Civil War News and Views: The Advanced Confederate Line, September 1861

Now that the Sesquicentennial is over, I look forward to revisiting the earlier war period in Northern Virginia. As readers may recall, I spent a lot of time a few years ago examining the Confederate advance closer to Washington at the end of August 1861, when forces under Gen. James Longstreet occupied the high ground on Munson's Hill and Mason's Hill. Not long ago I came across the following report from the September 6, 1861 edition of the Richmond Daily Dispatch concerning the new position within sight of Washington:

Confederate States Army, Fairfax Station, Va., Sept. 1 

Last evening I returned from Mason's Hill, seven miles south of Washington, D. C. Mason's Hill derives its name from the gentleman's name (Capt. Mason, now in the Confederate service at Norfolk, Va.,) who is the proprietor. Mason's Hill is a very high and commanding position, and about two miles from Munson's Hill, both of which are now fortified and in possession of the ‘"rebels."’ 

In a straight line from Mason's Hill stands the Capitol at Washington, and which can readily be seen with the naked eye. Whilst beholding the dome of the Capitol, I feel like one looking upon the ‘"promised land,"’ where shortly, I hope, ‘"may our possessions be."’ I had the pleasure of seeing Prof. Lowe's balloon, and am sure his observations were of little account to him. The Yankee experiment of ballooning came near receiving a great ‘"pull back,"’ by the firing upon the balloon spy by the Washington Artillery. Several shots were fired at it, when it immediately ‘"went down."’ Don't suppose, however, ‘"anybody was hurt."’ But, nevertheless. somebody was scared, for the balloon suddenly disappeared and did not come up again.

Camping at Mason's Hill is interesting and exciting — not a day passing away but a few Yankee pickets ‘"bite the dust."’ Whilst I was there, in one day eight were gathered by our boys, who keep a sharp lookout for the chaps, and give them a dead shot on sight — Several prisoners have been sent to General Davis' institution at Richmond for safe keeping. By the way, we will soon have a Yankee army on hand. 

On the morning of the 30th a large Federal camp, about two miles from Alexandria, broke up and retired, thinking, probably, the ‘"rebels"’ were getting too close for comfort.--They built a large fire, the smoke of which served to cover them as they broke up their camp.

Fine views are obtained from both Munson's and Mason's Hills, of the surrounding country, and also of the Potomac. Upon the Potomac, large vessels.

There has been considerable sickness in our camp; but, with the cool weather, the health of all the men is improving, and all will be on their feet soon, with musket in hand. No news at present that I dare tell you. Pen.

N. B.--Envelopes are very scarce. The man who goes into the manufactory of envelopes in the South, will make a fortune P. (courtesy of Perseus Digital Library)

An engraving of the Confederate fortification on Munson's Hill, Illustrated London News, Oct. 5, 1861 (courtesy of Emory University).

Foreign correspondents also took an interest in the advanced Confederate line. A piece in the October 5, 1861 edition of the Illustrated London News, accompanying the above illustration, contained the following account of the Rebel position at Munson's Hill:

 This is the point in Virginia at which the Unionists and the Confederates are nearest each other, and whilst our Artist was making his sketch, crouched beneath the shelter of the foliage, within hailing distance of the enemy's pickets, a continual spattering of bullets fell round the spot. More than halfway up the road towards the hill is a barricade, from behind which a Secessionist sharpshooter is having some pot shots, and, screened by the hedges in the cornfields, others are doing the same. In the foreground are the Union advanced pickets, furnished by the Michigan Regiment, one of whom is in the act of firing at two or three men beyond the barricade. A Michigan soldier just shot lies in the road. The Confederates have some rifled cannon on the earthwork, and whenever they see a number of Federalists together they send in a dose of shells.

A New York paper thus describes the Confederate position on Munson's-hill:—"Munson's-hill is probably the highest eminence within ten miles of the Potomac, immediately opposite Washington. It is about six miles from the Capitol, the intervening space being covered with a succession of gently rolling hills, crowned principally with forest trees, although here and there dotted with churches, farmhouses, and country villages. The streams are unimportant and the roads dusty. The hill presents its most abrupt side towards the national capital, and, unlike those around, has but few trees on its summit. Many of those which originally existed have no doubt been felled while the intrenchments were in progress. At present an immense Confederate flag—the red, white, and blue stripes in which are at least five feet wide each—is the most prominent object upon the top of the eminence Two of the trees which have been allowed to remain were used as an observatory. The Confederate defences are constructed entirely of earth, fifteen feet being the highest elevation. The sloping hillside in front of the fort is clear of underbrush or trees, and is sufficiently extended to allow 3000 men to parade. The distance from the cover of the woods to the summit of the hill is not so great but that a quick movement would drive the enemy from their guns with very little loss of life. The flank defences of the fort consist of three batteries. It is believed that earthworks have been thrown up on another portion of the hill commanding the road to Fairfax Courthouse. The fort is intended more particularly to command the road leading from Alexandria to Falls Church, the road from Washington to Fairfax, just mentioned, the railroad from Alexandria to Vienna, and the position of Bailey's Cross-roads."

With little to report in the way of large-scale battles, newspapers turned their attention to the Confederate lines within view of the nation's capital. Munson's and Mason's Hills were popular topics. Add in the thrilling ascent of Lowe's balloons or the tension of the picket war, and correspondents had plenty of material to keep their readers interested and entertained. The Confederates abandoned the advanced position by the end of September 1861, and not long afterwards, both sides settled in for a long fall and winter in camp.

Adding to the Newspaper Collection: Munson's Hill & Bailey's Crossroads in 1861

As frequent readers know, I am an avid collector of antique Civil War-era newspapers.  I often search for editions containing wartime scenes from across Northern Virginia and Washington.  Not too long ago I spotted a September 30, 1861 edition of the New York Illustrated News on eBay.  I was immediately drawn to the full-page engraving of Bailey's Crossroads and Munson's Hill.*  I am familiar with other period illustrations of these landmarks from Harper's Weekly, but I had never seen this particular engraving from the lesser-known Illustrated News.


New York Illustrated News, Sept. 30, 1861.  The cover illustration shows Federal vessels driving back an iron-plated Confederate steamer at Newport News, Virginia.  I purchased the paper from eBay dealer lindastevea.

