his recovery, Crawford was given command of the Pennsylvania Reserves.

On the evening of June 1, the men of the Third Brigade under Col. Joseph W. Fisher marched out of the city "to the sounds of martial music." (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.) The soldiers "were in fine spirits," and "cheered as they passed through [the] streets, glad again to be in the field." (Phila. Press, June 2, 1863.) Spectators along the sidewalk and in hotel windows echoed the soldiers' hurrahs for Ulysses S. Grant, Joseph Hooker, George B. McClellan, William Rosecrans, and other generals. (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.)

Rallying to the Defense of the Keystone State

Events soon took an alarming turn. As talk of a Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania spread, the Reserves grew anxious to leave Northern Virginia and defend their native soil against Lee's army. According to one regimental history, the thought of remaining behind in the defenses of Washington "was rather mortifying." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Officers made entreaties to Washington and Harrisburg to have the Reserves return to the field along with the Army of the Potomac. In one instance, the commander of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves and his fellow officers petitioned Col. William McCandless, head of the First Brigade:

We, the undersigned. . . having learned that our mother State has been invaded by a Confederate force, respectfully ask, that you will, if it be in your power, have us ordered within the borders of our State, for her defence. 

. . . we have more than once met and fought the enemy, when he was at home. We now wish to meet him again where he threatens our homes, our families and our firesides. 

Could our wish in this behalf be realized, we feel confident that we could do some service to the State that sent us to the field, and not diminish, if we could not increase, the lustre that already attaches to our name. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 260.)

McCandless received the petition on June 17 and "forwarded it through the proper channel to Washington." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Meanwhile, Gens. John F. Reynolds and George G. Meade, who had both led the Reserves through the bloody trials of 1862, requested that the War Department transfer the division to their respective army corps. (See, e.g., Sypher 448; Thomson & Rauch 260; Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.)

Col. William McCandless (courtesy of PRVC Historical Society).

At Last! -- Rejoining the Army of the Potomac

The fate of the Reserves became part of the larger question of reinforcing Hooker as he chased down Lee's army. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, worried about keeping the nation's capital safe from a possible Confederate advance, maintained a tight grip on the soldiers belonging to the defenses of Washington. (Coddington 96.) In the end, Halleck relented and agreed to send Hooker around 8,400 infantry reinforcements, including two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (Sears 220.)**

Late on June 23, Hooker directed Crawford "to hold [his] command in readiness to move at very short notice," with ten days' subsistence. (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Pickets were to remain posted "until further orders." (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Less than two days later, Hooker put the Reserves in motion to catch up with the rest of the army, which was already in pursuit of Lee. At 9:30 in the morning on June 25, Crawford was directed to "march with your command to-day, via the Leesburg turnpike, to Edwards Ferry, and, if possible . . . cross the river at that point, should you reach the Ferry in season." (OR, 1:27:3, 309.)

Not long afterwards, Hooker was shocked to learn from Crawford that John P. Slough, military governor of Alexandria, had detained the Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves. He fired off a note to Halleck, demanding that "General Slough be arrested at once" and promising that "charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) Hooker sharply warned Halleck, "You will find, I fear, when it is too late, that the effort to preserve department lines will be fatal to the cause of the country." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) The General-in-Chief wasted no time in brushing aside Hooker's request:

The Second Brigade, to which you refer in your telegram, forms no part of General Crawford's command, which was placed at your orders. No other troops can be withdrawn from the Defenses of Washington. (OR, 1:27:1, 57.)  

That same day, the First and Third Brigades struck camp and began their march from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill.*** The soldiers proceeded as far as the area around Vienna, where they bivouacked for the night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143; Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261). Early the next morning the Reserves resumed their march. The Pennsylvanians moved up the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike, past Dranesville, where many of them had first experienced battle.**** A "violent and constant" rainfall turned the roads into "almost knee-deep" mud. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261.) Despite such miserable conditions, the division reached Goose Creek that night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143.) At daylight on June 27, the Reserves headed a short distance to the Potomac and crossed the river at Edwards Ferry via pontoon bridge. (OR, 1:27:3, 353.) The division pushed through Maryland and arrived that night at the mouth of the Monocacy River, "in spite of the heavy roads." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261; see also OR, 1:27:1, 143.) Finally, on June 28, the Reserves crossed the Monocacy and marched to Ballinger's Creek near Frederick, where they joined the Fifth Corps. (OR, 1:27:1, 144; Hardin 141.)***** By the time the Reserves caught up with the Fifth Corps, Meade had taken command of the Army of the Potomac, and Gen. George Sykes had replaced him at the head of the corps.

Detail of Edwards Ferry, Goose Creek, and vicinity from 1862 Union Army map of Northeastern Virginia (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The Leesburg Turnpike, also visible here, served as the Pennsylvania Reserves main route of march to the crossing at Edwards Ferry.

The Pennsylvania Reserves continued their movement northward through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. The division arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 during the second day of the battle. That evening, the First Brigade drove into the Plum Run Valley and beat back an assault by troops from James Longstreet's corps on the Union left near Little Round Top. Crawford himself seized the colors and led the charge. The division's overall losses at Gettysburg stood at 26 killed, 181 wounded, and 3 missing. (OR, 1:27:1, 180.) The Reserves had proven their mettle once again and made a contribution to the Confederate defeat. Before long, the Pennsylvanians would return with the rest of the army to the familiar soil of the Old Dominion. In this war, there was no staying away.

Notes

*The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves of the Third Brigade were still stationed in Northern Virginia in June, most likely in the vicinity of Vienna or Fairfax Station. (Gibbs 214-15.)

**The other units sent to Hooker from the Department of Washington included a brigade of New Yorkers under Gen. Alexander Hays and the Second Vermont Brigade under Gen. George Stannard. Both brigades would go on to distinguish themselves at Gettysburg. Halleck also agreed to furnish a division of cavalry under Gen. Julius Stahel, as well as artillery units, including the 9th Massachusetts Battery.

***The drive to replenish the ranks of the Reserves while in the defenses of Washington met with little success. (Gibbs 213; Thomson & Rauch 256-57.) The two brigades that set out on June 25 totaled just 3,817 officers and men. (Coddington 98.)

