A Detour to Delaplane, Virginia: The First Bull Run Campaign and the Manassas Gap Railroad

This past weekend I decided to take the family for an outing in the countryside.  On Saturday morning we put the boys in their car seats, jumped into the SUV, and headed to Sky Meadows State Park in Fauquier County.  My wife and I first visited the park back in 2010.  The historic home of Mt. Bleak, located on the grounds of Sky Meadows, has several connections to Mosby's Rangers and the Civil War.  (I wrote a post about my previous visit here.)  Of course, I couldn't resist taking a little detour to another Civil War site on the way to Sky Meadows. 

Near the confluence of Goose Creek and Crooked Run we pulled off Rt. 17 and stopped at Delaplane.  This tiny hamlet, known as Piedmont Station during the Civil War, appears much as it did in the mid-nineteenth century.  The Manassas Gap Railroad reached the area in 1852.  The company decided to place a new station near the point where the railroad crossed the vital transportation link of the Dumfries-Winchester Road (now Rt. 17).  The town grew up around the station, and by the start of the Civil War, had become an important rail center in Fauquier County.  Piedmont Station was renamed Delaplane in 1874 and today is designated as a Historic District on the National Register of Historic Places.

Civil War Trails marker on Delaplane Grade Rd., just to the south of the old Manassas Gap Railroad line.  Today the tracks are part of the Norfolk Southern system. 

Piedmont Station played a key role in the First Bull Run Campaign.  Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, received an urgent order on July 18, 1861 to join forces with Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction.  The general, worried that his volunteer army would take too long to march to Beauregard's assistance, opted instead to send his army by rail.  Johnston proceeded to Piedmont Station and oversaw preparations for the transportation of his men to Manassas Junction.

Close-up of the Civil War Trails marker.  (More information can be found here on the Historical Marker Database.)  The marker makes the claim that "[h]ere. . . trains were used for the first time in history to move troops to impending battle." 

Meanwhile, Johnston's army was on the move out of the Shenandoah Valley.  Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's brigade left the Winchester area around noon on July 18.  After marching all day and night, they passed through Ashby's Gap and stopped in Paris at two in the morning of July 19.  (Incidentally, I wrote about Paris and Jackson-related sites a few years ago.)  Jackson allowed his men a few hours of rest before they set out to complete the remaining six miles to Piedmont Station. They arrived at six in the morning.  Patriotic civilians greeted Jackson's troops at the station and offered them food and drink.  Jackson's men, likely basking in the glow of admirers, ate their breakfast and then boarded the train of freight and cattle cars for Manassas.  Progress was slow.  The 34-mile trip took an incredible eight hours.  Jackson, of course, would go on to earn the nickname "Stonewall" on the battlefield of Manassas on July 21. 

Two original railroad buildings dating to 1852.  These structures have been used as depots, warehouses, and stores.  The National Register of Historic Places Registration Form for Delaplane notes that "[t]he survival of these two large antebellum brick structures associated with the railroad is a rare occurrence in Virginia since few antebellum brick buildings of this scale can be documented anywhere else in Virginia."  (p. 16.)

Despite logistical difficulties, regiments from the brigades of Col. Francis Bartow and Gen. Barnard Bee followed Jackson over the course of the next day or so.  The brigade of Col. Arnold Elzey, under the temporary command of Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, did not leave Piedmont Station until the early morning hours of July 21.  The men arrived at Manassas mid-day and marched quickly to the sounds of battle.  Elzey's troops smashed into the Federal right on Chinn Ridge and helped to secure the Confederate victory.

Another view of the antebellum railroad buildings, taken from Rokeby Rd.  The railroad line runs in front of the buildings.



Looking west down the old Manassas Gap Railroad tracks from Rokeby Rd. in Delaplane.  A Virginia State Historical Marker on Piedmont Station and First Manassas sits to the right.  (See here for text.)  The white SUV is traveling south on Rt. 17, the old Dumfries-Winchester Rd. 

Today Delaplane sits almost untouched by time.  You'll find no Starbucks, McDonald's, or strip malls there.  It isn't hard to imagine Jackson's troops mounting the rail cars and starting their journey towards Manassas and fame.  Walking next to the tracks, I was reminded of the contribution that this village made to modern military history.  Railroads played an important part in the Civil War, and Johnston's operation at Piedmont Station stood near the very start of it all.  Although the means of transportation proved a little slower than Johnston may have liked, his actions at Piedmont Station demonstrated the value of harnessing railroad technology to military advantage.  That's big stuff for such a small place, and well worth a stop to look around and ponder.