I've written extensively about both Munson's Hill and Bailey's Crossroads.  (See here and here.)   In August 1861, Confederates under James Longstreet pushed the Confederate lines in Northern Virginia closer to Washington.  The advanced position stretched beyond Falls Church to Munson's Hill and other locations.  The Confederates erected earthworks at the top of Munson's Hill, where they could see the unfinished Capitol dome in the distance.  The Union Army moved towards Bailey's Crossroads, not far down the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike (today's Rt. 7) from Munson's Hill.  The picket war in and around Bailey's became quite heated at times.  Recognizing the vulnerability of the advanced line, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston finally withdrew his forces from Munson's Hill at the end of September 1861.

"Munson's Hill, as Seen from Bailey's Cross Roads."  Union forces seized Munson's Hill on September 28, 1861.  Given the date of publication (Sept. 30, 1861), it is likely that this engraving was sketched during the time of the Confederate occupation and only printed after the evacuation.

The engraving depicts Bailey's Crossroads looking northwest up the Leesburg Turnpike towards the Confederate earthworks on Munson's Hill.  The Columbia Turnpike runs perpendicular to the Leesburg Turnpike.  A Union picket stands to the right of the picture, while two soldiers survey the Rebel position in the distance.  The sketch artist was B.C. Kidder of the 2nd Michigan.  Incidentally, pickets from this regiment clashed with Confederate infantry around Bailey's Crossroads at the end of August and start of September 1861.  (See here.) 

Close-up of the engraving showing the Confederate earthworks at the top of Munson's Hill.  The Confederate flag flying above Munson's Hill was visible all the way from Washington.  The "News and Notes" section of the Illustrated News reported: "A young lady residing in the upper part of Georgetown has just received a letter from her brother in the Rebel army, in which he states that from his post, near Munson's Hill, he can see the lights of his own home every night. . . . He had made great exertions to accompany the advance guard, in order that he might be among the first to enter the Capital, and rejoin his family at the earliest moment."

Today the same ground, covered with strip malls, chain restaurants, and residential development, bears little resemblance to the area during the Civil War.  (See here for a contemporary map.)  The engraving from the New York York Illustrated News takes us to a different time, beyond the traffic congestion and big box stores.  Such old newspaper images bring the past alive and remind us of how Northern Virginia once sat in the middle of a war zone. 

Note

*At the time of the Civil War, the location was spelled "Bailey's Cross Roads."

A Visit to the Battlefield of Second Manassas

As we approach the 150th anniversary of Second Manassas, I wanted to share a few impressions of a trip that I took a few months ago.  Each year of the Sesquicentennial, I have a goal of visiting a few sites associated with the events that took place in the corresponding year during the Civil War.  This past April I decided to tour the battlefield of Second Manassas, a short 30 minute drive from home.  I picked up my friend, Rufino, at a nearby Metro station and headed out I-66 to Manassas National Battlefield Park.  A little music from the 2nd S.C. String Band set the mood as we drove west.

Based on some initial research I had done on visiting the battlefield, I decided to take the audio driving tour.  I've gravitated towards this method of touring ever since a childhood trip to Gettysburg.  My Dad was a big fan, and I suppose his fondness rubbed off on me.  I purchased the audio tour and guidebook at the Henry Hill Visitor Center.  The package is produced by a private company known as "Travel Brains," but don't let the name fool you.  Overall, the tour was worthwhile and provided detailed information to supplement the National Park Service (NPS) brochure and the markers on the battlefield.  Those Civil War enthusiasts with extensive knowledge of the battle may find the tour a tad too basic.  I haven't read much on Second Manassas, so I appreciated the refresher.  The CD also gave useful, on-the-scene interpretations of what I was seeing on the battlefield.

A tour of the Second Manassas battlefield requires driving on some busy area roads.  As we headed down U.S.-29 (Lee Highway), I noticed tailgaters pressuring me to move faster.  Such behavior made my visit a little less pleasurable and prevented a more careful study of the surrounding terrain.  Pulling in and out of some tour stops also proved a bit dicey.  Needless to say, I am glad to hear that a by-pass of the battlefield is in the works.

The audio tour for some odd reason does not include the Brawner Farm, Tour Stop 1 on the NPS brochure.  Whatever you do, however, don't miss going to the Brawner Farm.  The NPS opened the site in 2007 after restoring the post-Civil War farmhouse and installing an Interpretive Center on Second Manassas.  Despite the old-school technology, the electric map in the farmhouse offers an excellent overview of troop positions over the course of the three-day engagement.  A variety of exhibits place the battle in a larger context and cover such topics as the court-martial of Gen. Fitz John Porter, a scapegoat of the Union defeat at Second Manassas.

The restored farmhouse at the Brawner Farm site.  The present structure was built after the Civil War and was enlarged in 1905.  John Brawner and his family moved to this site in 1857.  He leased the property and worked as a tenant farmer.  The original house was damaged during Second Manassas, and the Brawners moved away not long after the battle.

The Brawner Farm, of course, was the scene of Stonewall Jackson's attack on Union soldiers from John Pope's Army of Virginia on the evening of August 28, 1862.  Jackson intended to draw Pope into battle and prevent him from concentrating with the remainder of the Federal Army.  The fight is perhaps best known as the site of an encounter between two of the Civil War's most famous units--the Iron Brigade and the Stonewall Brigade.  Rufino and I took the Ranger-guided tour of the battle at Brawner Farm.  The Ranger re-traced the Union and Confederate lines and really helped us to visualize the brutal, close-range fighting that took place there.

View from the position of the Stonewall Brigade towards the area of the Union lines occupied by the Iron Brigade.

The Stone House (Tour Stop 3), at the junction of Sudley-Manassas Road (today's VA-234) and the Warrenton Turnpike (present-day U.S.-29).  The home is one of two pre-Civil War buildings that is still standing on the grounds of the national park.  During Second Manassas, the Stone House served a field hospital for the wounded.  Pope's retreating Federal troops passed by the house on the way back to the defenses of Washington.