****The Battle of Dranesville took place on December 20, 1861, and pitted a brigade of the Reserves against J.E.B. Stuart's Confederates.

*****The Pennsylvania Reserves officially became the Third Division of the Fifth Corps.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Civil War in the East (on-line database); Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1979 ed.); Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863; Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Martin D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); Harrisburg Daily Patriot and Union, June 27, 1863; Philadelphia Press, June 2, 1863; Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (2003); Jeffrey F. Sherry, "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Hist. Soc.); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

Additional Reading

An excellent and detailed account of the Pennsylvania Reserves' march from Upton's Hill/Fairfax Station to Edwards Ferry, including maps, can be found here, at Craig Swain's Civil War blog, To the Sound of the Guns. Also be sure to check out Craig's on-going series of posts on the march of the Union army through Loudoun County in the days prior to Gettysburg.

For the full story of the Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg, see "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," by James Sherry in Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997.

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part III: Military Duties in and Around Washington

Following a brief interlude, I return this week to the story of the Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia during the first half of 1863. The hard-fighting division had suffered heavy losses in the bloodletting of the previous year. Generals and politicians lobbied tirelessly to have the Reserves sent back to the Keystone State to recuperate and fill their ranks with new recruits. (See Part I.) In the end, the Union Army settled on an alternative course of action designed to accomplish the same goals. (See Part II.)

At the start of February 1863, the division's three brigades boarded transports at Belle Plain, Virginia and headed up the Potomac.* The Reserves were slated to join the newly-formed 22nd Corps of the Department of Washington, composed of soldiers who were assigned to the defense of the nation's capital. On February 7, the Pennsylvanians disembarked at the port of Alexandria and marched towards their old campgrounds around Fairfax Seminary.

Orders finally came on February 10. (OR, 1:51:1, 985.) Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington, directed the First Brigade to proceed to Fairfax Courthouse. The Second Brigade was ordered to Upton's Hill, while the Third Brigade was to occupy Minor's Hill.** The Reserves performed a variety of tasks, from the mundane to the downright dangerous.

Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington and 22nd Corps (courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

The experience of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves was typical of the regiments assigned to the area around Fairfax. The 2nd took the Orange & Alexandria Railroad from Alexandria to Fairfax Station on February 12 and established camp near Fairfax Court House. On February 21 the men received orders to guard the fords across Bull Run. The 2nd's picket line stretched for seven miles. As one regimental historian described duty there:

Our posts at the fords were almost nightly visited by the guerrillas, who exchanged a few shots with the pickets and disappeared. When a shot was fired, not knowing the strength or object of the enemy, the reserve at the post was turned out, and as this occurred several times through the night, the men's sleep was constantly liable to be disturbed. This tour of duty lasted sixteen days, and we were all glad when it was over. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 254.)

During the night of March 8, the 2nd Reserves proceeded to Union Mills and the next day returned to camp at Fairfax. By March 16, the regiment was on the move again. This time they were assigned to dig rifle pits outside town along the road to Centreville. Finally, on March 28, the 2nd marched four miles to Fairfax Station, where the men established a more permanent camp. As May got underway, the partisan rangers became more active, and the 2nd had to contend with intensified attacks on the picket lines and the railroad around Fairfax.

The Bucktails, also from the First Brigade, proceeded to Fairfax on February 12. Here they engaged in picket and scouting duty, dug rifle trenches, cut trees, and buried dead horses. On the night of March 8, Confederate ranger John Mosby captured Gen. Edwin Stoughton in a raid on Fairfax. Accordingly, "to guard against a repetition of such a humiliating experience, the Bucktails were ordered to move their camp closer to the village." (Thomson & Rauch 47.) A regimental history claims that due to this precautionary measure, "Mosby's Rangers did not again penetrate the Union line in that vicinity" while the Bucktails were in Fairfax. (Thomson & Rauch 247.)

The 4th and 7th Pennsylvania Reserves performed guard duty at Camp Convalescent, a few miles from Alexandria along Four Mile Run.*** This massive facility was home to thousands of soldiers recovering from wounds and illnesses. Camp Convalescent consisted of fifty barracks as well as officers' quarters, dining rooms, cook houses, and hospitals.

Period engraving of Camp Convalescent, outside of Alexandria (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery). The camp was new when the Pennsylvania Reserves arrived for guard duty in early 1863. The conditions at the previous camp had become so bad that it earned the nickname, "Camp Misery."

Regiments from the Third Brigade were also detailed to areas outside Minor's Hill. The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves encamped in Vienna near the Alexandria, Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad. Private Lindley H. Addleman described the daily routine in a letter to his sister:

. . .we halve been doing fatigue duty pretty near every day since we came but it is easy [work] Some days we load carrs with cordwood and Some days we on load hay oats and corn and rashions for the cavalry well that is what we halve to do beside camp guarding. (Spelling and grammar as in original.)

The 12th Pennsylvania Reserves were assigned to a spot near the railroad bridge over Bull Run in February and early March. Sergeant Thomas Dick of Company H seemed far from bothered by his routine. As he told his brother in a February 22 letter, "[o]ur duty is not very arduous here." Dick came on duty "about once a week . . .to guard the railroad." The sergeant seemed almost nonchalant about the risks involved:

Have nothing to annoy us but the guerrillas They pop one over occasionally. Major Larimer of the 5th was killed a short time ago while leading a skirmishing party. (Grammar as in original.)

New orders arrived on April 19. Heintzelman directed the Second Brigade, "except the detachment now on duty at the Convalescent Camp," to "report without delay to Brigadier General John P. Slough, military governor of Alexandria." (OR, 1:51:1, 1008.) The commander kept the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves in Vienna, but ordered the remainder of the Third Brigade to report immediately to Gen. J.H. Martindale, the military governor of Washington. The First Brigade remained in Fairfax Court House and environs.

