Farewell to Centreville: Johnston Takes the Army South

Last week I examined the extensive preparations that Gen. Joseph Johnston made to evacuate the Confederate lines around Centreville.  Concerned about enemy activity in the region, and facing a multitude of logistical challenges, Johnston began to transport supplies to Gordonsville on February 22, 1862.  His efforts continued into March.  Johnston was consumed with worry that he might not be able to pull it all off before Gen. George McClellan had the opportunity to strike first, and he made sure that President Jefferson Davis heard about the numerous difficulties that plagued his every move.

Johnston Finally Issues the Order to Withdraw

On March 5, Johnston got word of increased Union activity across the Potomac from Gen. W.H.C. Whiting's division at Dumfries.  This was all that Johnston needed to hear.  The cautious general was convinced that a Union attempt to turn his right flank was a real and imminent possibility.  (In fact, Confederate scouts had merely picked up on movement associated with an aborted plan to attack the Confederate batteries blockading the lower Potomac.) Johnston issued orders for the army to withdraw from Northern Virginia.  As for any stores remaining in Manassas and elsewhere, the commander felt that "the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.) 

Johnston directed Whiting to fall back to Fredericksburg on the morning of March 7.  D.H. Hill was to take his brigade from Leesburg on the same day and move south of the Rappahannock River.  The four divisions encamped around Centreville received orders to withdraw on the morning of Saturday, March 8.  Given the large amount of supplies remaining at Manassas Junction, Johnston decided to delay the evacuation so that the army had a little more time to collect as much as possible from the depots before moving out.  The baggage trains were sent ahead of the divisions, and on Sunday evening, March 9, the divisions finally got underway and slipped into the night.  (OR, 1:5, 526-27; Johnston, Narrative, 102-03.)

Despite Johnston's efforts, a large amount of provisions and other supplies remained at Manassas.  The soldiers were given permission to take what they could carry as they moved through the railroad junction.  Many soldiers helped themselves to food and whiskey for the long march ahead.  Civilians were also invited to come in and take what they could before the remainder was destroyed.  

The Confederates Move Out and "Little Mac" Moves In

The divisions of James Longstreet and G.W. Smith moved southwest along the Warrenton Turnpike, while divisions under Richard Ewell and Jubal Early followed the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.  Longstreet's division alone stretched "4 or 5 miles," and the wagon train "was at least three miles in length."  (in Cutrer 82.)

Johnston dispatched Jeb Stuart's cavalry to screen the retreat and act as a rear guard.  The troopers made sure that nothing at Manassas remained for the Union Army.  They wasted no time in torching the storehouses and other railroad buildings.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, wrote home about the losses:

You can form no idea of the amount of stores, etc. that could not be moved back, and which it was necessary to destroy, not only public but private stores.  There was at least one million dollars worth of heavy baggage belonging to the soldiers which it was impossible to get away.

We burned several thousand barrels of flour, a great deal of corn, hay, etc., and at least one million pounds of bacon. . . . (in Cutrer 81.)

Trooper William Blackford, who played a role in destroying the remaining supplies, remembered that "the smell of fried bacon was wafted for twenty miles."  (Blackford 60.)  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia spoke for many men when he lamented that "[o]ur regiment, although it could ill afford the loss, had to give up most of its baggage."  (Warfield 67.)

"Bull Run, Virginia. Ruins of Stone Bridge," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Barnard and James Gibson, who worked for Matthew Brady's studio in Washington, headed to Manassas and Centreville following the Confederate evacuation.  The two men and their assistants have left a priceless photographic record of the destruction associated with the withdrawal.

"Centreville, Virginia. Quaker Gun," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Union forces occupying Centreville after the retreat found that the Confederates had armed some fortifications with wooden cannon.  The story of the so-called "Quaker guns" reached the Northern papers and proved an embarrassment to McClellan.

The Confederate losses were not confined to Centreville and Manassas.  Johnston destroyed a meat packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap whose existence had given him a bit of heartburn as he prepared to evacuate.  The Confederates also blew up the Stone Bridge at Bull Run to delay any Yankees who dared to pursue.  Most significantly, Johnston was forced to abandon the heavy artillery along the lower Potomac.  Many of the guns were destroyed by the retreating Confederates, although the Union Army later managed to salvage some of the pieces.

"Manassas, Va. Orange and Alexandria Railroad Wrecked by Retreating Confederates," by George Barnard & James Gibson (courtesy of Library of Congress).  According to photographer Alexander Gardner, the Confederates burned a railroad bridge south of Manassas before two trains were moved to safety.  The Confederates set fire to the trains, and only six cars survived.  This photograph shows one of the damaged locomotives, as well as the remaining cars.   Ruins of various buildings are visible to the left.

Before long, McClellan received news about an alleged Confederate withdrawal and ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance.  Johnston, however, was long gone when the Union Army entered Centreville and Manassas on March 10.  The New York Times reported that the junction "presented a scene of the utmost desolation, a mass of charred and blackened ruins."  (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)  Burned railcars smoldered on the tracks.  Union soldiers found abandoned knives, sabers, clothing, tents, and other equipment.  The Philadelphia Press observed that "[b]etween Centreville and Manassas the road was strewn with hundreds of dead horses, who had evidently died of starvation."  (Phila. Press, March 13, 1862.)  The Confederates were soon replaced by fugitive slaves, who fled in "droves" to the newly established Union lines around Manassas. (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)

Johnston Surprises President Davis

As Union troops occupied Manassas, Johnston's men continued their march unmolested.  Goree told his mother that "we had a great deal of bad weather," but at least the men experienced "very little sickness."  (in Cutrer 82.)  The four divisions that had set out from Centreville finally crossed the Rappahannock on March 11.  Longstreet and Smith pushed on to Culpeper Court House, while Ewell and Early set up camp close to the river on either side of the O&A Railroad.  (Johnston, Narrative, 103-04.)

On March 13, Johnston finally informed Davis of the withdrawal of his army from Centreville.  Perhaps Johnston's tardiness in reporting the date of the evacuation stemmed from his fears about a leak, but his behavior also smacks of passive-aggressiveness.  The news took the Confederate President by surprise.  In fact, on the very day after the evacuation, he had written to Johnston that reinforcements were on the way.  (OR, 1:5, 1096.)  Davis appeared particularly upset by the abandonment of supplies:

'Tis true I have many of alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat; but, having heard of no cause of such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. (OR, 1:5, 527.)