The Unfinished Railroad (Tour Stop 6) made a lasting and haunting impression.  On August 29, 1862, elements of Pope's army launched a series of attacks against Jackson's men, who were positioned along the grade of an unfinished railroad.  Today, the tranquility of the quiet, wooded setting stands in sharp contrast to the savage killing that happened at the same spot 150 years ago.  Although a breeze gently blew through the trees, the air seemed strangely leaden.  I am not an overly supernatural person, but I somehow felt surrounded by the very spirits of those who had fought and died there.

Looking down the unfinished railroad cut.  Confederate defenders from Jame Archer's Brigade, A.P. Hill's Division, occupied the ground to the left.  Federal soldiers from Col. Daniel Leasure's Brigade of Isaac Stevens' Division of the Ninth Corps, Army of the Potomac attacked across the cut.  The bodies of Union dead and wounded covered the slope of the embankment.  A one-mile loop trail allows visitors to explore this truly hallowed ground. 

A few other stops on the battlefield also deserve top billing.  The Deep Cut (Tour Stop 7) witnessed a massive Federal assault on Jackson's right flank by Porter's Fifth Corps and part of Gen. Irvin McDowell's Third Corps on the afternoon of August 30, 1862.  At one point, Jackson's men, running low on ammunition, threw rocks at their attackers.  It is well worth the time to hike up the slope where the Union force advanced to the Confederate lines along the unfinished railroad bed.  The sweeping view from the top conveys a feeling for the vastness of the Union attack.  Chinn Ridge (Tour Stop 10) was the site of a Federal fight to delay Gen. James Longstreet's counter-attack on the afternoon of August 30.  Nearly 30,000 Confederates had surged forward and overwhelmed the Union left flank.  A desperate stand by Union troops on Chinn Ridge helped to prevent complete annihilation of Pope's army.  The placement of markers and artillery do a commendable job of interpreting the fighting that occurred there.

Looking up the slope towards the site of the Confederate line at the Deep Cut.  Porter's men advanced across this ground on August 30.  The Groveton Monument, erected by Union veterans after the war, is visible at the top of the hill to the center-right.

The unfinished railroad bed at the Deep Cut.  Confederates from William E. Starke's Division repulsed the Federal attack from this position.  I can't help but wonder whether some of the rocks were intentionally placed there to evoke images of the famous "stone fight."

Marker on Chinn Ridge indicating the position of the 73rd Ohio Infantry of Col. Nathaniel McLean's Brigade, First Division, First Corps, Army of Virginia, which fought to stem the tide of Longstreet's advancing Confederates on August 30.

Vantage point of a gunner with the 5th Maine Battery on Chinn Ridge.  Longstreet's men advanced across the field in front of the 12-pounder Napoleon.  The fighting here bought Pope additional time to mount a defense at Henry Hill.

As Rufino and I left the battlefield, I pondered why Second Manassas lives in the shadows of the much smaller battle that occurred there in July 1861.  The Park Ranger at Brawner Farm told me that around one in three tourists go to the Henry Hill Visitor Center, compared to just one in ten who stop by the Interpretive Center for Second Manassas.  The 1861 engagement looms large as the first major land battle of the war.  The exalted Stonewall Jackson won his nom de guerre there.  And we've all heard about the death of poor widow Henry or the congressmen and civilians who rode out to watch the battle.  The country, so the story goes, lost its innocence on the fields of Manassas and braced for a long, violent war.  This is the stuff of myth and legend. 

Second Manassas, although a significant victory for Robert E. Lee, is sandwiched in between Lee's emergence at the Seven Days Battles and Antietam, the bloodiest single day in U.S. history.  The long-dominant Lost Cause school of interpretation had little use for Longstreet and his spectacular counter-attack, and the Northern victors of the war viewed Union commanders like Pope, McDowell, and Franz Sigel as less than heroic or else entirely forgettable.  Is it any wonder that the battle failed to inspire the popular imagination in the same way as First Bull Run?  Second Manassas, however, deserves more from us.  After all, the battle, which resulted in yet another crushing Union defeat, showcased the formidable fighting prowess of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia and opened the way for the Confederate invasion of Maryland.  I hope that the 150th anniversary will focus more attention on this critical and fascinating battle.  And those looking for a perfect way to commemorate Second Manassas this year should consider heading to the battlefield and walking the very ground where the armies clashed.

For more information:

The National Park Service website for Manassas National Battlefield Park contains a wealth of information on visiting the battlefield of Second Manassas.

For more details on Second Manassas, check out the Civil War Trust's page on the battle.

The National Park Service is planning several days of Sesquicentennial-related activities from August 25-September 2, 2012.  More information can be found here. 

The City of Manassas and Historic Manassas, Inc. are also sponsoring 150th commemorative activities.  Check out the schedule here.

Farewell to Centreville: Johnston Takes the Army South

Last week I examined the extensive preparations that Gen. Joseph Johnston made to evacuate the Confederate lines around Centreville.  Concerned about enemy activity in the region, and facing a multitude of logistical challenges, Johnston began to transport supplies to Gordonsville on February 22, 1862.  His efforts continued into March.  Johnston was consumed with worry that he might not be able to pull it all off before Gen. George McClellan had the opportunity to strike first, and he made sure that President Jefferson Davis heard about the numerous difficulties that plagued his every move.

Johnston Finally Issues the Order to Withdraw

On March 5, Johnston got word of increased Union activity across the Potomac from Gen. W.H.C. Whiting's division at Dumfries.  This was all that Johnston needed to hear.  The cautious general was convinced that a Union attempt to turn his right flank was a real and imminent possibility.  (In fact, Confederate scouts had merely picked up on movement associated with an aborted plan to attack the Confederate batteries blockading the lower Potomac.) Johnston issued orders for the army to withdraw from Northern Virginia.  As for any stores remaining in Manassas and elsewhere, the commander felt that "the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.) 

Johnston directed Whiting to fall back to Fredericksburg on the morning of March 7.  D.H. Hill was to take his brigade from Leesburg on the same day and move south of the Rappahannock River.  The four divisions encamped around Centreville received orders to withdraw on the morning of Saturday, March 8.  Given the large amount of supplies remaining at Manassas Junction, Johnston decided to delay the evacuation so that the army had a little more time to collect as much as possible from the depots before moving out.  The baggage trains were sent ahead of the divisions, and on Sunday evening, March 9, the divisions finally got underway and slipped into the night.  (OR, 1:5, 526-27; Johnston, Narrative, 102-03.)