The 3rd Pennsylvania Reserves, along with other regiments in the Second Brigade, contributed to the defense of Alexandria. Following the Union defeat at Chancellorsville in May, earthworks were erected around the city. The 3rd encamped about a mile from the fortifications. An alarm was raised "a number of times, but no enemy appeared." (Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.) Moreover, "upon several occasions," the regiment acted "as a guard to the railroad trains carrying forage to [Joseph] Hooker's army, they going as far as Warrenton Junction." (Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.)

The regiments of the Third Brigade performed provost duty in Washington. The men maintained order and guarded Confederate prisoners and U.S. Government property. Private Benjamin Addleman of the 10th Pennsylvania Reserves and Lindley's brother, was quartered in barracks on East Capitol Hill. In a May 12 letter to his sister, Benjamin reported that "there has been a great many prisoners fetched to Washington from the army of the Potimack." Just the other day, he "helpt to fetch 795 rebls from the wharf. . . ." (Spelling and grammar as in original.) Thomas Dick of the 12th guarded Old Capitol  Prison at the end of May. As he told his sister, "we are off duty two days and on one: It is very nice duty."

Old Capitol Prison, Washington, DC (courtesy of Wikimedia Commons). The building served as the temporary meeting place for Congress (1815-19) after the British burned the Capitol during the War of 1812. Old Capitol Prison held Confederate sympathizers, spies, and prisoners of war. The Supreme Court now sits on this location east of the U.S. Capitol.  

By the start of June 1863, the three brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves were scattered across Northern Virginia and Washington. Since arriving in February, the Pennsylvanians had fended off attacks by partisan rangers, built entrenchments, and performed other necessary but mundane tasks. As one history of the Reserves summed up military life during that time, "picket duty here [was] more arduous than it was with the Army of the Potomac, and altogether the duties were no lighter nor the quarters any better than they were in the active army." (Hardin 137; see also Sypher 434; Thomson & Rauch 245; Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.) Men like Thomas Dick and Lindley Addleman, however, may have begged to differ. Whatever the case, much harder days were only a month away for many of the soldiers.

Notes

*The Pennsylvania Reserves were under the overall command of Col. Horatio G. Sickel. The First Brigade, led by Col. William McCandless, was composed of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 13th (Bucktails) Pennsylvania Reserves. The Second Brigade, under Col. Henry C. Bolinger, was composed of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th Pennsylvania Reserves. The Third Brigade, under Col. Joseph W. Fisher, was composed of the 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves.

**Upton's Hill sits on the Arlington County-Fairfax County boundary. Minor's Hill is a bit farther to the northwest and also straddles the border between the two counties. Both eminences are to the east of Falls Church and northwest of Alexandria. For a period map, see here.

***Camp Convalescent sat on land belonging to the present-day Army-Navy Country Club in Arlington County.

Sources

"Brief History of the 7th Pennsylvania Reserves (36th Infantry)," from Samuel Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865 (1869-71) (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); "Brief History of Company B, 7th Reserves, 'The Biddle Rifles,'" Perry County in the Civil War (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); James G. Barber, Alexandria in the Civil War (1988); Civil War in the East (on-line database); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Martin D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); Ltr. from Benjamin P. Addleman to Sister, May 12, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Lindley H. Addleman to Sister, Apr. 30, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Thomas W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 22, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Thomas W. Dick to Sister, May 31, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Americus Murray to Cousins, Apr. 19, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); "Other Government Buildings: Old Capitol Prison," Mr. Lincoln's White House (website); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

Good Bye to Camps Pierpont and Griffin: The Union Army Moves Out

As frequent readers of this blog are aware, I have devoted considerable attention to the Union Army camps that were established near Langley and Lewinsville, Virginia in October 1861.  After all, I live near the very area in present-day McLean where thousands of blue clad troops spent the first winter of the Civil War.  Camp Griffin served as the base for Gen. William "Baldy" Smith's division, including the famous Vermont Brigade.  The Pennsylvania Reserves under Gen. George A. McCall considered Camp Pierpont their home.

This week marks a 150th anniversary that pales in comparison to the Battle of Pea Ridge and the clash of the ironclads in Hampton Roads.  However, in my quiet little corner of the Civil War universe, the Union Army bid farewell to Lewinsville and Langley.  The units encamped here went on to participate in the storied history of the Army of the Potomac, and many became famous in their own right.  But it was at Camps Pierpont and Griffin that they drilled, paraded, and otherwise prepared for the campaigns ahead.

As I wrote in my last post, Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville and Manassas on March 9, 1862.  Word of the evacuation soon reached Union commander George McClellan in Washington.  That night he issued a general order for the divisions of his army to advance towards Manassas and Centreville.  In the first instance, the commander felt that he "might be able to take advantage of some accident and bring Johnston to battle under favorable circumstances."  (McClellan, Own Story, 222.)  However, recognizing that Johnston may have escaped altogether, McClellan felt that he could also use the advance to "break up the camps, give the troops a little experience in marching and bivouac before finally leaving the old base of supplies, to test the transportation arrangements and get rid of impedimenta, and thus prepare things" for his upcoming campaign.  (McClellan, Own Story, 222.)   As an added bonus, the movement could possibly throw Johnston into a state of confusion about the Union Army's true intentions.

The Vermont Brigade at Camp Griffin learned at midnight that they were to march at three in the morning on March 10.  The men were directed to prepare two days' rations.  The news of an advance "was received with cheers and rejoicing throughout the brigade."  (Benedict 241.)  The Vermonters were finally striking camp, and many soldiers became excited at the thought that they might soon have a chance to fight and defeat the Rebels.  The men raced to ready their knapsacks for the march. They also set fire to equipment and supplies that they could not easily take with them.  Some soldiers even dashed off letters to loved ones back home. 

Camp of the 3rd Vermont at Camp Griffin, Lewinsville, Virginia, by George Houghton (courtesy of Vermont Historical Society)

The brigade assembled with the rest of the division in a large field and set out in a "drizzling rain" at sunrise.  (Benedict 241.)   The snaking column of Smith's division moved through Lewinsville and continued southwest to Vienna, site of an early skirmish in 1861.  The men walked mainly on the side of the road to make way for wagon trains that accompanied the division.  Corporal Dan Mason of the 6th Vermont felt that the rain "made it muddy & hard walking."  (Ltr., Mason to Fiancee, Mar. 31, 1862.)  After a march of around ten miles, the division was halted north of Fairfax Court House at Flint Hill (present-day Oakton).  As the minutes turned into hours, the soldier surely began to wonder what was happening.  Near the end of the day, the Vermont boys heard "a whispered rumor that there was no enemy in front to be attacked."  (Benedict 241-42.)  Disappointed in the news, the men prepared to spend the night at Flint Hill.