Johnston refused to shoulder any of the blame for the supplies that he left behind.  After all, he had warned Richmond about stockpiling massive amounts of provisions at the front.  When all was said and done, out of more than 5 million pounds of provisions, "[a]bout one million pounds . . . was abandoned, and half as much more was spoiled for want of shelter."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.)   In any event, the Confederate government had "collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted" and was "responsible for the losses." (Johnston, B&L, 257.)  Goree privately agreed, writing on March 23, 1862 that "the authorities at Richmond are to blame for permitting such a vast amount of stores to accumulate upon us," despite Johnston's protests "time and again."  (in Cutrer 82.)

The Confederate Army's adventures around Washington were finished for now.  At one time, the lines had extended all the way to Munson's Hill, where the advanced outposts could see the unfinished dome of the Capitol.  Johnston pulled his men back once, and then again, where they settled down for a long winter in Centreville.  As spring approached, Johnston left the region altogether, and prepared to defend Richmond from a more feasible location.  The ball was now in Little Mac's court.

Sources
George B. Abdill, Civil War Railroads: A Pictorial Story of the War Between the States, 1861-1865 (1999 ed.); Gary E. Aldeman, Manassas Battlefield Then & Now: Historic Photography at Bull Run (2011); Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); W.W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart (1993); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas H. Goree (1995); Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); New York Times, March 12, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 13, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 14, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 17, 1862; Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox (1996): Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993); Mary Alice Wills, The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C., 1861-1862 (1975).

The Confederates Return to Dranesville

Tomorrow marks the 150th anniversary of the Battle of Dranesville.  As readers are well aware, I have covered the engagement here and at greater length in an article for the Civil War Trust.  Dranesville shattered the relative calm that had descended on Northern Virginia by December 1861.  Because I have already discussed the battle itself, I thought that I would dedicate a couple posts to what happened in the Union and Confederate ranks following the engagement.

Dranesville was a tactical Union victory, but that didn't stop Brig. Gen. Jeb Stuart from calling the battle a "glorious success" for the Confederates.  (OR, 1:5, 494.)  After all, the Confederate commander had saved his foraging party from falling into the enemy's hands.   Stuart's self-styled triumph, however, had not come without a cost.  Among his four infantry regiments, one battery, and assorted cavalry units, Stuart lost 43 killed, 143 wounded, and eight missing.  The Union suffered only seven killed and 61 wounded.

Following the two-hour fight on December 20, Stuart's force withdrew from the battlefield towards the Alexandria, Loudoun, & Hampshire Railroad.  When it became clear that his men were out of harm's way, Stuart pushed onward to Frying Pan Church.  There, the Confederates took care of their wounded from the engagement. Meanwhile, the 18th Virginia and 9th Georgia were dispatched from the main camp at Centreville to join Stuart at the church.  The regiments arrived at some point early in the morning.

Frying Pan Church, where Stuart cared for his wounded following the battle.  The church, located along present-day Centreville Road in Fairfax County, was built between 1783 and 1791.  The Baptist congregation included both whites and blacks.  The site is preserved and maintained by Fairfax County.  (See here for more information.)

As dawn broke on December 21, Stuart intended to return to Dranesville.  He soon had the 9th Georgia and 18th Virginia organized and on the way.  As a soldier from the 18th Virginia recalled:

We marched briskly along, it being-quite cold, and we therefore felt the more inclined to exert ourselves to give warmth to our bodies. We had no idea of going so far when we started, but were willing to follow Gen. Stuart anywhere, even to the banks of the Potomac. Onward, still onward we went, winding our way up and down circuitous and zigzag roads, which, though wearisome, were in excellent condition, being entirely free from the stiffing influence of dust. (Richmond Daily Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1861.)

Stuart sent his cavalry ahead to ascertain the presence of the enemy.  The scouts reported that the Union had abandoned Dranesville and that several Confederate wounded were left in town.  The Union commander, Brig. Gen. E.O.C. Ord, had lacked a sufficient number of ambulances and was unable to take all of his wounded prisoners with him to Camp Pierpont in Langley. 

Gen. Jeb Stuart (courtesy of National Park Service)

Stuart, desiring to collect his wounded and dead, pushed his men to Dranesville and arrived around 11 a.m.  Outside of town, in a house not far from the scene of the previous day's action, Stuart's men located between eight and ten wounded Confederate soldiers.  According to the soldier from the 18th Virginia, in front of the home "stood several charmingly looking ladies, who very soon became the paramount attraction":

They were kindly attending our wounded . . . .  They say the Yankees were very kind to our wounded, in bringing them to the house; they also left with them a good many bandages, to be used in dressing their wounds. . . .  These ladies with their mothers had come up from their comfortable homes, bringing with them beds and bed clothes. They also prepared soups and such like delicacies suited to the conditions of the wounded.  (Richmond Daily Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1861).

Stuart ordered his men to place the wounded in ambulances for the return to Centreville.  Two of the men were severely injured, and it soon became clear that they could not survive the long trip back.  Stuart reported that "at their own desire and at the surgeon's advice" the two soldiers "were left in charge of the ladies" in Dranesville  (OR, 1:5, 492.) 

The Confederate general also heard wild rumors about the battle from local inhabitants.  The Union force had consisted of "fifteen regiments of infantry, several batteries, and seven companies of cavalry."  (OR, 1:5, 493.)  In fact, Ord had just five regiments of infantry, one battery, and two squadrons of cavalry, but at the time, Stuart was not entirely certain of the size of Ord's force.  (Some locals may have seen the brigades of John Reynolds and George Meade, who had arrived too late to take part in the fight, and overestimated the number engaged on the 20th.)  The residents of Dranesville also informed Stuart that Ord had left with twenty wagon loads of dead and wounded!

Stuart set about the grisly task of collecting the dead from the battlefield.  The soldier from the 18th Virginia witnessed the carnage.  He wrote:

I was horror-struck by the ghastly appearance of the dead, as they lay all besmeared with their own blood, which in the agents of death they had gotten all over their faces, having as soon as shot clapped their hands to the part affected and drawn across their faces; shots of a more deadly character, I never saw.  (Richmond Daily Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1861.) 