Despite Johnston's efforts, a large amount of provisions and other supplies remained at Manassas.  The soldiers were given permission to take what they could carry as they moved through the railroad junction.  Many soldiers helped themselves to food and whiskey for the long march ahead.  Civilians were also invited to come in and take what they could before the remainder was destroyed.  

The Confederates Move Out and "Little Mac" Moves In

The divisions of James Longstreet and G.W. Smith moved southwest along the Warrenton Turnpike, while divisions under Richard Ewell and Jubal Early followed the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.  Longstreet's division alone stretched "4 or 5 miles," and the wagon train "was at least three miles in length."  (in Cutrer 82.)

Johnston dispatched Jeb Stuart's cavalry to screen the retreat and act as a rear guard.  The troopers made sure that nothing at Manassas remained for the Union Army.  They wasted no time in torching the storehouses and other railroad buildings.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, wrote home about the losses:

You can form no idea of the amount of stores, etc. that could not be moved back, and which it was necessary to destroy, not only public but private stores.  There was at least one million dollars worth of heavy baggage belonging to the soldiers which it was impossible to get away.

We burned several thousand barrels of flour, a great deal of corn, hay, etc., and at least one million pounds of bacon. . . . (in Cutrer 81.)

Trooper William Blackford, who played a role in destroying the remaining supplies, remembered that "the smell of fried bacon was wafted for twenty miles."  (Blackford 60.)  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia spoke for many men when he lamented that "[o]ur regiment, although it could ill afford the loss, had to give up most of its baggage."  (Warfield 67.)

"Bull Run, Virginia. Ruins of Stone Bridge," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Barnard and James Gibson, who worked for Matthew Brady's studio in Washington, headed to Manassas and Centreville following the Confederate evacuation.  The two men and their assistants have left a priceless photographic record of the destruction associated with the withdrawal.

"Centreville, Virginia. Quaker Gun," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Union forces occupying Centreville after the retreat found that the Confederates had armed some fortifications with wooden cannon.  The story of the so-called "Quaker guns" reached the Northern papers and proved an embarrassment to McClellan.

The Confederate losses were not confined to Centreville and Manassas.  Johnston destroyed a meat packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap whose existence had given him a bit of heartburn as he prepared to evacuate.  The Confederates also blew up the Stone Bridge at Bull Run to delay any Yankees who dared to pursue.  Most significantly, Johnston was forced to abandon the heavy artillery along the lower Potomac.  Many of the guns were destroyed by the retreating Confederates, although the Union Army later managed to salvage some of the pieces.

"Manassas, Va. Orange and Alexandria Railroad Wrecked by Retreating Confederates," by George Barnard & James Gibson (courtesy of Library of Congress).  According to photographer Alexander Gardner, the Confederates burned a railroad bridge south of Manassas before two trains were moved to safety.  The Confederates set fire to the trains, and only six cars survived.  This photograph shows one of the damaged locomotives, as well as the remaining cars.   Ruins of various buildings are visible to the left.

Before long, McClellan received news about an alleged Confederate withdrawal and ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance.  Johnston, however, was long gone when the Union Army entered Centreville and Manassas on March 10.  The New York Times reported that the junction "presented a scene of the utmost desolation, a mass of charred and blackened ruins."  (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)  Burned railcars smoldered on the tracks.  Union soldiers found abandoned knives, sabers, clothing, tents, and other equipment.  The Philadelphia Press observed that "[b]etween Centreville and Manassas the road was strewn with hundreds of dead horses, who had evidently died of starvation."  (Phila. Press, March 13, 1862.)  The Confederates were soon replaced by fugitive slaves, who fled in "droves" to the newly established Union lines around Manassas. (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)

Johnston Surprises President Davis

As Union troops occupied Manassas, Johnston's men continued their march unmolested.  Goree told his mother that "we had a great deal of bad weather," but at least the men experienced "very little sickness."  (in Cutrer 82.)  The four divisions that had set out from Centreville finally crossed the Rappahannock on March 11.  Longstreet and Smith pushed on to Culpeper Court House, while Ewell and Early set up camp close to the river on either side of the O&A Railroad.  (Johnston, Narrative, 103-04.)

On March 13, Johnston finally informed Davis of the withdrawal of his army from Centreville.  Perhaps Johnston's tardiness in reporting the date of the evacuation stemmed from his fears about a leak, but his behavior also smacks of passive-aggressiveness.  The news took the Confederate President by surprise.  In fact, on the very day after the evacuation, he had written to Johnston that reinforcements were on the way.  (OR, 1:5, 1096.)  Davis appeared particularly upset by the abandonment of supplies:

'Tis true I have many of alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat; but, having heard of no cause of such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. (OR, 1:5, 527.)

Johnston refused to shoulder any of the blame for the supplies that he left behind.  After all, he had warned Richmond about stockpiling massive amounts of provisions at the front.  When all was said and done, out of more than 5 million pounds of provisions, "[a]bout one million pounds . . . was abandoned, and half as much more was spoiled for want of shelter."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.)   In any event, the Confederate government had "collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted" and was "responsible for the losses." (Johnston, B&L, 257.)  Goree privately agreed, writing on March 23, 1862 that "the authorities at Richmond are to blame for permitting such a vast amount of stores to accumulate upon us," despite Johnston's protests "time and again."  (in Cutrer 82.)

The Confederate Army's adventures around Washington were finished for now.  At one time, the lines had extended all the way to Munson's Hill, where the advanced outposts could see the unfinished dome of the Capitol.  Johnston pulled his men back once, and then again, where they settled down for a long winter in Centreville.  As spring approached, Johnston left the region altogether, and prepared to defend Richmond from a more feasible location.  The ball was now in Little Mac's court.

Sources
George B. Abdill, Civil War Railroads: A Pictorial Story of the War Between the States, 1861-1865 (1999 ed.); Gary E. Aldeman, Manassas Battlefield Then & Now: Historic Photography at Bull Run (2011); Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); W.W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart (1993); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas H. Goree (1995); Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); New York Times, March 12, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 13, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 14, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 17, 1862; Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox (1996): Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993); Mary Alice Wills, The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C., 1861-1862 (1975).

