A Word from the Management: Some New Formatting and a Busy October

Here at All Not So Quiet Along the Potomac I try to stick to a schedule of two posts per week, or more if I am lucky.  This upcoming month promises to be a busy one for me on both the professional and family fronts.  I also need to work on another Civil War-related project that will take some of my limited free time in the evenings.  All this means that I will likely be posting with less frequency throughout the month of October.  Hopefully things will slow down just a little so that I can get back to a more normal schedule for November.

You may also have noticed that I've made a few relatively subtle changes to the blog. After each post, there is now a tool bar that will enable easier sharing with your friends, family, or colleagues.  I've also added a drop-down archive and have reorganized the order on the left-hand margin of the blog.  (Note too the Civil War Trust badge, which I've been meaning to install for a while now!)  You will see that the post field is a bit wider, so that the text is not scrunched into a narrow column.  The different width will also allow me to post larger sized pictures.  As always, I welcome feedback about the blog, whether content or format.

Thanks for reading!

Ron

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part II

The order came on the evening of September 27, 1861.  Confederate commander Joseph Johnston worried that his current position left his army exposed and vulnerable.  Unless the government in Richmond was prepared to provide the men and materiel for an offensive action, Johnston saw little value in remaining so far forward.  Gen. James Longstreet also reported on the twenty-seventh that he received information that his advanced position would be attacked by "a very strong force in a few days."  (OR, 1:51:2, 317.)  Perhaps this is all Johnston needed to hear.  Rather than risk a possible engagement along the forward line, the commander sent his men packing.  The Confederates occupying Munson's, Mason's, and Upton's Hills, Falls Church, and other advanced positions were told to fall back towards Fairfax Court House.

The withdrawal played out during the course of the night. According to Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, "before midnight we had abandoned all the splendid positions (Mason's, Munson's & Upton's Hills) . . . which we held in front of the enemy and in sight of the Potomac & Washington."  (in Cutrer 47.)   The Confederate Army had surrendered the high ground without a fight.

The 17th Virginia was doing duty in Falls Church when the order came. The regiment marched about three miles outside of town and camped for the night, only to return the next day. The 17th finally left the town for Camp Harrison in Fairfax Court House on the twenty-ninth. A couple soldiers posted a note on the gate to The Falls Church addressed to prospective Union occupiers:

Having been resident denizens of Falls Church for some time, we to-day reluctantly evacuate, not because you intimidate by your presence, but only in obedience to military dictation. We leave you a fire to cook potatoes, also to warm by, as the nights are now uncomfortable on account of their chilling influence.  (in Wallace 22.)

Goree wrote that the Confederates regretted leaving the advanced positions, "not only on account of being so pleasantly situated, but we all liked the excitement which our proximity to the Yankees produced."  (in Cutrer 47.)   He wrongly speculated that "the move was a strategic one, made to try and induce the Yankees to make an advance on us and give us battle in an open field."  (in Cutrer 47.) 



"General McClellan Occupying the Confederate Position at Munson's Hill," from a period engraving (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery).  The Union commander wasted no time in crossing the Potomac and riding out to the front upon learning that the Confederates had withdrawn from the area around Munson's Hill.

Goree's boss was not far off the mark as to Union intentions. Around the time the Confederates were marching towards Fairfax, Maj. Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, ordered Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson to advance from his position around Bailey's Crossroads and seize Munson's and Upton's Hills from the Confederates. Troops from Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division were to support the right flank of Richardson's brigade. On September 28, Federal soldiers stormed the empty Confederate works on Munson's and Upton's Hills without a fight. The capture of Mason's Hill soon followed. As McClellan wrote to his wife on September 29, "The moral effect of this advance will be great & it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, & I hope they have taken their last look at [Washington]." (Sears 104.)  The Confederates, meanwhile, had to determine their next move, but the chances for a fall offensive were not looking so good.

Sources
Russel H. Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command: September 1861-February 1862(2002); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); "Munson's Hill Evacuated by the Rebels," New York Times, Sept. 29, 1861; "The Occupation of Mason's Hill," New York Times, Oct. 2, 1861; Stephen W. Sears (ed.), The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (1989); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Freeman Store and Museum Included on the Virginia Landmarks Register

Readers may recall that I have talked about the Freeman Store in Vienna, Virginia a few times in previous posts. (See here and here, for example.)  At the time of the Civil War, the building was known as Lydecker Store.  The store served as a polling place for the May 23, 1861 vote on the Virginia Ordinance of Secession.  Lydecker's was one of three precincts in Fairfax that voted against secession. 