Once the wounded and dead were loaded in wagons, Stuart set out for the Confederate lines at Centreville around 4 p.m.  The colonel of the 18th Virginia gave his men the option of stopping for the night, or going the entire way back to camp.  His men agreed to continue the march.  As the soldier from the 18th Virginia wrote to the Daily Dispatch:

[S]ome of our men complained bitterly of sore feet, made so by traveling so much on this hard frozen ground. Some one or two were so lucky as to get a ride on horseback. Others were obliged to remain the over-night, and come in the following (Sunday) morning. No order as to regularity of marching could be maintained, each getting along as best he could. My Captain, myself, and several others were amongst the first to get to camp — how glad were we to get there. We found hot coffee and warm fires. So, drinking the coffee and toasting our feet, we retired for the night.  (Richmond Daily Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1861.)

Back in Centreville, the Confederates attended to their wounded and buried their dead.  The 11th Virginia, which had fought at Dranesville, was brigaded with the 17th Virginia.  The men of the 17th attended the internment of the 11th's dead, "prompted by the friendly feeling that had existed between the two commands ever since the organization of the brigade."  (Warfield 66.)  As Private Edgar Warfield remembered:

The act brought forth from Colonel [Sam] Garland of the Eleventh a beautiful letter, which was read on dress parade, expressing his grateful appreciation of the soldierly friendship which induced our command to unite with them in paying this last tribute of respect to their dead comrades. (Warfield 66.)

The Confederates recovered from their setback at Dranesville and prepared to celebrate the Christmas holiday.  The battle had been an unsettling experience for many soldiers, including those who visited the scene of the fight on the 21st.  But as 1861 drew to a close, much worse awaited Confederate and Union soldiers alike in the upcoming year and beyond.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

National Register of Historic Places Registration Form for Frying Pan Meetinghouse; Richmond Daily Dispatch, Dec. 30, 1861; Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virgina Infantry (1996 ed.).

The 17th Virginia Gets a New Brigade Commander and Settles Into Camp

This blog has traced the history of the 17th Virginia Infantry throughout the first year of the Civil War.  I have taken a particular interest in this regiment given that it was composed of men from across Northern Virginia, including Fairfax County.  By way of a quick recap, the militia companies that eventually formed the 17th  gathered in Alexandria not long after the Virginia Convention voted to secede on April 17, 1861.  They left town when Union forces invaded Virginia the next month.  Assigned to Gen. James Longstreet's brigade, the 17th Virginia played a leading role at Blackburn's Ford on July 18.  Following First Manassas, the 17th moved forward to Centreville and then Fairfax Court House.  The regiment served with Longstreet's advanced forces around Falls Church and at Mason's and Munson's Hills during August and September.  In  mid-October, the regiment fell back to Centreville as part of a general withdrawal of Confederate troops.

Autumn 1861 brought change at the top for the 17th Virginia.  Even before moving to Centreville, the men of the regiment lost their brigade commander.  In mid-October, Longstreet received a promotion to major general. After drilling his men one final time on October 12, Longstreet said his good-byes, and the soldiers responded with a loud cheer for the general who had led them through the Manassas Campaign and the recent picket war.  (Wallace 23.)  The next day Longstreet issued General Order No. 17, in which he  "express[ed] his sincere thanks to the officers and soldiers of the command for the kindly patience, the soldierly fortitude, and the cheerful obedience which they have invariably exhibited during the many hardships and privations of a long and trying campaign."  (Warfield 61.)  He concluded that "[t]he command of a brigade second to none is well worthy the boast of any general, and even regret may well be felt at promotion which removes it a step, at least, from him." (Warfield 61-62.)

Gen. Charles Clark of Mississippi replaced Longstreet, but his tenure at the top was short-lived.  On October 22, not long after the 17th moved to Centreville, the Confederate War Department organized the Department of Northern Virginia out of the forces currently operating in the area stretching from the mouth of the Potomac River to the Shenandoah Valley. The new department's Potomac District was composed of divisions under the command of Earl Van Dorn, Gustavus W. Smith, Longstreet, and Edmund Kirby Smith.  Longstreet's old brigade, including the 17th Virginia, was placed under Gen. Richard S. Ewell and was eventually assigned to Longstreet's new division.

Gen. Richard S. Ewell, the 17th Virginia's new brigade commander (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The 17th Virginia passed the time in Centreville "drilling, mounting Quaker guns, standing picket duty, and doing our part in the details set to the work of throwing up breastworks," but not all was so uneventful.  (Warfield 63.)  In late October, Virginia Governor John Letcher visited Centreville to present the flags of the Commonwealth to the Virginia regiments encamped there.  As Letcher handed a flag to the 17th, he urged the regiment to "[t]ake it, and when you go into Alexandria drive out the invaders of our soil." (Wallace 24.)   The 17th Virginia's commander, Col. Montgomery Corse, promised to plant the flag "on the ramparts of Ft. Ellsworth" in Alexandria, or "the blood of the Seventeenth shall flow freely in the attempt." (Wallace 24.)  The next day the 17th Virginia participated in a grand review of Virginia troops by the governor as spectators crowded the surrounding hills to catch a glimpse of the spectacle. 

Confederate winter quarters at Centreville, VA (courtesy of Library of Congress).  This photograph was taken in March 1862 after the Confederates had abandoned the area.

According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th, "the night of November 1 we experienced one of the most terrific storms of wind, rain, and hail that we had to contend with during the war."  (Warfield 64.)  Warfield recalled:

The storm continued throughout the night.  Every tent in the camp except two was thrown down and the contents were scattered.  The storm did not cease until the afternoon of the 2nd, and during that time the men were without shelter, thoroughly drenched, and unable to cook their meals.  (Warfield 64.)

Conditions improved by the end of the month, when the 17th began to construct log cabins in preparation for winter.*  The men of the regiment cut trees and brought them to camp in the quartermaster's wagons.  One soldier considered this work "the hardest I ever performed."  (Wallace 24.)  The small log huts, like those pictured above, served as home for the soldiers during the harsh, cold days ahead.

A battle flag of the 17th Virginia, marked with engagements from the 1862 Peninsula Campaign (courtesy of the Fairfax Rifles)

November ended with the presentation of the famed Confederate battle flag to the 17th Virginia and the other regiments at Centreville.  Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, in characteristic bombast, told the men: "Under its untarnished folds, beat back the invader and find nationality, everlasting immunity from an atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for yourselves, or death." (Warfield 65-66.)   But first, the army had to survive the winter weather, and all the misery that camp life could bring.