The 17th Virginia Gets a New Brigade Commander and Settles Into Camp

This blog has traced the history of the 17th Virginia Infantry throughout the first year of the Civil War.  I have taken a particular interest in this regiment given that it was composed of men from across Northern Virginia, including Fairfax County.  By way of a quick recap, the militia companies that eventually formed the 17th  gathered in Alexandria not long after the Virginia Convention voted to secede on April 17, 1861.  They left town when Union forces invaded Virginia the next month.  Assigned to Gen. James Longstreet's brigade, the 17th Virginia played a leading role at Blackburn's Ford on July 18.  Following First Manassas, the 17th moved forward to Centreville and then Fairfax Court House.  The regiment served with Longstreet's advanced forces around Falls Church and at Mason's and Munson's Hills during August and September.  In  mid-October, the regiment fell back to Centreville as part of a general withdrawal of Confederate troops.

Autumn 1861 brought change at the top for the 17th Virginia.  Even before moving to Centreville, the men of the regiment lost their brigade commander.  In mid-October, Longstreet received a promotion to major general. After drilling his men one final time on October 12, Longstreet said his good-byes, and the soldiers responded with a loud cheer for the general who had led them through the Manassas Campaign and the recent picket war.  (Wallace 23.)  The next day Longstreet issued General Order No. 17, in which he  "express[ed] his sincere thanks to the officers and soldiers of the command for the kindly patience, the soldierly fortitude, and the cheerful obedience which they have invariably exhibited during the many hardships and privations of a long and trying campaign."  (Warfield 61.)  He concluded that "[t]he command of a brigade second to none is well worthy the boast of any general, and even regret may well be felt at promotion which removes it a step, at least, from him." (Warfield 61-62.)

Gen. Charles Clark of Mississippi replaced Longstreet, but his tenure at the top was short-lived.  On October 22, not long after the 17th moved to Centreville, the Confederate War Department organized the Department of Northern Virginia out of the forces currently operating in the area stretching from the mouth of the Potomac River to the Shenandoah Valley. The new department's Potomac District was composed of divisions under the command of Earl Van Dorn, Gustavus W. Smith, Longstreet, and Edmund Kirby Smith.  Longstreet's old brigade, including the 17th Virginia, was placed under Gen. Richard S. Ewell and was eventually assigned to Longstreet's new division.

Gen. Richard S. Ewell, the 17th Virginia's new brigade commander (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The 17th Virginia passed the time in Centreville "drilling, mounting Quaker guns, standing picket duty, and doing our part in the details set to the work of throwing up breastworks," but not all was so uneventful.  (Warfield 63.)  In late October, Virginia Governor John Letcher visited Centreville to present the flags of the Commonwealth to the Virginia regiments encamped there.  As Letcher handed a flag to the 17th, he urged the regiment to "[t]ake it, and when you go into Alexandria drive out the invaders of our soil." (Wallace 24.)   The 17th Virginia's commander, Col. Montgomery Corse, promised to plant the flag "on the ramparts of Ft. Ellsworth" in Alexandria, or "the blood of the Seventeenth shall flow freely in the attempt." (Wallace 24.)  The next day the 17th Virginia participated in a grand review of Virginia troops by the governor as spectators crowded the surrounding hills to catch a glimpse of the spectacle. 

Confederate winter quarters at Centreville, VA (courtesy of Library of Congress).  This photograph was taken in March 1862 after the Confederates had abandoned the area.

According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th, "the night of November 1 we experienced one of the most terrific storms of wind, rain, and hail that we had to contend with during the war."  (Warfield 64.)  Warfield recalled:

The storm continued throughout the night.  Every tent in the camp except two was thrown down and the contents were scattered.  The storm did not cease until the afternoon of the 2nd, and during that time the men were without shelter, thoroughly drenched, and unable to cook their meals.  (Warfield 64.)

Conditions improved by the end of the month, when the 17th began to construct log cabins in preparation for winter.*  The men of the regiment cut trees and brought them to camp in the quartermaster's wagons.  One soldier considered this work "the hardest I ever performed."  (Wallace 24.)  The small log huts, like those pictured above, served as home for the soldiers during the harsh, cold days ahead.

A battle flag of the 17th Virginia, marked with engagements from the 1862 Peninsula Campaign (courtesy of the Fairfax Rifles)

November ended with the presentation of the famed Confederate battle flag to the 17th Virginia and the other regiments at Centreville.  Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, in characteristic bombast, told the men: "Under its untarnished folds, beat back the invader and find nationality, everlasting immunity from an atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for yourselves, or death." (Warfield 65-66.)   But first, the army had to survive the winter weather, and all the misery that camp life could bring.

Notes
*Throughout October and November 1861, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston bickered with the War Department over the provision of assistance in building winter quarters.  Johnston saw the War Department as neglectful of his pleas, while Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin accused Johnston of turning away help.  In the end, the soldiers appear to have taken matters into their own hands.  See OR, 1:5, 891, 896-97, 934, 941-42, 948-49, 951; see also this post at Living in the Past concerning the dispute.

Sources
Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Back to Where They Started After Manassas: Johnston Moves the Army to Centreville

As I wrote in a series of recent posts, the Confederates left their advanced positions in Northern Virginia at the end of September 1861 and fell back to Fairfax Court House.  Commander Joseph Johnston, along with Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and G.W. Smith, had recommended an offensive action to Jefferson Davis on October 1, but the Confederate President nixed any plans for a grand invasion across the Potomac.  Johnston was left to contemplate his next move.

The commanding general recognized the vulnerability of his army's position at Fairfax.  As Johnston recalled in his Narrative after the war, "[t]he semicircular course of the Potomac, and roads converging from different points on it to our position, made it easy for the Federal army to turn either of our flanks without exposing its own communications."  (Johnston 77.)  Johnston worried that the Union Army's growing capabilities rendered the Fairfax line "more hazardous" than before.  (Johnston 77.)