The Pennsylvania Reserves at Camp Pierpont received the orders to march around midday on March 10.  As Private A.F. Hill of the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves recalled:

Instantly all was bustle and excitement. Coffee-pots were kicked over; a few extra provisions were thrust into haversacks; knapsacks were hurriedly packed, and in fifteen minutes the regiment was formed. . . .  (Hill 200).

The Bucktail regiment also "broke camp in good spirits."  (Thomson & Rauch 89.)  Just like the Vermonters who had left Camp Griffin that morning, the Pennsylvania boys hoped that they were on their way to fight the enemy. 

McCall's division left Langley around 1 p.m.  As Hill described the departure of the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves, "[t]he band struck up a favorite air, we moved as one man, and uttering one wild farewell cheer, we marched from Camp Pierpont—forever."  (Hill 200.)  The soldiers moved along the Leesburg-Georgetown Turnpike in the direction of Dranesville, a place where many of them had fought the previous December.  The rain soon gave way to clearer weather.  Hill observed that due to the rough conditions of the march, "many extra great-coats, many blankets, and much superfluous clothing were abandoned by the way—left lying at the road-side."  (Hill 201.)

The division continued across Difficult Run.  Around three miles from Dranesville, the men turned left onto a smaller road through the woods and crossed the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike.  Around eight that night, the Pennsylvania Reserves entered the neighborhood of Hunter's Mills (current-day Hunter Mill Road area of Reston), north of Fairfax Court House.  The men had marched around fifteen to eighteen miles since setting out.  As one Bucktail told to a local newspaper a few days later, "[t]his was one of the hardest marches for a short one, that we ever had, and it was worse because we had been confined in camp so long. . . ."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Mar. 19, 1862.)   The division was halted, and the men bivouacked for the night in the cold and damp weather.

Meanwhile, other elements of the Union Army had reached Centreville and Manassas and found that Johnston was long gone.  McClellan considered that "it was now evident, from the information received, that it would be impossible to reach the enemy within a reasonable distance from Washington."  (McClellan, Own Story, 224.)  The commanding general therefore decided to keep his divisions where they stood and returned to planning for his upcoming campaign.   The men sleeping at Flint Hill and Hunter's Mills would have to wait a while longer before they had the chance to beat Joe Johnston.

Up Next:  Life in the camps at Hunter's Mills and Flint Hill.

Sources
Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); George Grenville Benedict, Vermont in the Civil War, Vol. 1, (1886);  M.D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); A.F. Hill, Our Boys: The Personal Experiences of a Soldier in the Army of the Potomac (1864); George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1 (1913); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (1864); Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Vermont Historical Society, On-Line Collection of Letters of Dan Mason; Wellsboro Agitator, March 18, 1862; Paul G. Zeller, The Second Vermont Volunteer Infantry Regiment, 1861-1865 (2002).

Freeman Store and Museum Included on the Virginia Landmarks Register

Readers may recall that I have talked about the Freeman Store in Vienna, Virginia a few times in previous posts. (See here and here, for example.)  At the time of the Civil War, the building was known as Lydecker Store.  The store served as a polling place for the May 23, 1861 vote on the Virginia Ordinance of Secession.  Lydecker's was one of three precincts in Fairfax that voted against secession. 

Thanks to the Fairfax Civil War Facebook page for making me aware that the Virginia Department of Historic Resources (DHR) has placed the store on the Virginia Landmarks Register.  The press release can be found here and the application can be found here. The DHR will now forward the application to the National Park Service for a decision on whether to include the Freeman Store on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).

I would invite readers to take a look at the application, which contains a wealth of information about the store during the Civil War.  I am also honored that my blog was cited in support of the history included in the application. 

Congrats to the Town of Vienna and Historic Vienna, Inc.!  An NRHP listing can't be too far away!  And to readers who haven't visited, I would recommend stopping by this site the next time you are in the area.

Spreading the Word About Local Civil War History: The Patch Platform

This past June, Erica Hendry, editor of the Vienna Patch, contacted me about submitting my blog posts to the Vienna Patch's blog platform.  According to the main Patch website, the Patch platform consists of a series of on-line local news and information sites "run by professional editors, writers, photographers and videographers who live in or near the communities [they] serve."  They are supported by a team in the Patch's New York City headquarters.  I have been a reader of the local Northern Virginia Patches for quite some time and find them to offer thorough and well-written stories on local news and events that I just can't find in the Washington Post.

I gladly accepted Erica's offer to submit posts on the Vienna Patch.  In my mind, running posts on the Patch is like having a syndicated column in a local newspaper.  The editor may make minor corrections, or reject objectionable, inaccurate, or inflammatory material (no worries here!), but the post as published is basically the same one as written and submitted.  In addition, I retain the rights to my material. 

So why this additional platform?  Writing for the Patch will enable me to reach other audiences that I may not necessarily have reached by publishing just on Blogger.  Some people have an interest in the Civil War or local history, but would not necessarily read stand-alone blogs.  The Patch may also help drive content on my blog, as I look for stories that may appeal to the audiences in Vienna, Georgetown, or other nearby areas.

I won't be submitting all my blog posts to the Patch, but when I examine a topic that may be of interest to local readers, I will run that post on the Patch.  My first post in the Vienna Patch appeared just the other day and examines the looting and pillaging that occurred in Northern Virginia when General Irvin McDowell passed through on the way to Bull Run.  (Readers will remember I ran this same post here a couple of weeks ago.)  For the most part, the post on the Patch will be the same as the one that I place here, with a few modifications to fit the Patch format.

Erica also introduced me to other Patch editors in DC and Northern Virginia.  So far, the Georgetown Patch, run by Shaun Courtney, has picked up All Not So Quiet Along the Potomac.  The website recently published a post I did about the Aqueduct Bridge, which ran between Georgetown and Arlington. 