Thanks to the Fairfax Civil War Facebook page for making me aware that the Virginia Department of Historic Resources (DHR) has placed the store on the Virginia Landmarks Register.  The press release can be found here and the application can be found here. The DHR will now forward the application to the National Park Service for a decision on whether to include the Freeman Store on the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP).

I would invite readers to take a look at the application, which contains a wealth of information about the store during the Civil War.  I am also honored that my blog was cited in support of the history included in the application. 

Congrats to the Town of Vienna and Historic Vienna, Inc.!  An NRHP listing can't be too far away!  And to readers who haven't visited, I would recommend stopping by this site the next time you are in the area.

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part I

As September 1861 drew to a close, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston pondered his next move.  His line stretched from around Flint Hill through Fairfax Court House and Fairfax Station to Sansgter's Crossroads.  The advanced forces of the Confederate Army sat astride Munson's and Mason's Hills, within a few miles of the Union lines and Washington.  The exposed position of the advanced elements worried Johnston, and only a few weeks before, he had vetoed Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard's suggestion for a general advance closer to the Federal capital. 

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Library of Congress)

On September 26, Johnston wrote to Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin in Richmond.  The general noted that his objective in occupying his present position in Northern Virginia was "to remove the troops from the unhealthy atmosphere of the valley of Bull Run and to be ready to turn the enemy's position and advance into Maryland whenever the strength of this army would justify it."  (OR, 1:5, 881.)  However, "the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming the offensive. To do so would require more men and munitions."  (OR, 1:5, 882.)  Johnston put the choice starkly before the Secretary:

We are not now in a strong defensive position either to fight a battle or to hold the enemy in check. The position was occupied for a different purpose. It is now necessary to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line. There are very grave and serious objections to the latter course, and the idea even should not be entertained until after it is finally determined to be impracticable to place this army in such condition as would justify its taking at an early day the active offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The general took aim at the Confederate government's ability to organize for an advance:

The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evansport and length of time required for the collection of those means have given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition to assume the offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

Johnston, for all his doubts, gave the Secretary a chance to prove him wrong:

If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it important that either his excellency the President of the Confederate States, yourself, or some one representing you, should here upon the ground confer with me in regard to this all-important question. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The response from the War Department could not come soon enough.  Johnston's anxieties about the state of Confederate preparedness troubled him, and it was only a matter of hours before Johnston would take action to deal with his army's vulnerabilities.

Lewinsville, Round 2: The Confederates Encounter "Baldy" Smith's Men Once Again

Last year I wrote about a skirmish that occurred in Lewinsville a couple weeks after the better-known encounter there on September 11, 1861. (See here.)  While researching the September 25 engagement, I noticed the lack of sources telling the Confederate side of the story. In fact, the OR does not appear to contain any official Confederate reports on the skirmish. I was left wondering about the identity of the Confederate units who attacked Brig. Gen. "Baldy" Smith's men near the tiny Northern Virginian hamlet. Following additional research, I recently uncovered more about Confederate involvement in this minor and relatively bloodless action. So, for my 150th anniversary post, I'd like to take a closer look at the Confederates who participated in the skirmish at Lewinsville.

Around nine in the morning of September 25, Smith led a Union force of 5,100 infantry, 16 guns, and 150 cavalry on a reconnaissance and foraging mission to Lewinsville. Smith deployed his men and guns along the road from Langley to Lewinsville and directed the quartermaster to start loading his wagons with forage. Not long afterwards, a body of Confederate cavalry appeared just east of Lewinsville. Capt. Thaddeus Mott's artillery opened fire on the troopers and drove them away.  In all likelihood, the cavalry scouts returned to the Confederate advanced line near Falls Church to warn of the Federal expedition.