According to Alfred Roman's biography of Beauregard, Johnston first suggested that the army establish a new position at Manassas, but Beauregard, "fearing the bad effect upon the army and the people of a retreat to the point held by us before our late victory, proposed Centreville instead."  (Roman 154.)  Given concerns that Centreville "was somewhat commanded by a succession of heights too distant to be embraced within the Confederate line,"  Beauregard also offered to take charge of establishing defensive positions.  Johnston's Narrative does not discuss Beauregard's role in selecting Centreville, and Roman's book, which is likely Beauregard's ghostwritten autobiography, may give Old Bory too much credit.

Johnston finally issued the order for the army to move to Centreville in mid-October.*  The position was less exposed than Fairfax and sat not far from the critical railroad junction at Manassas.  The divisions of James Longstreet and Earl Van Dorn occupied the ground between Union Mills and Centreville, with the position at Union Mills anchoring the Confederate right.  Gen. Smith's division was sent to the heights above the Warrenton Turnpike near Centreville, while "Stonewall" Jackson's soldiers were held in reserve to the rear of the town.  (Jackson himself would soon take charge of the Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia and head out to the Shenandoah.)  Gen. Jeb Stuart's cavalry force patrolled the countryside in advance of the Centreville line.

Detail of the Centreville area from an 1862 Union Army map (courtesy of the Library of Congress).  The circle at the top indicates Centreville and the hills to the north of Warrenton Turnpike.  The circle at the bottom shows the location of Union Mills, the right of the Confederate line.  Manassas Junction is at the bottom left of the map.

Johnston immediately set to work on the defenses at Centreville, but not all was as formidable as it appeared:

The engineers were directed to fortify the summit of the hill near this village— that, by holding it, the strongest and salient point of the position, with two or three thousand men, the army itself might be free to manoeuvre. As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere, at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. (Johnston 78.)

"Centreville, Va., Fort on heights, with Quaker guns," photograph taken in March 1862 after Union occupation (courtesy of  Library of Congress).

Private Edgar Warfield recalled the withdrawal of the 17th Virginia to Centreville:

It was with real regret that we left Fairfax. We had spent many pleasant hours at the place, and it was so near home for many of us. But such is a soldier's lot. Previous to leaving camp details were named from several regiments to move telegraph wires and take them to Centreville. The next morning [October 17] found us pitching our tents on our new camp grounds on the heights near the village of Centreville. (Warfield 63.)

The Confederates settled in for a long fall and winter.  During the months after First Manassas, many soldiers, including the 17th Virginia, moved eastward to Fairfax Court House and beyond.  This ground had been taken with no real bloodshed, but had also been given up without a fight.  Now, the views of the unfinished Capitol dome from Munson's Hill were but a memory, and the Confederates sat not far from the very battlefield where they had beaten the Union Army back in July. 

Note
*Most accounts indicate that the Confederates fell back sometime between October 16-19.  Johnston and Longstreet, for example, mark the event as occurring on October 19, while an October 18 letter home from Longstreet aide Tom Goree indicates that the army headed to Centreville sometime before the 19th.  Private Edgar Warfield's memoirs state that his regiment received Johnston's order on the night of October 16 and arrived the next morning at Centreville.

Sources
Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Jefferson Davis Visits Fairfax, Confers with the Top Brass, and Reviews the Army: Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1861

As I discussed in a recent post, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston wrote to Judah P. Benjamin, the acting Secretary of War in Richmond, urging that Benjamin, a representative, or President Jefferson Davis come to Fairfax Court House to confer about a possible offensive.  Benjamin responded to Johnston on September 29, 1861, telling him it was "extremely difficult. . . to determine whether or not we can furnish you the further means you may deem necessary to assume the active offensive."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  The secretary in part blamed Johnston for the government's inability to assess the situation:  "We have not in the Department a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  Benjamin told Johnston that he had "earnestly requested the President to visit your headquarters in person, and to learn on conference with you the true position of your army in all respects, and the possibility of a prompt offensive movement."  Davis "consented to this," and Benjamin hoped that Davis would reach Johnston's camp within a day or two. (OR, 1:5, 883.)

Arrival in Fairfax

The Confederate President boarded the train to Richmond early on September 30 and arrived at Fairfax Station late in the afternoon. Civilians and soldiers lining the route to Fairfax Court House cheered the President as he passed by, and Davis tipped his hat to the admirers. Due to an apparent "misunderstanding," the army never procured a house in Fairfax for the President to use during his visit. (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.) Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, however, came to the rescue and brought the President to stay at his headquarters. Generals Johnston and Gustavus W. Smith called on Davis that evening to pay their respects, but "no official subjects were alluded to in that interview." (OR, 1:5, 884-85.)

Jefferson Davis, photo by Matthew Brady, c. 1858-60 (courtesy of Library of Congress).

The October 1 Conference

The next day, October 1, Davis "rode many miles visiting the encampments."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  A couple companies of the 16th Mississippi also took Davis on a reconnaissance mission near the Union lines, which now occupied the high ground around Falls Church that the Confederates had just recently abandoned.

The night of October 1, Davis conferred with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at headquarters.  Much ink has been spilled on this famous "council of war," at which Davis and the top commanders in Virginia discussed the possibility of assuming the offensive and invading the North.  First and foremost, I counsel readers to check out the entire text of Smith's January 31, 1862 memorandum on the conference in the OR. (See OR, 1:5, 884-87.)  The memorandum was also signed by Beauregard and Johnston. Davis himself claims to have seen this document for the first time in 1880. (Davis 450.)  The accounts by Davis, Johnston, and Roman are also worth reading.  (See the sources below for links.)  Sherman over at Living in the Past has done a great job of describing the meeting and the subsequent controversy between Davis and his generals over the conference.  (See here.) The Civil War Daily Gazette also has a good post on the subject.  (See here.)

At the conference, Smith was the first to broach the subject that had compelled Davis to come to Fairfax in the first place.  He asked, "Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive?" (OR, 1:5, 885.)  A discussion ensued.  All those present at the conference agreed that "the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad; that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition; that if kept inactive it must retrograde immensely in every respect firing the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all."   (OR, 1:5, 885.) 

Davis was again asked, "Is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy's country? Can you not by stripping other points to the last they will bear, and, even risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition to move forward?"  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  The generals argued that "success here was success everywhere, defeat here defeat everywhere."  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  Gen. Beauregard had been pushing a more aggressive strategy for quite some time now, and most certainly wanted to ensure that Davis accepted his plan to invade Maryland and threaten Washington. 