Notes
*Throughout October and November 1861, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston bickered with the War Department over the provision of assistance in building winter quarters.  Johnston saw the War Department as neglectful of his pleas, while Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin accused Johnston of turning away help.  In the end, the soldiers appear to have taken matters into their own hands.  See OR, 1:5, 891, 896-97, 934, 941-42, 948-49, 951; see also this post at Living in the Past concerning the dispute.

Sources
Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Back to Where They Started After Manassas: Johnston Moves the Army to Centreville

As I wrote in a series of recent posts, the Confederates left their advanced positions in Northern Virginia at the end of September 1861 and fell back to Fairfax Court House.  Commander Joseph Johnston, along with Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and G.W. Smith, had recommended an offensive action to Jefferson Davis on October 1, but the Confederate President nixed any plans for a grand invasion across the Potomac.  Johnston was left to contemplate his next move.

The commanding general recognized the vulnerability of his army's position at Fairfax.  As Johnston recalled in his Narrative after the war, "[t]he semicircular course of the Potomac, and roads converging from different points on it to our position, made it easy for the Federal army to turn either of our flanks without exposing its own communications."  (Johnston 77.)  Johnston worried that the Union Army's growing capabilities rendered the Fairfax line "more hazardous" than before.  (Johnston 77.)

According to Alfred Roman's biography of Beauregard, Johnston first suggested that the army establish a new position at Manassas, but Beauregard, "fearing the bad effect upon the army and the people of a retreat to the point held by us before our late victory, proposed Centreville instead."  (Roman 154.)  Given concerns that Centreville "was somewhat commanded by a succession of heights too distant to be embraced within the Confederate line,"  Beauregard also offered to take charge of establishing defensive positions.  Johnston's Narrative does not discuss Beauregard's role in selecting Centreville, and Roman's book, which is likely Beauregard's ghostwritten autobiography, may give Old Bory too much credit.

Johnston finally issued the order for the army to move to Centreville in mid-October.*  The position was less exposed than Fairfax and sat not far from the critical railroad junction at Manassas.  The divisions of James Longstreet and Earl Van Dorn occupied the ground between Union Mills and Centreville, with the position at Union Mills anchoring the Confederate right.  Gen. Smith's division was sent to the heights above the Warrenton Turnpike near Centreville, while "Stonewall" Jackson's soldiers were held in reserve to the rear of the town.  (Jackson himself would soon take charge of the Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia and head out to the Shenandoah.)  Gen. Jeb Stuart's cavalry force patrolled the countryside in advance of the Centreville line.

Detail of the Centreville area from an 1862 Union Army map (courtesy of the Library of Congress).  The circle at the top indicates Centreville and the hills to the north of Warrenton Turnpike.  The circle at the bottom shows the location of Union Mills, the right of the Confederate line.  Manassas Junction is at the bottom left of the map.

Johnston immediately set to work on the defenses at Centreville, but not all was as formidable as it appeared:

The engineers were directed to fortify the summit of the hill near this village— that, by holding it, the strongest and salient point of the position, with two or three thousand men, the army itself might be free to manoeuvre. As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere, at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. (Johnston 78.)

"Centreville, Va., Fort on heights, with Quaker guns," photograph taken in March 1862 after Union occupation (courtesy of  Library of Congress).

Private Edgar Warfield recalled the withdrawal of the 17th Virginia to Centreville:

It was with real regret that we left Fairfax. We had spent many pleasant hours at the place, and it was so near home for many of us. But such is a soldier's lot. Previous to leaving camp details were named from several regiments to move telegraph wires and take them to Centreville. The next morning [October 17] found us pitching our tents on our new camp grounds on the heights near the village of Centreville. (Warfield 63.)

The Confederates settled in for a long fall and winter.  During the months after First Manassas, many soldiers, including the 17th Virginia, moved eastward to Fairfax Court House and beyond.  This ground had been taken with no real bloodshed, but had also been given up without a fight.  Now, the views of the unfinished Capitol dome from Munson's Hill were but a memory, and the Confederates sat not far from the very battlefield where they had beaten the Union Army back in July. 

Note
*Most accounts indicate that the Confederates fell back sometime between October 16-19.  Johnston and Longstreet, for example, mark the event as occurring on October 19, while an October 18 letter home from Longstreet aide Tom Goree indicates that the army headed to Centreville sometime before the 19th.  Private Edgar Warfield's memoirs state that his regiment received Johnston's order on the night of October 16 and arrived the next morning at Centreville.

Sources
Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Jefferson Davis Visits Fairfax, Confers with the Top Brass, and Reviews the Army: Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1861

As I discussed in a recent post, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston wrote to Judah P. Benjamin, the acting Secretary of War in Richmond, urging that Benjamin, a representative, or President Jefferson Davis come to Fairfax Court House to confer about a possible offensive.  Benjamin responded to Johnston on September 29, 1861, telling him it was "extremely difficult. . . to determine whether or not we can furnish you the further means you may deem necessary to assume the active offensive."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  The secretary in part blamed Johnston for the government's inability to assess the situation:  "We have not in the Department a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  Benjamin told Johnston that he had "earnestly requested the President to visit your headquarters in person, and to learn on conference with you the true position of your army in all respects, and the possibility of a prompt offensive movement."  Davis "consented to this," and Benjamin hoped that Davis would reach Johnston's camp within a day or two. (OR, 1:5, 883.)

Arrival in Fairfax

The Confederate President boarded the train to Richmond early on September 30 and arrived at Fairfax Station late in the afternoon. Civilians and soldiers lining the route to Fairfax Court House cheered the President as he passed by, and Davis tipped his hat to the admirers. Due to an apparent "misunderstanding," the army never procured a house in Fairfax for the President to use during his visit. (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.) Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, however, came to the rescue and brought the President to stay at his headquarters. Generals Johnston and Gustavus W. Smith called on Davis that evening to pay their respects, but "no official subjects were alluded to in that interview." (OR, 1:5, 884-85.)

Jefferson Davis, photo by Matthew Brady, c. 1858-60 (courtesy of Library of Congress).

The October 1 Conference

The next day, October 1, Davis "rode many miles visiting the encampments."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  A couple companies of the 16th Mississippi also took Davis on a reconnaissance mission near the Union lines, which now occupied the high ground around Falls Church that the Confederates had just recently abandoned.