The Confederates quickly prepared for battle. Gen. James Longstreet assembled a force consisting of the 1st Georgia, 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina, 13th Virginia, 17th Virginia, 1st Virginia Cavalry, and Capt. Thomas Rosser's Washington Artillery of New Orleans. (Gernand 94-95; see also Wallace 21.)*  Three of these units -- the 1st Virginia Cavalry, 13th Virginia, and Washington Artillery -- had fought Smith's men only a few weeks earlier at the first "Battle of Lewinsville."  The soldiers organized around The Falls Church and set out on the road to Lewinsville (likely today's Great Falls Street). The Confederates also loaded all of their wagons and sent them to Fairfax Court House, presumably to avoid capture of supplies in the event of a Union victory.  As Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, told his mother a couple days later, the Confederates were "expecting to have a very severe fight."  (in Cutrer 45.)

By three in the afternoon, Smith had gathered an incredible 90 wagon loads of forage.  The general recalled his skirmishers and sent the wagons back to the Federal lines.  At about 4 p.m., just as Smith's men were preparing for their return to camp, the Confederates struck.  Smith described the opening of the skirmish in his official report:

[W]e could see advancing over the hills from the Falls Church road what seemed to be a large regiment, marching rapidly in close column and others deployed as skirmishers, with the apparent intention of turning our flank. At the same time they opened fire with seemingly one gun on our extreme left, but at too great distance for any effect, which ceased entirely. . . . Their cavalry was seen in small bodies, moving through the corn fields and woods to our left and on the Lewinsville road. (OR, 1:5, 216.)

Rosser, likely realizing that his guns were having little impact, moved them into position to the right of the Union force "at about 2,500 yards," where he opened fire on Mott's section at Mackall's House. (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Federal artillery under Mott and Capt. Charles Griffin answered the Confederate guns.  Some of the Union rounds fell among the infantry gathered at the graveyard of the Lewinsville Presbyterian Church.  The two sides exchanged about 30 rounds before the skirmish ended with little, if any, participation by the infantry.  Smith recalled that "we could see their dust as they retreated on the Falls Church road."  (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Smith's men moved slowly back to camp, where they arrived about seven that evening. 

Thomas L. Rosser, commander of the Confederate artillery at Lewinsville, who rose to become a cavalry general (courtesy of Wikipedia).

The Confederates, however, had not left the scene entirely. Rosser hauled one gun to a hill overlooking the crossroads at Langley and around dusk fired four or five shots.  Smith sent a scout to investigate, but by the time he arrived, the Confederates were gone.  First Sergeant W.H. Andrews of the 1st Georgia remembered that the Confederates returned to Falls Church "as proud as if we had really been in a battle of some consequence."  (in Gernand 95.)

Smith reported that one man was wounded "slightly in the arm" by a bursting shell.  (OR, 1:5, 217.)  Tom Goree wrote to his mother on September 27 that the Union Army "got some of the best of this fight, as they killed one of our men, and took another prisoner, who rode up to them mistaking them for friends."  (in Cutrer 45.)  Andrews' account differs in that he recalled that two men, both from the 2nd South Carolina, were killed during the skirmish.  In all, casualties had been light, just as in the encounter of September 11.

Clearly the armies were restless, and many soldiers must have felt the anticipation of a big battle approaching. Within a period of just two weeks, Confederate and Union forces had clashed at Lewinsville, a village not far from Longstreet's advanced line. The second skirmish involved even greater numbers than the first. As Goree wrote on September 27, "I think, Mother, that the fight will come off somewhere in a very few days. We will either advance or the enemy will." (in Cutrer 45.) The young aide was probably not alone in his sentiments as the two armies headed into the first autumn of the war.

Notes
*According to a first-hand account by First Sergeant W.H. Andrews, his regiment, the 1st Georgia, marched to Lewinsville with the 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina,13th Virginia, "Col. [Jeb] Stuart's Regiment of Black Horse Cavalry" (1st Virginia Cavalry), and Rosser's battery.  (Gernand 95.)  Wallace's history of the 17th Virginia places the 17th at Lewinsville along with the 2nd South Carolina and two guns of the Washington Artillery.  (Wallace 21.)

Sources
"Another Important Reconnoissance [sic] Near Washington," New York Times, Sept. 26, 1861; Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Addendum, September 26, 2011
Thanks to reader Dudley Bokoski for pointing out a reference to the September 25 skirmish at Lewinsville in a report from Gen. James Longstreet in which he blamed Col. Joseph Kershaw of the 2nd S.C. for not striking a decisive blow.  (See OR, 1:51:2, 314.)  As Longstreet said, "I am inclined to think that the failure of the effort is due entirely to Colonel Kershaw's getting on a different road from the one I intended he should have taken. Had he been up to time there is no doubt but there would have been one more Bull Run affair.  As things miscarried, the enemy discovered us in time to get a good start."  Unfortunately, neither Kershaw's nor Stuart's reports of the skirmish survive.