Davis got to the point.  He wanted to know how many men were needed to take the offensive.  Smith said 50,000; Johnston and Beauregard stated a more conservative 60,000.  The latter two also claimed that the supplies in Northern Virginia were "entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis opposed the suggestion to transfer soldiers to Virginia. After all, the President was under pressure from all parts of the country to defend the Confederacy.  Davis regretted that he could furnish no reinforcements at the time, and even if he could, he had no weapons to arm them.

The generals seemed resigned that "there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the enemy."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis toyed with the idea of "partial operations" into Maryland to strike a "sudden blow" against Union troops on the lower or upper Potomac.  The generals saw too many risks in such a plan and largely rejected the idea.  However, they threw a bone to Davis, agreeing that "if any opportunity should occur offering reasonable chances of success, the attempt would be made." (OR, 1:5, 887.)  The two-hour conference thus dashed Beauregard's dream of a decisive blow across the Potomac. 

Review of the Army

The Confederate President woke up to rain on October 2.  Davis wrote to his wife that  "if the weather permits, I shall resume my labors and to-morrow hope to return."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  The President also expressed disappointment with what he had seen so far: "The condition of things here is not as good as I expected and the position has nothing but its comfort to recommend it."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  I have not yet found a record of what the President did that day, but the rain may have caused a disruption in Davis' schedule.

The next afternoon, the President reviewed the Confederate troops quartered in the area.  Soldiers from several brigades lined the road for about a mile and a half, stretching from Fairfax Court House towards Germantown.  Gen. James Longstreet's men, including the 17th Virgina, participated in the spectacle.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, described "quite a display" in a letter to his sister a few days later:

The President & Genls Johnston, Beauregard & Smith, with their aids [sic] & escort, road along the line in front, whilst our bands as they passed were discoursing excellent music. The President would salute each flag as he passed it. After he passed the line, he then took a position, and the line formed into column and passed him, the officers saluting as they passed. (in Cutrer 47.)

Following the review, Longstreet  and his staff headed to Beauregard's headquarters to meet with Davis.  According to Goree, the President "spoke of the honorable positions we had occupied in the advance" and "asked if we could give him a view of the Potomac."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Goree, all to aware of the recent evacuation of Munson's and Mason's Hills, replied that "we could have done so, a few days since, but could not now."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Davis, full of bluster, replied that "I hope that in a short time we will force a view of it, at the Long Bridge."  (in Cutrer 47.)  How the Confederate President expected that to happen in light of the conference of October 1, he did not say.

Davis boarded a train that night and returned to Richmond. The President's trip had given Johnston the answer he needed.  The cautious commander had made the right decision after all in withdrawing his men from their advanced position.  Now Johnston would turn to establishing a purely defensive position, and even Fairfax felt a bit too forward for his purposes.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Lynda L. Crist & Mary S. Dix (eds.), The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1861, Vol. 7 (1991); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1 (1881); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part II

The order came on the evening of September 27, 1861.  Confederate commander Joseph Johnston worried that his current position left his army exposed and vulnerable.  Unless the government in Richmond was prepared to provide the men and materiel for an offensive action, Johnston saw little value in remaining so far forward.  Gen. James Longstreet also reported on the twenty-seventh that he received information that his advanced position would be attacked by "a very strong force in a few days."  (OR, 1:51:2, 317.)  Perhaps this is all Johnston needed to hear.  Rather than risk a possible engagement along the forward line, the commander sent his men packing.  The Confederates occupying Munson's, Mason's, and Upton's Hills, Falls Church, and other advanced positions were told to fall back towards Fairfax Court House.

The withdrawal played out during the course of the night. According to Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, "before midnight we had abandoned all the splendid positions (Mason's, Munson's & Upton's Hills) . . . which we held in front of the enemy and in sight of the Potomac & Washington."  (in Cutrer 47.)   The Confederate Army had surrendered the high ground without a fight.

The 17th Virginia was doing duty in Falls Church when the order came. The regiment marched about three miles outside of town and camped for the night, only to return the next day. The 17th finally left the town for Camp Harrison in Fairfax Court House on the twenty-ninth. A couple soldiers posted a note on the gate to The Falls Church addressed to prospective Union occupiers:

Having been resident denizens of Falls Church for some time, we to-day reluctantly evacuate, not because you intimidate by your presence, but only in obedience to military dictation. We leave you a fire to cook potatoes, also to warm by, as the nights are now uncomfortable on account of their chilling influence.  (in Wallace 22.)

Goree wrote that the Confederates regretted leaving the advanced positions, "not only on account of being so pleasantly situated, but we all liked the excitement which our proximity to the Yankees produced."  (in Cutrer 47.)   He wrongly speculated that "the move was a strategic one, made to try and induce the Yankees to make an advance on us and give us battle in an open field."  (in Cutrer 47.) 



"General McClellan Occupying the Confederate Position at Munson's Hill," from a period engraving (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery).  The Union commander wasted no time in crossing the Potomac and riding out to the front upon learning that the Confederates had withdrawn from the area around Munson's Hill.

Goree's boss was not far off the mark as to Union intentions. Around the time the Confederates were marching towards Fairfax, Maj. Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, ordered Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson to advance from his position around Bailey's Crossroads and seize Munson's and Upton's Hills from the Confederates. Troops from Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division were to support the right flank of Richardson's brigade. On September 28, Federal soldiers stormed the empty Confederate works on Munson's and Upton's Hills without a fight. The capture of Mason's Hill soon followed. As McClellan wrote to his wife on September 29, "The moral effect of this advance will be great & it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, & I hope they have taken their last look at [Washington]." (Sears 104.)  The Confederates, meanwhile, had to determine their next move, but the chances for a fall offensive were not looking so good.