The night of October 1, Davis conferred with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at headquarters.  Much ink has been spilled on this famous "council of war," at which Davis and the top commanders in Virginia discussed the possibility of assuming the offensive and invading the North.  First and foremost, I counsel readers to check out the entire text of Smith's January 31, 1862 memorandum on the conference in the OR. (See OR, 1:5, 884-87.)  The memorandum was also signed by Beauregard and Johnston. Davis himself claims to have seen this document for the first time in 1880. (Davis 450.)  The accounts by Davis, Johnston, and Roman are also worth reading.  (See the sources below for links.)  Sherman over at Living in the Past has done a great job of describing the meeting and the subsequent controversy between Davis and his generals over the conference.  (See here.) The Civil War Daily Gazette also has a good post on the subject.  (See here.)

At the conference, Smith was the first to broach the subject that had compelled Davis to come to Fairfax in the first place.  He asked, "Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive?" (OR, 1:5, 885.)  A discussion ensued.  All those present at the conference agreed that "the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad; that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition; that if kept inactive it must retrograde immensely in every respect firing the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all."   (OR, 1:5, 885.) 

Davis was again asked, "Is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy's country? Can you not by stripping other points to the last they will bear, and, even risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition to move forward?"  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  The generals argued that "success here was success everywhere, defeat here defeat everywhere."  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  Gen. Beauregard had been pushing a more aggressive strategy for quite some time now, and most certainly wanted to ensure that Davis accepted his plan to invade Maryland and threaten Washington. 

Davis got to the point.  He wanted to know how many men were needed to take the offensive.  Smith said 50,000; Johnston and Beauregard stated a more conservative 60,000.  The latter two also claimed that the supplies in Northern Virginia were "entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis opposed the suggestion to transfer soldiers to Virginia. After all, the President was under pressure from all parts of the country to defend the Confederacy.  Davis regretted that he could furnish no reinforcements at the time, and even if he could, he had no weapons to arm them.

The generals seemed resigned that "there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the enemy."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis toyed with the idea of "partial operations" into Maryland to strike a "sudden blow" against Union troops on the lower or upper Potomac.  The generals saw too many risks in such a plan and largely rejected the idea.  However, they threw a bone to Davis, agreeing that "if any opportunity should occur offering reasonable chances of success, the attempt would be made." (OR, 1:5, 887.)  The two-hour conference thus dashed Beauregard's dream of a decisive blow across the Potomac. 

Review of the Army

The Confederate President woke up to rain on October 2.  Davis wrote to his wife that  "if the weather permits, I shall resume my labors and to-morrow hope to return."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  The President also expressed disappointment with what he had seen so far: "The condition of things here is not as good as I expected and the position has nothing but its comfort to recommend it."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  I have not yet found a record of what the President did that day, but the rain may have caused a disruption in Davis' schedule.

The next afternoon, the President reviewed the Confederate troops quartered in the area.  Soldiers from several brigades lined the road for about a mile and a half, stretching from Fairfax Court House towards Germantown.  Gen. James Longstreet's men, including the 17th Virgina, participated in the spectacle.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, described "quite a display" in a letter to his sister a few days later:

The President & Genls Johnston, Beauregard & Smith, with their aids [sic] & escort, road along the line in front, whilst our bands as they passed were discoursing excellent music. The President would salute each flag as he passed it. After he passed the line, he then took a position, and the line formed into column and passed him, the officers saluting as they passed. (in Cutrer 47.)

Following the review, Longstreet  and his staff headed to Beauregard's headquarters to meet with Davis.  According to Goree, the President "spoke of the honorable positions we had occupied in the advance" and "asked if we could give him a view of the Potomac."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Goree, all to aware of the recent evacuation of Munson's and Mason's Hills, replied that "we could have done so, a few days since, but could not now."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Davis, full of bluster, replied that "I hope that in a short time we will force a view of it, at the Long Bridge."  (in Cutrer 47.)  How the Confederate President expected that to happen in light of the conference of October 1, he did not say.

Davis boarded a train that night and returned to Richmond. The President's trip had given Johnston the answer he needed.  The cautious commander had made the right decision after all in withdrawing his men from their advanced position.  Now Johnston would turn to establishing a purely defensive position, and even Fairfax felt a bit too forward for his purposes.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Lynda L. Crist & Mary S. Dix (eds.), The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1861, Vol. 7 (1991); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1 (1881); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part II

The order came on the evening of September 27, 1861.  Confederate commander Joseph Johnston worried that his current position left his army exposed and vulnerable.  Unless the government in Richmond was prepared to provide the men and materiel for an offensive action, Johnston saw little value in remaining so far forward.  Gen. James Longstreet also reported on the twenty-seventh that he received information that his advanced position would be attacked by "a very strong force in a few days."  (OR, 1:51:2, 317.)  Perhaps this is all Johnston needed to hear.  Rather than risk a possible engagement along the forward line, the commander sent his men packing.  The Confederates occupying Munson's, Mason's, and Upton's Hills, Falls Church, and other advanced positions were told to fall back towards Fairfax Court House.

The withdrawal played out during the course of the night. According to Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, "before midnight we had abandoned all the splendid positions (Mason's, Munson's & Upton's Hills) . . . which we held in front of the enemy and in sight of the Potomac & Washington."  (in Cutrer 47.)   The Confederate Army had surrendered the high ground without a fight.

The 17th Virginia was doing duty in Falls Church when the order came. The regiment marched about three miles outside of town and camped for the night, only to return the next day. The 17th finally left the town for Camp Harrison in Fairfax Court House on the twenty-ninth. A couple soldiers posted a note on the gate to The Falls Church addressed to prospective Union occupiers:

Having been resident denizens of Falls Church for some time, we to-day reluctantly evacuate, not because you intimidate by your presence, but only in obedience to military dictation. We leave you a fire to cook potatoes, also to warm by, as the nights are now uncomfortable on account of their chilling influence.  (in Wallace 22.)

Goree wrote that the Confederates regretted leaving the advanced positions, "not only on account of being so pleasantly situated, but we all liked the excitement which our proximity to the Yankees produced."  (in Cutrer 47.)   He wrongly speculated that "the move was a strategic one, made to try and induce the Yankees to make an advance on us and give us battle in an open field."  (in Cutrer 47.) 



"General McClellan Occupying the Confederate Position at Munson's Hill," from a period engraving (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery).  The Union commander wasted no time in crossing the Potomac and riding out to the front upon learning that the Confederates had withdrawn from the area around Munson's Hill.