Frank Leslie's and a View of the Area Near Chain Bridge

Part of my Civil War hobby involves collecting Civil War era books and newspapers. I have found that newspapers in particular are an affordable way to own an actual piece of Civil War history. Some relatively well-preserved editions can be purchased for as little as $40, which isn't bad when considering how old they are. A short while ago, I decided it was time to take a look again at what was available on eBay. Unable to resist, I ended up purchasing a January 18, 1862 copy of Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper. 

January 18, 1862 edition of Frank Leslie's.  The top illustration depicts Federal troops moving along the Louisville & Nashville R.R. and the Louisville & Nashville Turnpike in Kentucky, while the bottom one shows Confederate guns firing on Dam No. 5 near Williamsport, Maryland in December 1861.

This edition of Frank Leslie's may strike readers as covering a relatively quiet period in the war out East. There is a brief discussion of the Confederate movement on Dam No. 5 on the Potomac, but other than that, not much of significance had happened. Out West, things were a little more active, and the paper takes a look at Gen. Don Carlos Buell's movements in Kentucky. (The Battle of Mill Springs would actually take place the day following the publication of the paper.)

Sure, I could have purchased editions of Harper's Weekly or Frank Leslie's from far sexier times.  But the main reason I bought the paper has to do with the following illustration:

The title of the lithograph is "New Military Road Near the Chain Bridge, Virginia," based on a sketch by the newspaper's "special artist with the Grand Army of the Potomac." (Click image for a larger view.) The illustration depicts a Federal wagon train descending the Leesburg & Georgetown Turnpike (today's Chain Bridge Road/VA-123). Chain Bridge is off to the left at the bottom of the hill and not depicted here. Ft. Marcy was located not far uphill from the site of the engraving. The new Military Road, which led to Ft. Ethan Allen, veers to the right at the bottom of the hill and crosses over Pimmit Run. The scenery looks today very much like it did then. I'd insert a modern shot, but the late summer foliage is still too thick to make a good comparison. A contemporary map of the area can be found here.

I had seen a few reproductions of this image in books and am now glad to be the owner of an original copy.  I cross over this very ground on my way to Chain Bridge every weekday morning.  This lithograph carries me back to a time when the roads around Northern Virginia served as vital transportation networks for the Union Army.  And it reminds all of us that what may now be mundane commuter roads were once worthy of national attention.

Beauregard Writes to Jefferson Davis About the Affair at Lewinsville

The skirmish at Lewinsville was rather small and inconsequential in the scheme of things, but that didn't stop army commanders from putting their own spin on it.  Union Gen. George McClellan certainly took the opportunity to tell his bosses that the victory meant "no more Bull Run affairs."  Likewise, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard wrote to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond on September 13, 1861.  He boasted:

On the 11th instant we had quite a brisk affair d'avant poste at Lewinsville, between about three hundred men and two pieces of artillery on our part, and on that of the enemy three regiments and eight pieces of artillery, which resulted in their complete rout, with the known loss of about one dozen men killed, wounded, and prisoners.  "Nobody hurt" on our side, not even a horse!*

The claim of a "complete rout" was certainly exaggerated.  Gen."Baldy" Smith's men, under Col. Isaac Stevens, were already getting ready to head back to camp when they were attacked by Col. Jeb Stuart, and the Union force's withdrawal from Lewinsville under fire was a pretty orderly affair.

The home that served as Beauregard's headquarters in Fairfax Court House (courtesy of Library of Congress)

Beauregard added that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's report on the skirmish, which was forthcoming, "does so much credit to Colonel Stuart, of the cavalry."  Beauregard praised both Stuart and Gen. James Longstreet as "two very promising officers."  (Stuart, during this time, was operating as part of Longstreet's command in the Munson's Hill/Mason's Hill area.)  Beauregard informed Davis of his intention to move Longstreet's whole brigade to Falls Church and Gen. Richard Ewell's brigade to Annandale, where they could "support, at a moment's notice, the forces at and about Munson's and Mason's hills." Beauregard himself had just moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court House, "so as to be nearer the scene of operations."