Sources
Russel H. Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command: September 1861-February 1862(2002); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); "Munson's Hill Evacuated by the Rebels," New York Times, Sept. 29, 1861; "The Occupation of Mason's Hill," New York Times, Oct. 2, 1861; Stephen W. Sears (ed.), The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (1989); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Lewinsville, Round 2: The Confederates Encounter "Baldy" Smith's Men Once Again

Last year I wrote about a skirmish that occurred in Lewinsville a couple weeks after the better-known encounter there on September 11, 1861. (See here.)  While researching the September 25 engagement, I noticed the lack of sources telling the Confederate side of the story. In fact, the OR does not appear to contain any official Confederate reports on the skirmish. I was left wondering about the identity of the Confederate units who attacked Brig. Gen. "Baldy" Smith's men near the tiny Northern Virginian hamlet. Following additional research, I recently uncovered more about Confederate involvement in this minor and relatively bloodless action. So, for my 150th anniversary post, I'd like to take a closer look at the Confederates who participated in the skirmish at Lewinsville.

Around nine in the morning of September 25, Smith led a Union force of 5,100 infantry, 16 guns, and 150 cavalry on a reconnaissance and foraging mission to Lewinsville. Smith deployed his men and guns along the road from Langley to Lewinsville and directed the quartermaster to start loading his wagons with forage. Not long afterwards, a body of Confederate cavalry appeared just east of Lewinsville. Capt. Thaddeus Mott's artillery opened fire on the troopers and drove them away.  In all likelihood, the cavalry scouts returned to the Confederate advanced line near Falls Church to warn of the Federal expedition.

The Confederates quickly prepared for battle. Gen. James Longstreet assembled a force consisting of the 1st Georgia, 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina, 13th Virginia, 17th Virginia, 1st Virginia Cavalry, and Capt. Thomas Rosser's Washington Artillery of New Orleans. (Gernand 94-95; see also Wallace 21.)*  Three of these units -- the 1st Virginia Cavalry, 13th Virginia, and Washington Artillery -- had fought Smith's men only a few weeks earlier at the first "Battle of Lewinsville."  The soldiers organized around The Falls Church and set out on the road to Lewinsville (likely today's Great Falls Street). The Confederates also loaded all of their wagons and sent them to Fairfax Court House, presumably to avoid capture of supplies in the event of a Union victory.  As Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, told his mother a couple days later, the Confederates were "expecting to have a very severe fight."  (in Cutrer 45.)

By three in the afternoon, Smith had gathered an incredible 90 wagon loads of forage.  The general recalled his skirmishers and sent the wagons back to the Federal lines.  At about 4 p.m., just as Smith's men were preparing for their return to camp, the Confederates struck.  Smith described the opening of the skirmish in his official report:

[W]e could see advancing over the hills from the Falls Church road what seemed to be a large regiment, marching rapidly in close column and others deployed as skirmishers, with the apparent intention of turning our flank. At the same time they opened fire with seemingly one gun on our extreme left, but at too great distance for any effect, which ceased entirely. . . . Their cavalry was seen in small bodies, moving through the corn fields and woods to our left and on the Lewinsville road. (OR, 1:5, 216.)

Rosser, likely realizing that his guns were having little impact, moved them into position to the right of the Union force "at about 2,500 yards," where he opened fire on Mott's section at Mackall's House. (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Federal artillery under Mott and Capt. Charles Griffin answered the Confederate guns.  Some of the Union rounds fell among the infantry gathered at the graveyard of the Lewinsville Presbyterian Church.  The two sides exchanged about 30 rounds before the skirmish ended with little, if any, participation by the infantry.  Smith recalled that "we could see their dust as they retreated on the Falls Church road."  (OR, 1:5, 216.)  Smith's men moved slowly back to camp, where they arrived about seven that evening. 

Thomas L. Rosser, commander of the Confederate artillery at Lewinsville, who rose to become a cavalry general (courtesy of Wikipedia).

The Confederates, however, had not left the scene entirely. Rosser hauled one gun to a hill overlooking the crossroads at Langley and around dusk fired four or five shots.  Smith sent a scout to investigate, but by the time he arrived, the Confederates were gone.  First Sergeant W.H. Andrews of the 1st Georgia remembered that the Confederates returned to Falls Church "as proud as if we had really been in a battle of some consequence."  (in Gernand 95.)

Smith reported that one man was wounded "slightly in the arm" by a bursting shell.  (OR, 1:5, 217.)  Tom Goree wrote to his mother on September 27 that the Union Army "got some of the best of this fight, as they killed one of our men, and took another prisoner, who rode up to them mistaking them for friends."  (in Cutrer 45.)  Andrews' account differs in that he recalled that two men, both from the 2nd South Carolina, were killed during the skirmish.  In all, casualties had been light, just as in the encounter of September 11.

Clearly the armies were restless, and many soldiers must have felt the anticipation of a big battle approaching. Within a period of just two weeks, Confederate and Union forces had clashed at Lewinsville, a village not far from Longstreet's advanced line. The second skirmish involved even greater numbers than the first. As Goree wrote on September 27, "I think, Mother, that the fight will come off somewhere in a very few days. We will either advance or the enemy will." (in Cutrer 45.) The young aide was probably not alone in his sentiments as the two armies headed into the first autumn of the war.

Notes
*According to a first-hand account by First Sergeant W.H. Andrews, his regiment, the 1st Georgia, marched to Lewinsville with the 9th Georgia, 2nd South Carolina,13th Virginia, "Col. [Jeb] Stuart's Regiment of Black Horse Cavalry" (1st Virginia Cavalry), and Rosser's battery.  (Gernand 95.)  Wallace's history of the 17th Virginia places the 17th at Lewinsville along with the 2nd South Carolina and two guns of the Washington Artillery.  (Wallace 21.)

Sources
"Another Important Reconnoissance [sic] Near Washington," New York Times, Sept. 26, 1861; Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Addendum, September 26, 2011
Thanks to reader Dudley Bokoski for pointing out a reference to the September 25 skirmish at Lewinsville in a report from Gen. James Longstreet in which he blamed Col. Joseph Kershaw of the 2nd S.C. for not striking a decisive blow.  (See OR, 1:51:2, 314.)  As Longstreet said, "I am inclined to think that the failure of the effort is due entirely to Colonel Kershaw's getting on a different road from the one I intended he should have taken. Had he been up to time there is no doubt but there would have been one more Bull Run affair.  As things miscarried, the enemy discovered us in time to get a good start."  Unfortunately, neither Kershaw's nor Stuart's reports of the skirmish survive.