Goree's boss was not far off the mark as to Union intentions. Around the time the Confederates were marching towards Fairfax, Maj. Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, ordered Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson to advance from his position around Bailey's Crossroads and seize Munson's and Upton's Hills from the Confederates. Troops from Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division were to support the right flank of Richardson's brigade. On September 28, Federal soldiers stormed the empty Confederate works on Munson's and Upton's Hills without a fight. The capture of Mason's Hill soon followed. As McClellan wrote to his wife on September 29, "The moral effect of this advance will be great & it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, & I hope they have taken their last look at [Washington]." (Sears 104.)  The Confederates, meanwhile, had to determine their next move, but the chances for a fall offensive were not looking so good.

Sources
Russel H. Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command: September 1861-February 1862(2002); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); "Munson's Hill Evacuated by the Rebels," New York Times, Sept. 29, 1861; "The Occupation of Mason's Hill," New York Times, Oct. 2, 1861; Stephen W. Sears (ed.), The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (1989); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Lewinsville, Round 2: The Confederates Encounter "Baldy" Smith's Men Once Again

Last year I wrote about a skirmish that occurred in Lewinsville a couple weeks after the better-known encounter there on September 11, 1861. (See here.)  While researching the September 25 engagement, I noticed the lack of sources telling the Confederate side of the story. In fact, the OR does not appear to contain any official Confederate reports on the skirmish. I was left wondering about the identity of the Confederate units who attacked Brig. Gen. "Baldy" Smith's men near the tiny Northern Virginian hamlet. Following additional research, I recently uncovered more about Confederate involvement in this minor and relatively bloodless action. So, for my 150th anniversary post, I'd like to take a closer look at the Confederates who participated in the skirmish at Lewinsville.

Around nine in the morning of September 25, Smith led a Union force of 5,100 infantry, 16 guns, and 150 cavalry on a reconnaissance and foraging mission to Lewinsville. Smith deployed his men and guns along the road from Langley to Lewinsville and directed the quartermaster to start loading his wagons with forage. Not long afterwards, a body of Confederate cavalry appeared just east of Lewinsville. Capt. Thaddeus Mott's artillery opened fire on the troopers and drove them away.  In all likelihood, the cavalry scouts returned to the Confederate advanced line near Falls Church to warn of the Federal expedition.

The Confederates quickly prepared for battle. Gen. James Longstreet assembled a force consisting of the 1st Georgia, 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina, 13th Virginia, 17th Virginia, 1st Virginia Cavalry, and Capt. Thomas Rosser's Washington Artillery of New Orleans. (Gernand 94-95; see also Wallace 21.)*  Three of these units -- the 1st Virginia Cavalry, 13th Virginia, and Washington Artillery -- had fought Smith's men only a few weeks earlier at the first "Battle of Lewinsville."  The soldiers organized around The Falls Church and set out on the road to Lewinsville (likely today's Great Falls Street). The Confederates also loaded all of their wagons and sent them to Fairfax Court House, presumably to avoid capture of supplies in the event of a Union victory.  As Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, told his mother a couple days later, the Confederates were "expecting to have a very severe fight."  (in Cutrer 45.)

By three in the afternoon, Smith had gathered an incredible 90 wagon loads of forage.  The general recalled his skirmishers and sent the wagons back to the Federal lines.  At about 4 p.m., just as Smith's men were preparing for their return to camp, the Confederates struck.  Smith described the opening of the skirmish in his official report:

[W]e could see advancing over the hills from the Falls Church road what seemed to be a large regiment, marching rapidly in close column and others deployed as skirmishers, with the apparent intention of turning our flank. At the same time they opened fire with seemingly one gun on our extreme left, but at too great distance for any effect, which ceased entirely. . . . Their cavalry was seen in small bodies, moving through the corn fields and woods to our left and on the Lewinsville road. (OR, 1:5, 216.)

Rosser, likely realizing that his guns were having little impact, moved them into position to the right of the Union force "at about 2,500 yards," where he opened fire on Mott's section at Mackall's House. (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Federal artillery under Mott and Capt. Charles Griffin answered the Confederate guns.  Some of the Union rounds fell among the infantry gathered at the graveyard of the Lewinsville Presbyterian Church.  The two sides exchanged about 30 rounds before the skirmish ended with little, if any, participation by the infantry.  Smith recalled that "we could see their dust as they retreated on the Falls Church road."  (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Smith's men moved slowly back to camp, where they arrived about seven that evening. 

Thomas L. Rosser, commander of the Confederate artillery at Lewinsville, who rose to become a cavalry general (courtesy of Wikipedia).

The Confederates, however, had not left the scene entirely. Rosser hauled one gun to a hill overlooking the crossroads at Langley and around dusk fired four or five shots.  Smith sent a scout to investigate, but by the time he arrived, the Confederates were gone.  First Sergeant W.H. Andrews of the 1st Georgia remembered that the Confederates returned to Falls Church "as proud as if we had really been in a battle of some consequence."  (in Gernand 95.)

Smith reported that one man was wounded "slightly in the arm" by a bursting shell.  (OR, 1:5, 217.)  Tom Goree wrote to his mother on September 27 that the Union Army "got some of the best of this fight, as they killed one of our men, and took another prisoner, who rode up to them mistaking them for friends."  (in Cutrer 45.)  Andrews' account differs in that he recalled that two men, both from the 2nd South Carolina, were killed during the skirmish.  In all, casualties had been light, just as in the encounter of September 11.

Clearly the armies were restless, and many soldiers must have felt the anticipation of a big battle approaching. Within a period of just two weeks, Confederate and Union forces had clashed at Lewinsville, a village not far from Longstreet's advanced line. The second skirmish involved even greater numbers than the first. As Goree wrote on September 27, "I think, Mother, that the fight will come off somewhere in a very few days. We will either advance or the enemy will." (in Cutrer 45.) The young aide was probably not alone in his sentiments as the two armies headed into the first autumn of the war.

Notes
*According to a first-hand account by First Sergeant W.H. Andrews, his regiment, the 1st Georgia, marched to Lewinsville with the 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina,13th Virginia, "Col. [Jeb] Stuart's Regiment of Black Horse Cavalry" (1st Virginia Cavalry), and Rosser's battery.  (Gernand 95.)  Wallace's history of the 17th Virginia places the 17th at Lewinsville along with the 2nd South Carolina and two guns of the Washington Artillery.  (Wallace 21.)