Beauregard was expecting a full-scale Union attack, and the recent Union reconnaissance at Lewinsville had done little to disabuse him of such notions. He warned Davis:

I am under the impression, from all I can learn, that the enemy, whenever ready, will make a strong demonstration in our front, and then endeavor to turn this place, either by Dumfries, on the lower Potomac, or by Leesburg, on the upper Potomac; in either case we ought to be prepared to strike him from Camp Pickens [Manassas] as a centre, for which purpose we must have collected at that point a large depot of provisions and ammunition.

Beauregard used the threat of a possible Federal advance to plug his ideas for army reorganization. He wrote that the Confederate Army of the Potomac "ought to be under one head, with also one head to each of the two corps of said army; for the general-in-chief of such a large force has too much to engross his time and attention, to be able to discharge also the important duties of chief of a corps d'armee."   Davis was to give these suggestions "serious and immediate consideration, as I believe no time is to be lost in this matter."

Beauregard finished his letter with a post script to Davis: "General McClellan is said, by the prisoners, to have been present at Lewinsville." The general must surely have cracked a smile at the image of the Union army commander presiding over the rout of his own forces. The reality, of course, was much different, but McClellan did ride out to meet the Union forces as they returned to camp from Lewinsville.

I have not seen a copy of Davis' response to Beauregard's letter, if there ever was one.  In a few short weeks, however, the Confederate President would travel to Fairfax and confer with his leading generals on issues of organization and strategy. In the meantime, the Confederates would continue to wait and watch along the advanced line near Falls Church and Annandale.

Note
*The Union force of 1,800 men consisted of the 79th New York, four companies of the First Regiment U.S. Chasseurs, two companies of the 2nd Vermont, two companies of the 3rd Vermont, five companies of the 19th Indiana, four guns of Captain Charles Griffin's battery, and a detachment of 50 regular cavalry and 40 volunteer cavalry. A section of Captain Thaddeus Mott's battery was also brought to the front and fired on the Confederates.

Source
The official correspondence cited in this post can be found in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1, p. 477-78 (1884).

The 150th Anniversary of the Battle of Lewinsville

This upcoming Sunday marks the 150th anniversary of the so-called "Battle of Lewinsville." Living right down the street from Lewinsville, which is now a part of McLean, Virginia, I have taken a particular interest in the minor fight that occurred there on September 11, 1861. Not long after starting this blog, I began to research the Battle of Lewinsville and wrote a few posts about some interesting aspects of the engagement.

As a quick recap, on September 11, Union Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith sent a force of about 1,800 men, accompanied by four guns, to conduct reconnaissance at Lewinsville. The soldiers, under the immediate command of Col. Isaac Stevens, left Camp Advance around 7:30 a.m. and arrived in the village about two and a half hours later. Around 2 p.m., the mission was complete, and recall was sounded. As the Union soldiers prepared for their return to camp, over 300 Confederates under the command of Col. J.E.B. Stuart launched an attack from the direction of Falls Church. Heavy artillery dueling ensued as the Union force fell back towards Washington.  Smith himself arrived on the scene with two additional artillery pieces. Both sides claimed victory, and casualties were light.

As we approach the anniversary of the Battle of Lewinsville, I thought I would direct readers to a few posts that I have done on the subject:

*Last summer, I looked at the role the 79th New York "Highlanders" played at Lewinsville. The regiment's story is one of redemption following a disgraceful mutiny in August 1861. See here for a post on how the 79th lost its colors, and see here for a detailed account of the 79th in action at Lewinsville. 

*Jeb Stuart won accolades for his performance at Lewinsville, where he led a small force of the 1st Virgina Cavalry, 13th Virginia Infantry, and two guns of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans against far superior Union numbers.  Stuart apparently lost no men.  Check out this post on how Stuart was promoted to brigadier general in part because of his bold (and some may say reckless) leadership at Lewinsville.

*Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, reacted very favorably to the Union Army's performance at Lewinsville.  In June of last year, I discussed McClellan's boast to President Lincoln on the day of the skirmish.