This opportunity shows just how various forms of on-line communication can work together to spread the word about our nation's history.  I certainly look forward to sharing my insights on local Civil War history with the readers of the Patch.

McDowell and Civilians in Northern Virginia: Trying to Do the Right Thing (Part II)

As I discussed earlier this week, by the middle of July 1861 Federal commander Irvin McDowell had already taken several measures to protect civilians in Northern Virginia from the impact of war.  McDowell's orders reflected a conciliationist approach towards non-combatants, but not all men in the ranks shared his view.  As the Union Army prepared to move on the Confederate position near Manassas, the raw, undisciplined recruits would put McDowell's policy to the test.

The Union Army left camp in and around Washington on July 16, 1861 and headed into the heart of Northern Virginia.  During their march over the next couple of days, the Union soldiers grew increasingly unrestrained.  Colonel William T. Sherman commanded the men in his brigade to respect private property and refrain from foraging, but to no avail.  Volunteers ignored his orders, questioned his authority, and took whatever they pleased.  According to one account, Sherman reprimanded a Wisconsin solider for stealing mutton.  The solider countered that he was hungry and asserted that "it was rebel mutton, anyhow."  Sherman arrested the soldier; the mutton, however, was cooked and served to Sherman's staff at mealtime.  (William C. Davis, Battle at Bull Run: A History of the First Major Campaign of the Civil War, p. 96 (1981 ed.); Ethan S. Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas, p. 85 (2002).)

Meanwhile, some soldiers resorted to more drastic forms of pillage.  In Vienna, Federal troops in Brigadier General Daniel Tyler's division ransacked a grocery store that belonged to an alleged secessionist.  The ringleaders were Ohio boys who may have been motivated by a desire to avenge the Confederate attack on their fellow Ohioans in Vienna the month before.  Sergeant Dan Littlefield of the 3rd Michigan "did not think it was right to steal and destroy private property in that manner."  He worried that "if we go through the country that way, many would join the southern [sic] army that otherwise would not."  (excerpted in Steve Soper, The "Glorious Old Third": A History of the Third Michigan Infantry, 1855 to 1927, Ch. 9 (2007).)  McDowell would have agreed.

General William T. Sherman, later in the Civil War (courtesy of Library of Congress).  On the march to Manassas, Sherman tried in vain to keep his soldiers under control.

Around midday on July 17, Colonel David Hunter's division entered Fairfax Court House without a fight.  The soldiers found that the Confederates had abandoned the town and put a torch to a few buildings before retreating.  Some Union troops raised a flag over the courthouse, and then things rapidly deteriorated.  As an ashamed regimental chaplain wrote the following year:

I am sorry to say, that the occupation of Fairfax by our troops was marked, in some instances, by pillage and destruction. Several unoccupied houses were forcibly entered, their furniture injured or smashed to pieces, and many articles stolen and carried away. There was no reason for such wilful destruction of property, and there was no excuse for it. It left enemies behind us, when we might have secured friends. Men, who would have scorned to do such a thing at home, seemed eager and more than ready to lay their hands upon what was not their own. Many things were taken which could not possibly be carried upon the march, and which were thrown aside the next morning, and left upon the road. There was such an element of meanness and of cowardice in all this, that I could not help condemning it then, and I condemn it now. There is some glory in winning a trophy in a fair fight. But the appropriation of private property in a defenceless town, is nothing better than theft. It does not rise even to the dignity of burglary, for that requires a certain amount of courage. (Augustus Woodbury, A Narrative of the Campaign of the First Rhode Island Regiment, in the Spring and Summer of 1861, p. 82 (1862).)

Wartime photo of Fairfax Court House (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Advancing Union troops looted the county seat on July 17, 1861.

Around the same time, Federal soldiers under General Tyler, including Sherman's men, marched into the hamlet of Germantown.  As William Lusk of the 79th New York wrote to his mother, "soon the soldiers were ransacking the houses for food, destroying and burning what they could not use themselves."  However, he was "happy to say the boys in my company had little hand in these doings, as such paltry work finds little countenance from its officers." (William Thompson Lusk, War Letters of William Thompson Lusk, p. 52 (1911).)  A few bad seeds decided to burn down the village, and before long, Germantown was in flames.  

The 69th New York came upon one of the burning houses.  Major Thomas F. Meagher of the 69th, future leader of the Irish Brigade, disavowed any involvement by his men and condemned this spiteful act.  He wrote:

Whose was the scurvy and malignant hand that fired the deserted homestead? It is for the regiments of the Brigade, in advance of the 69th to answer. With them rests the responsibility of this savage riotousness and mischief. The house was doomed irrevocably when the 69th came up. The Irish regiment swept by the blazing ruin, cursing the ruffians who had played the barbarous prank, and maddened with the thought of the disgrace it would bring on the Federal Flag. (Thomas F. Meagher, "The Last Days of the 69th in Virginia," in Michael Cavanaugh, Memoirs of Gen. Thomas Francis Meagher, p. 393 (1892).)

McDowell witnessed what his men had done at Fairfax Court House.  He was angered by the behavior of his men and their blatant disregard for his orders to respect civilian property in Northern Virginia. On July 18, McDowell dashed off General Orders No. 18 (OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp, 743-44), in which he began:

It is with the deepest mortification the general commanding finds it necessary to reiterate his orders for the preservation of the property of the inhabitant of the district occupied by the troops under his command.

Hardly had we arrived at this place when, to the horror of every right-minded person, several houses were broken open and others were in flames by the act of some of those who, it has been the boast of the loyal, came here to protect the oppressed and free the country from the domination of a hated party.

He followed with a dose of guilt and shame:

The property of this people is at the mercy of troops who we right-fully say are the most intelligent, best-educated, and most law-abiding of any that were ever under arms. But do not, therefore, the acts of yesterday cast the deeper stain upon them? 

It has been claimed by some that their particular corps were not disgraced. This is of but little moment; since the individuals are not found out, we are all alike disgraced.