Sources
"Another Important Reconnoissance [sic] Near Washington," New York Times, Sept. 26, 1861; Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Addendum, September 26, 2011
Thanks to reader Dudley Bokoski for pointing out a reference to the September 25 skirmish at Lewinsville in a report from Gen. James Longstreet in which he blamed Col. Joseph Kershaw of the 2nd S.C. for not striking a decisive blow.  (See OR, 1:51:2, 314.)  As Longstreet said, "I am inclined to think that the failure of the effort is due entirely to Colonel Kershaw's getting on a different road from the one I intended he should have taken. Had he been up to time there is no doubt but there would have been one more Bull Run affair.  As things miscarried, the enemy discovered us in time to get a good start."  Unfortunately, neither Kershaw's nor Stuart's reports of the skirmish survive.

A Day in the Life of the War: The 17th Virginia Skirmishes with Soldiers from New Jersey

This summer I have written a few posts tracing the movements of the 17th Virginia across Northern Virginia after the First Battle of Manassas. The regiment, part of General James Longstreet's brigade, marched from Centreville to Fairfax Court House, where the soldiers established Camp Harrison in early August 1861. The men of the 17th performed occasional picket duty along Longstreet's advanced line, which by the end of August extended to Falls Church and Mason's and Munson's Hills. The 17th Virginia got caught up in the endless series of skirmishing that took place along this part of the line, including an encounter with 3rd New Jersey on August 31. Although lasting less than ten minutes, this skirmish has received its fair share of attention, both in the OR and in Confederate memoirs.

Col. George W. Taylor, commander of the 3rd New Jersey (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Taylor would later be promoted to brigadier general and lead the First New Jersey Brigade during the Second Manassas Campaign.  He was mortally wounded on August 27, 1862 as he defended a section of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.

Early in the morning of August 31, Col. George W. Taylor of the 3rd New Jersey set off with about 40 men to cut off the Confederate pickets who had been "extremely annoying to our outposts on the Little River turnpike and on the road leading from thence to Chestnut [Mason's] Hill." (OR, 1:5:1, 121.)* Taylor's men were forced to "cross a fence and a narrow cornfield." (OR, 1:5:1, 121.) A company of the 17th Virginia, however, was prepared and waiting. As Taylor reported to his commander, Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny:

While in the corn we were suddenly opened upon by a rapid and sharp fire, which our men, whenever they got sight of the enemy, returned with much spirit. Scarce two minutes elapsed when I found 3 men close to me had been shot down. The enemy being mostly hid, I deemed it prudent to order my men to fall back to the woods, distant about 30 yards, which I did. At the same time I ordered enough to remain with me to carry off the wounded, but they did not hear or heed my order except two. With these we got all off, as I supposed (the corn being thick), but Corporal Hand, Company I, who, when I turned him over, appeared to be dying. I took his musket, also the musket of one of the wounded, and returned to the woods to rally the men. I regret to say that none of them could be found, nor did I meet them until I reached the blacksmith-shop, three-quarters of a mile distant. (OR, 1:5:1, 121-22.)

Taylor was determined to retrieve his missing men from the cornfield. He quickly reinforced the part of his command under Capt. Leonard Regur with twenty-five soldiers from the picket line and sent the men to gather whatever dead and wounded they could find. Approaching the scene of the recent skirmish, Regur worried that the Confederate force had grown larger and turned his men around rather than enter the cornfield. In his report to Kearny, Taylor defended Regur's decision as "justified." (OR, 1:5:1, 122.)

The sentiment in the Confederate camp was one of victory.  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia remembered the skirmish as a "brisk fight."  (Warfield, 61.)  He noted that the 3rd New Jersey was repulsed "with some little loss" to the Union side.  (Warfield, 61.)  In the meantime, General Jubal Early had arrived in the area with the 5th North Carolina and 24th Virginia to relieve the 17th Virginia.**  Early dubbed the the skirmish "a very sharp fight" in which a company of the 17th Virginia had "repulsed the enemy and inflicted a severe punishment on him."  (Early, 48.)

General Kearny, the Union brigade commander, apparently had a hard time just leaving the soldiers who had fallen near Mason's Hill.  Some time after the skirmish ended and Early's pickets had taken the place of the 17th Virginia, Early was told that "a flag of truce had appeared at the outside picket, where the fight had taken place in the early morning." Early rode to a home near the site of the skirmish.  As he recalled:

I . . . had the person bearing the flag brought to me blindfolded. He proved to be a Dr. Coxe, surgeon of the New Jersey regiment, a detachment of which had been engaged in the above named affair. He stated that he came on the part of Colonel Tyler [sic] of the 3rd New Jersey to get the bodies of several men who were missing, and that he was informed that General Kearney [sic], who commanded on that part of the line, had directed Colonel Tyler [sic] to send the party with the flag.  (Early, 49.)***

Early was at first unsure of what to do.  He informed the doctor "of the irregularity of the proceeding."  (Early, 49.)  However, "after some conversation in which I endeavored to leave him under the impression that we had a large force in the vicinity, I gave him permission to carry off the dead bodies, two of which he had picked up outside of my picket, and two others having been brought in to the picket before his arrival."  (Early, 49.)****  The burial party then arrived and retrieved the Union soldiers who had died in the morning's skirmish. 

This story reminded me of how small events in a big war can still leave a very lasting impression on participants. Of all the skirmishes Early and Warfield experienced in one way or another, they never seem to have forgotten the brief firefight around Mason's Hill and the efforts that the Union Army made to ensure that the 3rd New Jersey's dead received a proper burial. It is these seemingly inconsequential actions that marked time 150 years ago this month in Northern Virginia.

Notes

*The OR records the skirmish as taking place "at Munson's Hill, on Little River Turnpike, Va."  However, Munson's Hill was located next to the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike, not the Little River Turnpike.  Mason's Hill sat astride the Columbia Turnpike, which intersected with the Little River Turnpike farther to the south.  Mason's Hill was also known as "Chestnut Hill."  Given the description of the roads in Taylor's report, and his use of the name "Chestnut Hill," it appears that the OR misnamed the skirmish.  Confederate sources cited in this post confirm the location of the action as near Mason's Hill.

**Early stated that his regiments arrived "before light on the morning of the 31st of August," while Warfield remembered that the 17th Virginia was relieved by the two regiments  "[d]uring the night of August 31."  (Early, 48; Warfield, 61.)  Perhaps this discrepancy is due to a lapse in time before Early's men actually moved into position to relieve the 17th.  Alternatively, Warfield may have remembered the early morning darkness of the 31st as the night.