A few books discuss the Battle of Lewinsville, but I have found some inaccuracies. One book, for example, places the engagement in Vienna, Virginia at the same site as the Confederate attack on the 1st Ohio in June 1861! (See Russel H. Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command: September 1861-February 1862, p. 7 (2002)). The best and most accurate account I have read so far is "A Civil War Action in Lewinsville, Virginia, 11 September 1861," by Edgar R. Hon in the Yearbook of the Historical Society of Fairfax County, Vol. 29 (2003-04). 

Unfortunately, current visitors to Lewinsville have little way of knowing what occurred there 150 years ago. I understand that a Civil War Trails marker or a Fairfax County historical marker commemorating the Battle of Lewinsville is going to be installed in McLean. I will let readers know when I find out more, but such a marker would be a welcome sight. 


A current view of  the Gilbert house, where the Confederate attack on pickets of the 79th New York unfolded at Lewinsville.  Jeb Stuart placed his guns to the right of the house and opened fire on the retiring Union soldiers.  Known today as "Meadowbrook," the home is located in Lewinsville Park off Chain Bridge Road in McLean. The Fairfax County Inventory of Historic Sites lists the date of construction as circa 1860, although according to Carole Herrick's history of McLean, the farmhouse dates to 1847.  The house was damaged during the Civil War, and in 1941, the owners made  numerous additions. Fairfax Country acquired the property in 1973. 


A Word About 9/11

The Battle of Lewinsville, which has always lived in the shadows of the larger engagements of the Civil War, now shares an anniversary date with the tragedy of 9/11.  It is sometimes difficult for us to imagine a battle occurring in a place that has been so transformed since the mid-19th century.  But think how hard it would have been for a soldier at Lewinsville to grasp that in 140 years to the day, a united America would experience one of the most violent and traumatic attacks in the nation's history.  That horrible day ten years ago is still very much with us, both individually and collectively as a country.  I remember distinctly standing on the top floor of my law firm in downtown DC, looking out at the smoking Pentagon across the Potomac.  I remember too not knowing whether the White House, right next door, would be a target for the terrorists.  The fear gripped me, and like hundreds, if not thousands, of others in Washington, I joined the exodus out of town by foot.  I still get choked up just thinking about it all.  As I conclude this post, I'd like to remember all those who lost their lives in the terrorist attacks of a decade ago.  You are in our thoughts and prayers.  America, and the world, will never forget.

Beauregard Urges a General Movement Closer to Washington: Not So Fast!

As September 1861 got underway, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard grew restless.  Some advanced Confederate units were already sitting on the hills outside of Falls Church and Annandale.  But Beauregard, concerned about the vulnerability of the Confederate's forward position and eager to take a more aggressive stance, made a plea to his superior, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.  On September 6, Old Bory wrote a note to Johnston:

I have been reflecting much on our advanced positions since my visit to them, and I think, under the present circumstances, we can neither give them up, nor allow them to be taken from us by a coup de main, or an attack in force, for the effect on the morale of the enemy would be tremendous. From what I saw the other day, our reserves at Fairfax Court-House, and Station (about eight miles back), are too far back to be able to come up in time to the assistance of those advanced positions; hence we must make up our minds, I think, to advance them, for the present at any rate. . . .(in Roman, 476.)

Beauregard recommended moving several brigades forward from their present positions. Most critically, he suggested that Johnston strengthen the advanced positions along the Confederate line at Munson's and Mason's Hill. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, these two prominences had been occupied at the end of August with a relatively small force under Gen. James Longstreet and Col. J.E.B. Stuart. Beauregard wanted Longstreet, who was currently encamped at Fairfax Court House, to move his entire brigade to Munson's Hill.  He recommended that one brigade be sent to Mason's Hill and another to a spot between both hills. Beauregard also urged Johnston to send one brigade to a spot near Vienna, two brigades to Falls Church, two brigades to Annandale, and one brigade to Springfield.

The hero of Ft. Sumter made sure to anticipate Johnston's objections.   He recommended that other brigades "might be put at Centreville, Fairfax Court House and Station, as a second reserve. . . ."  (in Roman, 476.)  These soldiers "might occasionally be moved towards the Potomac to keep the enemy constantly alarmed for the safety of Washington, and to cross Maryland should he send off a large force from Washington to any point on the lower Potomac," where Beauregard anticipated a Union attack.  (in Roman, 476.)

Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard (courtesy of Wikipedia).

Sitting at his writing table in Manassas, Johnston dashed off a reply to Beauregard on the same day. Beauregard's plea for a more aggressive stance did not go over well.  He told Beauregard, in no uncertain terms:

I cannot perceive the advantage of placing ourselves so near the enemy's works as you propose (the line of Munson's and Mason's hills, etc.). They seem to me too strong to be attacked by us with our present means.  We can rely upon sufficient supplies neither of ammunition, ordnance, nor provisions. (Roman, 476.)

Johnston worried that an general advance would "bring on a war of outposts and continual skirmishing, which would gradually improve the United States troops, and so diminish the difference now existing in our favor."  (in Roman, 476.)

The commanding general thought that the Confederates had already gone far enough:

The line of Fairfax Court-House seems to me sufficiently forward for our purposes, and on it our troops are more easily supplied than on the other. An approach to Washington must be by crossing tho Potomac above. For that we want the men and artillery I have asked for. That line, even, is too far from Evansport  [on the lower Potomac], which we must be in position to assist. (in Roman, 476-77.)

Johnston finished with a blunt rebuke of the recent forward movement towards Washington:

I confess that I do not like the present arrangement in front, at Munson's and Mason's hills. In authorizing their occupation I did not mean to have such posts—posts of such maguitnde—established, and now nothing but reluctance to withdraw—to go backward—prevents me from abandoning them.  (in Roman, 477.)

Beauregard had his answer.  A general advance towards Washington was out of the question, and even the current positions had not earned Johnston's confidence.  Beauregard would have to remain satisfied with staying put for the time being.

Source:
The official correspondence cited in this post can be found in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1, p. 473 (1884).

General "Baldy" Smith's Soldiers Enter the Old Dominion State

Long-time readers of this blog may recall that I have devoted considerable attention to the Civil War history of present-day McLean, Virginia.  During the first winter of the war, two Union divisions encamped on the farmlands around Langley and Lewinsville.  As we near the 150th anniversary of various happenings in and around my adopted hometown, I thought readers might be interested in the origins of the Union Army's presence around here.

In some recent posts, I've discussed how the Confederates moved ever closer to the nation's capital during August 1861.  By the end of the month, Confederates were entrenched on the hills near Falls Church, where they could look across the river to Washington and the unfinished Capitol dome.  The Union commander of the Army of the Potomac, Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, was well aware of the Confederates in his midst.  He had already started strengthening the initial defenses of Washington not long after taking charge of the army, but the Virginia side of the Chain Bridge -- around 10 miles from Falls Church and the Confederate line -- was not yet heavily fortified as September got underway.

The strategic situation would soon change.  As McClellan wrote in his memoirs:

On the 3d of Sept., while reviewing troops east of the Capitol, I received dispatches to the effect that the enemy had appeared in force opposite the Chain Bridge and towards Great Falls; also that they were probably on the point of advancing along their whole line. After giving the necessary orders at other points I rode to Gen. [William F. "Baldy"] Smith's headquarters at the Chain Bridge, and determined to move his brigade across the river during the night and to entrench a position on the Virginia side as the surest method of saving the bridge. (McClellan, 95.)

Smith prepared his men for the march to the Old Dominion State.  Starting late at night on September 3, and continuing into September 4, the Union soldiers slipped across the Chain Bridge and climbed the steep incline of the Leesburg & Georgetown Turnpike.  The regiments included the 2nd and 3rd Vermont, 19th Indiana, 33rd and 79th New York, and the 2nd and 5th Wisconsin.  Smith's men stopped a mile or so past Chain Bridge and encamped on high ground not far from Langley, Virginia.

Brig. Gen. William F. "Baldy" Smith (courtesy of Wikipedia).  Smith was born in St. Albans, Vermont in 1824 and graduated from West Point in 1845.  He was instrumental in organizing the famed Vermont Brigade of the Army of the Potomac in 1861.  Smith rose to become a division and corps commander. 

Some of the soldiers thought that McClellan was moving to pounce on the Confederates at Falls Church, but they soon learned that they would be clearing the land and building earthworks and forts.  The men immediately got to work constructing what were to become known as Ft. Marcy, northwest of Chain Bridge, and Ft. Ethan Allen, to the south.*  Both of these strongholds were built on the property of Gilbert Vanderwerken, who owned an omnibus line in Washington and had purchased over 1,300 acres of pastureland in Virginia for his horses.