Sources

William C. Davis, Battle at Bull Run (1985 ed.); Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of First Bull Run (2009); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, Delaplane Historic District (2003); Ethan Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas (2002).

Adding to the Newspaper Collection: Munson's Hill & Bailey's Crossroads in 1861

As frequent readers know, I am an avid collector of antique Civil War-era newspapers.  I often search for editions containing wartime scenes from across Northern Virginia and Washington.  Not too long ago I spotted a September 30, 1861 edition of the New York Illustrated News on eBay.  I was immediately drawn to the full-page engraving of Bailey's Crossroads and Munson's Hill.*  I am familiar with other period illustrations of these landmarks from Harper's Weekly, but I had never seen this particular engraving from the lesser-known Illustrated News.


New York Illustrated News, Sept. 30, 1861.  The cover illustration shows Federal vessels driving back an iron-plated Confederate steamer at Newport News, Virginia.  I purchased the paper from eBay dealer lindastevea.

I've written extensively about both Munson's Hill and Bailey's Crossroads.  (See here and here.)   In August 1861, Confederates under James Longstreet pushed the Confederate lines in Northern Virginia closer to Washington.  The advanced position stretched beyond Falls Church to Munson's Hill and other locations.  The Confederates erected earthworks at the top of Munson's Hill, where they could see the unfinished Capitol dome in the distance.  The Union Army moved towards Bailey's Crossroads, not far down the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike (today's Rt. 7) from Munson's Hill.  The picket war in and around Bailey's became quite heated at times.  Recognizing the vulnerability of the advanced line, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston finally withdrew his forces from Munson's Hill at the end of September 1861.

"Munson's Hill, as Seen from Bailey's Cross Roads."  Union forces seized Munson's Hill on September 28, 1861.  Given the date of publication (Sept. 30, 1861), it is likely that this engraving was sketched during the time of the Confederate occupation and only printed after the evacuation.

The engraving depicts Bailey's Crossroads looking northwest up the Leesburg Turnpike towards the Confederate earthworks on Munson's Hill.  The Columbia Turnpike runs perpendicular to the Leesburg Turnpike.  A Union picket stands to the right of the picture, while two soldiers survey the Rebel position in the distance.  The sketch artist was B.C. Kidder of the 2nd Michigan.  Incidentally, pickets from this regiment clashed with Confederate infantry around Bailey's Crossroads at the end of August and start of September 1861.  (See here.) 

Close-up of the engraving showing the Confederate earthworks at the top of Munson's Hill.  The Confederate flag flying above Munson's Hill was visible all the way from Washington.  The "News and Notes" section of the Illustrated News reported: "A young lady residing in the upper part of Georgetown has just received a letter from her brother in the Rebel army, in which he states that from his post, near Munson's Hill, he can see the lights of his own home every night. . . . He had made great exertions to accompany the advance guard, in order that he might be among the first to enter the Capital, and rejoin his family at the earliest moment."

Today the same ground, covered with strip malls, chain restaurants, and residential development, bears little resemblance to the area during the Civil War.  (See here for a contemporary map.)  The engraving from the New York York Illustrated News takes us to a different time, beyond the traffic congestion and big box stores.  Such old newspaper images bring the past alive and remind us of how Northern Virginia once sat in the middle of a war zone. 

Note

*At the time of the Civil War, the location was spelled "Bailey's Cross Roads."

Good Bye to Camps Pierpont and Griffin: The Union Army Moves Out

As frequent readers of this blog are aware, I have devoted considerable attention to the Union Army camps that were established near Langley and Lewinsville, Virginia in October 1861.  After all, I live near the very area in present-day McLean where thousands of blue clad troops spent the first winter of the Civil War.  Camp Griffin served as the base for Gen. William "Baldy" Smith's division, including the famous Vermont Brigade.  The Pennsylvania Reserves under Gen. George A. McCall considered Camp Pierpont their home.

This week marks a 150th anniversary that pales in comparison to the Battle of Pea Ridge and the clash of the ironclads in Hampton Roads.  However, in my quiet little corner of the Civil War universe, the Union Army bid farewell to Lewinsville and Langley.  The units encamped here went on to participate in the storied history of the Army of the Potomac, and many became famous in their own right.  But it was at Camps Pierpont and Griffin that they drilled, paraded, and otherwise prepared for the campaigns ahead.