*** Warfield also recalled that the 3rd New Jersey "sent over a flag of truce for the purpose of getting their dead."  (Warfield, 61.) 

****The OR states that the nominal list of Union casualties "shows 2 killed and 3 wounded."  (OR, 1:5:1, 122.)

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Jubal Anderson Early & R.H. Early (ed.), Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

Longstreet Advances Closer to Washington: The Occupation of Mason's Hill & Munson's Hill

As I have discussed in previous posts, General James Longstreet stood at the vanguard of the Confederate advance through Northern Virginia in late summer of 1861.  During the end of August, Longstreet pushed a force of infantry beyond his picket line at Falls Church, Virginia and closer to the Union capital.*  Assisted by Col. J.E.B. Stuart's 1st Virginia Cavalry, the soldiers drove in Federal pickets and seized two prominences that dominated the surrounding countryside -- Mason's Hill and Munson's Hill.  The newly captured territory was only a handful of miles from the nation's capital.  As Longstreet later recalled, "[w]e were provokingly near Washington, with orders not to attempt to advance even to Alexandria."  (Longstreet, 59.)  From their new position, the Confederates had a full view of Washington, including the unfinished Capitol dome rising in the distance.  They also could observe the Union lines in Northern Virginia as far as Alexandria.

The soldiers set to work digging earthworks on Mason's and Munson's Hills. The heights swept the plains around Bailey's Crossroads, where the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike met the Colombia Turnpike.** As long as the Confederate forces were dug in atop these two hills, the Union Army dare not occupy territory closer to Falls Church and Annandale.

A view of Mason's Hill and Munson's Hill from an 1862 Union Army map, showing their proximity to Falls Church and Bailey's Crossroads (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Washington sits to the northeast (upper right of the map), about nine miles away.  The Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike runs past Munson's Hill to Falls Church and beyond.  At the time this map was drawn, the Union was in control of this area and had erected forts, which are shown here. Today, historical markers are located near the site of  the Confederate positions on Mason's and Munson's Hills (see here and here).

The position at Mason's and Munson's Hills was normally held by a couple regiments of infantry, a battery, and Stuart's cavalry.  The infantry and artillery units rotated every few days, but Stuart's men remained a permanent fixture.  Longstreet remembered in his memoirs that because "the authorities allowed me but one battery. . . we collected a number of old wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of different calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some large enough of calibre to threaten Alexandria, and even the National Capitol and Executive Mansion."  (Longstreet, 60.)  According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia, Co.H, the soldiers had some fun with the stovepipe gun at the Union Army's expense.  As he related in his memoirs, "[i]t was a favorite trick to run it out into the center of the road and go through the motions of loading a gun and pointing it at the enemy, who promptly stampeded, under the impression that we had a piece of artillery with us." (Warfield, 60.)

The Confederates, taking full advantage of their position on the high ground, erected signal stations on Mason's and Munson's Hills. Officers from General Wade Hampton's Legion sent messages at night from across the Potomac to Munson's Hill. The Confederates also hatched a clever scheme to relay messages to Munson's Hill from Washington. An ex-Maryland legislator, E. Pliny Bryan, was sent to rent a room in Washington from which Munson's Hill could be seen. As described by E.P. Alexander, who at the time was active in Confederate intelligence gathering and signal work:

[Bryan] was to take the bearing of the hill by compass from his window, and communicate it to us by an agreed-upon advertisement in a daily paper, which we received regularly. This would give us the bearing on which to turn our powerful telescope, loaned for the purpose by a Charleston gentleman, and in position on Munson's Hill. Then we would identify his window by finding a coffee-pot in it, and by motions of the coffee-pot, and opening and shutting the blinds, etc., he would send his messages, and we would reply, if necessary, by a large flag and by firing guns. (Cummins 93.)

The plan was on the verge of being executed in September 1861, when the Confederates abandoned their advanced positions.

Looking at the Confederate earthworks on Munson's Hill down the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike from Bailey's Crossroads, September 1861 (courtesy of Virginia Historical Society).  The Confederate flag atop Munson's Hill was seen from as far away as Washington.  This sketch was drawn by Union soldier Robert Knox Sneden. 

At the end of August, the Confederates raised the Stars and Bars on Munson's Hill.  The New York Times informed its readers that the large flag "was visible with a glass from the top of the shiphouse at the Navy-yard" in Washington.  A similar flag was raised from Mason's Hill.  The presence of the Confederates so close to Washington, flying their flag defiantly and in plain view from the capital, caused consternation among Washingtonians and in the Union ranks. 

In September 1861, Longstreet moved the headquarters of his advanced forces to Home Hill  in Falls Church.  At the time of the Civil War, Home Hill was owned by John Bartlett, a transplant from New York.  The property is now called the Lawton House and is located on Lawton Street, just off of VA-7.  The photograph above shows Home Hill today.

Historical marker in front of Home Hill, recalling Longstreet's stay at the property. 

During this time, the Union Army relied on aerial reconnaissance by Professor Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, who ascended in his balloon from Ft. Corcoran, Ball's Cross Roads, and Chain Bridge to observe the Confederate positions on the two hills.  According to Confederate General Jubal Early, Lowe kept a balloon up "almost constantly." (Early, 49.)  Confederate gunners atop Munson's Hill found Lowe an inviting target and fired shots at his balloon. Luckily for Lowe, they missed their mark. 

With the armies so close to one another, and tensions running high, fighting was bound to erupt in the no-man's land between the lines. In the next installment, I examine the skirmishing that took place around Munson's Hill and Bailey's Crossroads at the end of August and start of September 1861.

Notes

*According to an August 29, 1861 letter from Longstreet's aid, Tom Goree, to his uncle and sister, this advance likely took place around August 27.
**Bailey's Crossroads was spelled "Bailey's Cross Roads" at the time of the Civil War.

Sources

Edmund H. Cummins, "The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army," Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, at 93 (1888).

Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995).

Jubal Anderson Early & R.H. Early (ed.), Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912).

Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002).

Frederick Stansbury Haydon, Military Ballooning During the Early Civil War (1941).

James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896).

Charles P. Poland, Jr., The Glories of War: Small Battles and Early Heroes of 1861 (2004).

"Special Dispatch from Washington," dated Aug. 31, 1861, New York Times, Sept. 1, 1861 edition.

Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).