The men called their new home, "Camp Advance." The name likely originated from the fact that the brigade had moved so far forward into Virginia. (Zeller, 43.)  However, according to another account, "the somewhat formidable title of 'Camp Advance' was given, under the impression that the movement meant a speedy advance upon Richmond." (Benedict, 91-92.)

Smith's men suffered from the endless rain at the start of September. As Alexander Campbell of the 79th New York wrote to his wife on September 6, "[i]t has been damp and dissegreable [sic] weather." (Johnston, 39.) The misery for some soldiers was compounded by the lack of adequate shelter. Both the 2nd Vermont and 5th Wisconsin, and perhaps other regiments, waited about two weeks until they received tents.   

"Gen. Smith's Brigade--from Fort Marcy. Chain Bridge, Va.," by Arthur Lumley, Sept. 1861, sketch for Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper (courtesy of New York Public Library Digital Gallery).  Based on the caption and date, this sketch appears to depict Camp Advance, or a portion of it.  Smith was a brigade commander in September and was still encamped close to Ft. Marcy.  In October 1861, as a division commander, Smith pushed his soldiers to a position that would likely have been farther west than is seen in this sketch.  This view from Ft. Marcy to the encampments beyond is from the western side of the fort.  The Potomac River and Leesburg & Georgetown Turnpike are visible to the right of the sketch.

Close up of above sketch, showing wagons moving down the turnpike with the Potomac River beyond the tents to the right.  This part of the pike is today's VA-123.

Aside from digging entrenchments and felling trees, the men at Camp Advance spent their days on picket duty or on scouting missions in the surrounding countryside.  Occasionally, the soldiers on reconnaissance brought back Confederate prisoners, horses, and contraband.  The men assigned to picket duty also confronted possible dangers, as the Confederates were equally as curious about the Union men who had encamped just over the Chain Bridge and also sent scouting parties to the area.

Detail from an 1862 Union Army map showing the area around Chain Bridge, Ft. Marcy, Ft. Ethan Allen, and Langley (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The encircled portion of the map represents the approximate position of Camp Advance based on the sketch above and first-hand accounts of soldiers from the regiments encamped there.  Today, the area around the camp and Ft. Marcy is bisected by the GW Parkway.

On September 10, President Lincoln, General McClellan, Secretary of War Simon Cameron, and Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin rode out from Washington to pay a visit to the soldiers at Camp Advance.  The men were thrilled to see Old Abe and McClellan, and many soldiers rushed to shake hands with the dignitaries in their presence.  The very next day, some of the men would be tested in battle for the first time.  But for now, they were just happy to have the monotony of camp life broken by a visit from such esteemed guests.

Note

*In his A Report on the Defenses of Washington to the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army, Brevet Major General John Gross Barnard notes that Smith crossed Chain Bridge on September 24, 1861 and began building the two forts.  (p. 14.) The reference to the 24th shows up in several sources, including the well-known work on the defenses of Washington, Mr. Lincoln's Forts.  However, this date is contradicted by numerous primary and secondary sources, which indicate that Smith entered Virginia on September 3-4 and set to work on the forts shortly thereafter.  Perhaps Barnard slipped a "2" before the "4," accidentally, and the mistake stuck!

Sources

Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Wisconsin for the Year Ending September 30th, 1863 (1863); John G. Barnard, A Report on the Defenses of Washington to the Chief of Engineers, U.S. Army (1871); George Grenville Benedict, Vermont in the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1886); Civil War in the East (website with army and unit information); The Civil War Letters of Forrest Little (website); Benjamin Franklin Cooling III & Walton H. Owen II, Mr. Lincoln's Forts: A Guide to the Civil War Defenses of Washington (2010 ed.); Terry A. Johnston, Jr., "Him on the One Side and Me on the Other" (1999) (collection of soldiers' letters);George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); NRHP Nomination Form for Ft. Ethan Allen;  Second Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry (website with soldiers' letters); Kerry A. Trask, Fire Within: A Civil War Narrative from Wisconsin (1995); Vermont in the Civil War (website with unit information); Paul G. Zeller, The Second Vermont Volunteer Infantry Regiment, 1861-1865 (2002).