McDowell adopted measures to stop further acts of plunder and destruction, and reiterated his previous order to protect the civil liberties of the local inhabitants:

Commanders of regiments will select a commissioned officer as regimental provost-marshal, and ten men as a permanent police force under him whose special and sole duty it shall be to preserve the property from depredation, and arrest all wag-doers, of whatever regiment or corps they may be. Any one found committing the slightest depredations, killing pigs or poultry, or trespassing on the property of the inhabitants, will be reported to headquarters, and the least that will be done to them will be to send them to the Alexandria jail. 

It is again ordered that no one shall arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen not in arms at this time, or search or attempt to search any house, or even to enter the same, without permission.

McDowell concluded:

The troops must behave themselves with as much forebearance and propriety as if they were at their own homes.  They are here to fight the enemies of the country, not to judge and punish the unarmed and helpless, however guilty they may be.  When necessary, that will be done by the proper persons.

The commander once again proved his commitment to a policy of conciliation, and we know that at least some Federal volunteers like Lusk, Meagher, and Woodbury were more than likely pleased with the renewed effort to impose discipline.  In any event, the army was soon on the march again, and within a few days it engaged the Confederates on the battlefield of Bull Run.  The war was going to be a long one after all, and as the months turned into years, McDowell's early attempts to restrain his troops and protect civilian property looked almost quaint. Unfortunately for the residents of Northern Virginia, the war and Union occupation would mar the countryside and transform everyday life, and the Bull Run Campaign was just the beginning.

Reenactment of the Battle of Vienna

This past Saturday I convinced my wife to accompany me to the reenactment of the Battle of Vienna before heading out to dinner.  The Town of Vienna, Historic Vienna, Inc., and the Vienna Sesquicentennial Committee sponsored an entire weekend of living history surrounding the 150th anniversary of the battle, including the capstone reenactment on Saturday evening.  Jim Lewis, well-known local historian and member of the Hunter Mill Defense League, provided the public with an overview of the skirmish and narrated the reenactment, which was coordinated by the 5th Regiment ANV and 17th Virginia Infantry Regiment, Company G.
 

Replica locomotive on loan from Strasburg, Virginia.  In a recent post, I examined the Battle of Vienna's key place in railroad history.

Reenactors portraying the 1st Ohio approach Vienna aboard a platform car.  The car was placed on the old railbed of the  Alexandria, Loudoun, & Hampshire R.R., later the Washington & Old Dominion (W&OD) R.R., and now the W&OD Trail.

The reenactment was held on the grounds of the Vienna Community Center, just off the W&OD Trail near the actual site of the 1861 action. Staging the event this close to the original location brought with it a few incongruities, as suburbia has long since established its presence here.  The Town of Strasburg, Virginia, which had earlier conducted a railroad-themed reenactment of its own, donated the use of a replica Civil War locomotive. Of course, the railroad is no longer there, so the organizers had to use a few men to move a flatbed trailer of some sort, which served as a stand-in for one of the platform cars that carried soldiers of the 1st Ohio. As the Union troops were pushed along the old railroad bed in front of the locomotive, the reenactment began with the earth shattering boom of a Confederate canon.  When I heard a few infants in the audience cry, I knew there was a reason I didn't bring along my twin boys!  The reenactors took some degree of historical license as the skirmish unfolded in front of the spectators.  The "battle" ended in about thirty minutes, with the 1st South Carolina driving the 1st Ohio back in the direction of Alexandria. Overall, the event drew a large crowd, and the town once again did a commendable job in educating the public through living history.

The train "pushes" the platform car carrying the men of the 1st Ohio towards Vienna.

A Confederate artillery crew, representing part of Kemper's Battery, prepares to surprise the Yankees on the rail car.

Soldiers from the 1st Ohio rush from the platform car after taking a hit from the Rebel artillery...

...and form a skirmish line.

The 1st South Carolina drives back the Union skirmishers.

The Rumor of "Black Confederates" at Vienna

The topic of so-called "black Confederates" always generates a lot of controversy in the blogosphere.  Although the use of black troops was reluctantly authorized in the dying days of the Confederacy, some groups and individuals erroneously claim that considerable numbers of African-Americans fought for the South during the Civil War. (See, for example, here and here.)   Occasionally, the Battle of Vienna figures on the list of engagements where black Confederates saw action.  (See here and here.)  While researching the skirmish for this week's posts, I decided to dig a little deeper on the issue.  Based on the sources that I reviewed, the veracity of this story seems dubious at best. 

Brigadier General Robert Schenck, the Union commander at Vienna, filed a supplement to his official report of June 18, 1861. (Schenck Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 127.)  According to Schenck, "[a] perfectly reliable Union man, residing in Vienna, [and who] was there during the attack" had come to him with more information about the Confederate force that had engaged the 1st Ohio.  This is the same man, incidentally, who brought six of the Union dead to Schenck's camp in his wagon.  Schenck wrote that the Unionist told  him that the Confederates under Col. Maxcy Gregg had "a body of 150 armed picked negroes, who were posted nearest us in a grain field on our left flank." (emphasis added)  However, Schenck also noted that these men were "not observed by us, as they lay flat in the grain and did not fire a gun."  Overall, based on the Unionist's information, Schenck overestimated the Confederate numbers at Vienna and concluded that "the whole force attacking us was at least 2,000."  (In fact, the Rebels numbered around 750.)

The New York Times also picked up the story about the rumored black soldiers.  In an article on June 18, 1861, the newspaper reported on the estimated strength of the Confederate force at Vienna:

Some of the Ohio men pretend to say that there were 800 South Carolinians present, subsequently reinforced by 600 Virginians from Falls Church.  It is added, moreover, that the Palmettoans had two flank companies of picked negroes, armed with muskets and sabre-bayonets-these sable soldiers acting as servants and pack-horses in time of peace, and as soldiers whenever fighting is the business immediately on hand.

Even the Times disputed this account.  The correspondent concluded that "[t]hese stories, I may add, are not confirmed by any evidence; and there are many of the more incredulous order, who maintain that there never was any larger rebel force near the train than fifty Virginians, using a single field piece under cover of the woods. I confess that the weight of evidence at present would seem to be in favor of this theory."

These accounts have little value as clear-cut evidence that black Confederates actually fought at Vienna.  Schenck, who was also present at the battle, indicated that no one on the Union side observed the blacks.  Given that the original source of the rumor provided Schenck faulty evidence of Southern troop strength, it is not much of a stretch to think that the local Unionist was also mistaken as to the presence of armed blacks.  Col. Gregg, commander of the 1st South Carolina, never mentioned the alleged force of 150 armed African-Americans in his official report on the battle.  (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 128-30.)  And the New York Times, whose source appears to be men from the 1st Ohio, pointed to the lack of evidence backing up the rumors about the Confederate troops at Vienna, including the use of blacks in the battle.

Confederate soldiers in camp with an African-American servant.  This image is of the Clinch Rifles, 5th Georgia Infantry, but based on a report in the OR, it appears that such servants may have accompanied the 1st S.C.  (courtesy of the Georgia Sharpshooters)

All of these primary sources raise questions about what the Unionist saw, if not "150 armed picked negroes."  Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, overall Union commander in the area, forwarded to Union Army headquarters a report from an informant not long after the battle.  The spy, who had surveyed the Confederate lines, observed:

The South Carolina regiments were the best armed and equipped and in high spirits, 'freezing for a fight,' being much elated by the Vienna affair. Negroes with them as servants. (OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 722.) 

It is possible that several slaves accompanied the 1st South Carolina during Gregg's reconnaissance mission and that they took cover in a grain field when the battle erupted in Vienna.  Or maybe the Unionist somehow mistook white soldiers for African-Americans due to the smoke and confusion along the train tracks.  The answer is likely lost to history.  What we do know is that we can place little confidence in the rumors of  black Confederate combatants at the Battle of Vienna.

Historic "Firsts," the Railroad and the Battle of Vienna

The Battle of Vienna is often described as being a historic first, although not everyone agrees on what that first is. A historical marker in Vienna, erected in 1975, describes the action as one in which "a railroad was first used tactically in warfare."  The Vienna Centennial Park marker notes that in 1861, "[f]irst use of a railroad in war occurs in Vienna during the Civil War."  The Strategic Junction marker on Hunter Mill Road explains that the action at Vienna "was the first tactical use of railroad in the war."  The Fairfax County Sesquicentennial website description of the Battle of Vienna concludes that "[t]his would go down in history as the first time a train was engaged in warfare in US history."  So, who is right? What claim does the Battle of Vienna have in the annals of military and railroad history?

Certainly the skirmish in Vienna cannot be considered the first time a railroad was ever used in the history of warfare.  Trains saw some limited use for westward troop movements during the Mexican War (1846-48). The 1st Georgia Infantry, for instance, gathered in Columbus, Georgia in 1846 and marched to Chehaw, Alabama, where they took a train to Montgomery on their way to rendez-vous with other forces gathering along the Rio Grande.  Trains were also used in Europe during the Crimean War (1853-56). In 1855, a railway was constructed from Balaclava to Sevastopol to transport ammunition and other supplies to British and French troops laying siege to the Russians at Sevastopol.


The railroad town of Grafton, occupied by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's troops, 1861.  Note the train at the center of the engraving (courtesy of Wikipedia).


The railroad also saw what was likely its first tactical use in the Civil War a couple of weeks before the June 17, 1861 action at Vienna.  Following the Union seizure of the important rail hub at Grafton, (West) Virginia on the Baltimore & Ohio line in June 1861, Major General George B. McClellan ordered his forces in the area to pursue the retreating Confederates at Philippi.  The movement was designed "[t]o prevent their further outrages upon the railroads or upon the property of loyal citizens." (McClellan Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 65.)  The Union soldiers, starting for Philippi on June 2, advanced in two separate columns.  The part of the force under Col. Benjamin Kelly, numbering around 1,600 men, took the train eastward towards Harpers Ferry to mislead Confederate scouts and pickets as to the intention of the movement.  About six miles from Grafton, Kelly's force left the train cars at Thornton and marched over a little-used road towards Philippi. The Federal troops defeated the Rebel force at a battle on June 3.  Today, the state of West Virginia is proud to proclaim that the "first tactical use of the railroad to move troops to battle" in the Civil War occurred at Grafton on June 2, 1861.  And keep in mind this movement predates the more-often cited tactical use of the rails to move Confederate troops from the Shenandoah Valley to the front at Manassas in mid-July 1861.

Given that railroads had seen use prior to the Civil War, and that a Union force had already employed a railroad for tactical purposes at Philippi, Vienna's "first" must relate to something other than what the historical markers say.  The train at the Battle of Vienna was ambushed, making it inaccurate to speak of "tactical use."  Above all else, the attack on the train at Vienna appears to be the first time a train came under fire in the Civil War, if not in all of U.S. history.  The prize goes to Fairfax County's website for using such a description of the battle.  And it turns out that the Vienna Centennial Park marker gets it at least partially right.  Text on another part of the marker notes, "Though the battle was short, Vienna achieved distinction as the site of the first railroad battle in history."  (Although I am not sure if it was the first in world history, it likely was the first in our nation's history and in the Civil War.)

U.S. Military R.R. locomotives during the Petersburg Campaign, c. 1864-65 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Created in 1862, the U.S.M.R.R. operated a rail network in support of the Union war effort.

Vienna set the stage for the future appearance of railroads in military engagements, such as the Battle of Wentzville, Missouri on July 16-17, 1861, where a train carrying six companies of Union infantry was attacked near Wentzville by Confederate bushwhackers over the course of two days. Trains were also used offensively during the Civil War, including the "dry land Merrimac" train battery employed by the Confederates at Savage's Station in June 1862.

Vienna can rightfully claim a Civil War "first," even if that "first" is not always stated as precisely as it could have been.  The attack on the Union train there reminds us of just how central a role railroads would play during four long years of combat.

Battle of Vienna, June 17, 1861: An Overview

This upcoming Friday marks the 150th anniversary of the so-called "Battle of Vienna." This little-known encounter in Northern Virginia is now getting its fair share of attention, at least in the D.C. area.  The Town of Vienna will even be putting on a reenactment of the battle this Saturday, complete with a locomotive brought in from the Shenandoah Valley.  (More on the train a little later....)  There are some interesting angles to explore in connection with this early action in the Civil War, so I've decided to dedicate the entire week to the skirmish.

General Robert Schenck (courtesy of Library of Congress)

On June 17, 1861, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commander of the Union Department of Northeastern Virginia, ordered Brigadier General Robert Schenck to undertake a reconnaissance mission in the direction of Vienna.  Schenck selected the 1st Ohio, and set out with his troops on the Alexandria, Loudoun, and Hampshire Railroad.  At a wagon crossroads near Falls Church, he relieved the 69th New York with two companies.  He sent two other companies to patrol Falls Church, and dispatched an additional two companies to guard the railroad and bridge between the crossroads and Vienna.  With the remaining four companies of 271 men, Schenck proceeded slowly towards Vienna.  A locomotive pushed the train along the tracks.  Most of the soldiers sat on platform cars, while Schenck rode in a passenger car with Col. Alexander M. McCook, commander of the 1st Ohio.

Col. Maxcy Gregg (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The day before, Col. Maxcy Gregg, head of the 1st South Carolina, was ordered to conduct a reconnaissance towards the Potomac River.  He set out from camp near Fairfax Court House with about 575 soldiers and 70 cavalrymen.  At Frying Pan Church, Gregg met an additional 70 cavalry, as well as an artillery detachment of 34 men and two guns.  The force proceeded towards the Potomac, where on June 17 Gregg "went in person to the bank of the river to reconnoiter," but he "could see but few troops of the enemy, and no boats prepared for crossing the river." (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 129.)   The Confederate troops began the long march back towards camp.  In Vienna, Gregg expected to see the enemy, who had recently sent an expedition to the area, but detecting no Federals, he ordered his men to proceed to Fairfax Court House.  At around 6 p.m., however, "a distant railroad whistle was heard." (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 129.)  As Gregg wrote in his battle report:

I marched the troops back, placing the two 6-pounder guns on the hill commanding the bend of the railroad, immediately supported by Company B, First South Carolina Volunteers. . . . . The rest of the regiment . . . was formed on the crest of the hill to the right of the guns. The cavalry were drawn up still farther to the right. (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 129.)

As the 1st Ohio turned the curve outside of Vienna, the Confederate battery opened fire with shot, shell, and grapeshot.  The first platform car was untouched, but the second and third cars received the deadliest fire.  The train encountered some mechanical difficulties, and the engineer could not pull the train out of range of the guns.  (By some accounts, the breaks had locked when the engineer slammed them at the outset of the attack.)  The soldiers, coming to the realization that they were sitting ducks, "left the cars, and retired to right and left of [the] train through the woods."  (Schenck Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p.126.)  Meanwhile, to Schenck's disgust and amazement, the engineer "instead of retiring slowly, as I ordered, detached his engine with one passenger car from the rest of the disabled train and abandoned us, running to Alexandria." (Schenck Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p.126.) Believing that his force was badly outnumbered by as many as 1,500 Confederates, Schenck threw skirmishers out along his flanks and retired towards Arlington.  Without the train, his men were forced to carry the wounded on litters or in blankets.

Fanciful sketch of the Battle of Vienna, from Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Gregg dispatched two companies to skirmish with the retiring Union soldiers, but seeing that they were slipping out of his grasp, he sent cavalrymen in pursuit.  As Gregg later recounted, "[f]rom the lateness of the hour, however, the nature of the ground, and the start which the enemy had, they could not be overtaken." (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 129.)  He also may have been convinced that he was outnumbered by a larger Union force.  Under orders "to avoid any unnecessary engagement, and not to remain absent from my camp more than one night," Gregg marched his regiment back to Fairfax after burning the railroad cars that were abandoned in Vienna. (Gregg Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 129.)

A Unionist from Vienna eventually loaded six of the dead into his wagon and took them to Schenck's camp.  In all, Schenck reported eight dead and four wounded in the engagement.  The casualties came entirely from Companies G and H, which had been positioned on the second and third rail cars.

In the immediate aftermath of the skirmish, McDowell wanted to move in force upon Vienna.  As he wrote in his official report, "[h]ad the attack not been made, I would not suggest this advance at this time; but now that it has, I think it would not be well for us to seem even to withdraw."  (McDowell Report, OR, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, p. 125.) General-in-Chief Winfield Scott, however, opposed the idea of sending more troops in the direction of the town.  He would soon recall Brigadier General Daniel Tyler from an advanced position at Falls Church, which Scott viewed as too exposed and vulnerable.

The news of the skirmish at Vienna spread across the North. The New York Times was particularly critical of the defeat, which followed closely on the heels of the Union loss at Big Bethel.  According to a June 20, 1861 article, a local man had flagged the train near Vienna and warned the 1st Ohio of an impending disaster, but Schenck did not halt the train or prepare his soldiers for an attack.  (Schenck makes no mention of this episode in his report.)  The Times also questioned the failure of the Union force to send scouts or skirmishers ahead of the train to ascertain any dangers.  As the Times wrote on June 19:

In the present case an entirely inadequate body of men was actually within the enemy's lines, in a railroad train, with no more careful exploration of the country than a traitorous engineer, or an accidental glance from a car-window, might furnish. . . .   Surely, the simplest knowledge of military matters must condemn so heedless a movement as to the last degree reckless and unscientific, and may fairly sit in judgment upon those who planned it. The entire policy of these detached and apparently purposeless expeditions is questionable. If they are understood to be what are technically known as reconnaissances in force, they should have force in the possession of flying-artillery, and dragoons. To enter upon doubtful territory, where the enemy may be in the greatest strength, without precaution, is simply foolhardiness.

Such reporting fed concerns about the preparedness of the Union volunteers camped around Washington.  As journalists dissected the action at Vienna, however, the Union high command was busy contemplating its next move.  

Note on Sources

The Battle at Bull Run by William C. Davis and The Glories of War: Small Battles and Early Heroes of 1861 by Charles P. Polland, Jr. contain fairly detailed accounts of the Battle of Vienna.