As I wrote in my last post, Confederate Gen. Joseph Johnston withdrew his army from Centreville and Manassas on March 9, 1862.  Word of the evacuation soon reached Union commander George McClellan in Washington.  That night he issued a general order for the divisions of his army to advance towards Manassas and Centreville.  In the first instance, the commander felt that he "might be able to take advantage of some accident and bring Johnston to battle under favorable circumstances."  (McClellan, Own Story, 222.)  However, recognizing that Johnston may have escaped altogether, McClellan felt that he could also use the advance to "break up the camps, give the troops a little experience in marching and bivouac before finally leaving the old base of supplies, to test the transportation arrangements and get rid of impedimenta, and thus prepare things" for his upcoming campaign.  (McClellan, Own Story, 222.)   As an added bonus, the movement could possibly throw Johnston into a state of confusion about the Union Army's true intentions.

The Vermont Brigade at Camp Griffin learned at midnight that they were to march at three in the morning on March 10.  The men were directed to prepare two days' rations.  The news of an advance "was received with cheers and rejoicing throughout the brigade."  (Benedict 241.)  The Vermonters were finally striking camp, and many soldiers became excited at the thought that they might soon have a chance to fight and defeat the Rebels.  The men raced to ready their knapsacks for the march. They also set fire to equipment and supplies that they could not easily take with them.  Some soldiers even dashed off letters to loved ones back home. 

Camp of the 3rd Vermont at Camp Griffin, Lewinsville, Virginia, by George Houghton (courtesy of Vermont Historical Society)

The brigade assembled with the rest of the division in a large field and set out in a "drizzling rain" at sunrise.  (Benedict 241.)   The snaking column of Smith's division moved through Lewinsville and continued southwest to Vienna, site of an early skirmish in 1861.  The men walked mainly on the side of the road to make way for wagon trains that accompanied the division.  Corporal Dan Mason of the 6th Vermont felt that the rain "made it muddy & hard walking."  (Ltr., Mason to Fiancee, Mar. 31, 1862.)  After a march of around ten miles, the division was halted north of Fairfax Court House at Flint Hill (present-day Oakton).  As the minutes turned into hours, the soldier surely began to wonder what was happening.  Near the end of the day, the Vermont boys heard "a whispered rumor that there was no enemy in front to be attacked."  (Benedict 241-42.)  Disappointed in the news, the men prepared to spend the night at Flint Hill.

The Pennsylvania Reserves at Camp Pierpont received the orders to march around midday on March 10.  As Private A.F. Hill of the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves recalled:

Instantly all was bustle and excitement. Coffee-pots were kicked over; a few extra provisions were thrust into haversacks; knapsacks were hurriedly packed, and in fifteen minutes the regiment was formed. . . .  (Hill 200).

The Bucktail regiment also "broke camp in good spirits."  (Thomson & Rauch 89.)  Just like the Vermonters who had left Camp Griffin that morning, the Pennsylvania boys hoped that they were on their way to fight the enemy. 

McCall's division left Langley around 1 p.m.  As Hill described the departure of the 8th Pennsylvania Reserves, "[t]he band struck up a favorite air, we moved as one man, and uttering one wild farewell cheer, we marched from Camp Pierpont—forever."  (Hill 200.)  The soldiers moved along the Leesburg-Georgetown Turnpike in the direction of Dranesville, a place where many of them had fought the previous December.  The rain soon gave way to clearer weather.  Hill observed that due to the rough conditions of the march, "many extra great-coats, many blankets, and much superfluous clothing were abandoned by the way—left lying at the road-side."  (Hill 201.)

The division continued across Difficult Run.  Around three miles from Dranesville, the men turned left onto a smaller road through the woods and crossed the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike.  Around eight that night, the Pennsylvania Reserves entered the neighborhood of Hunter's Mills (current-day Hunter Mill Road area of Reston), north of Fairfax Court House.  The men had marched around fifteen to eighteen miles since setting out.  As one Bucktail told to a local newspaper a few days later, "[t]his was one of the hardest marches for a short one, that we ever had, and it was worse because we had been confined in camp so long. . . ."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Mar. 19, 1862.)   The division was halted, and the men bivouacked for the night in the cold and damp weather.

Meanwhile, other elements of the Union Army had reached Centreville and Manassas and found that Johnston was long gone.  McClellan considered that "it was now evident, from the information received, that it would be impossible to reach the enemy within a reasonable distance from Washington."  (McClellan, Own Story, 224.)  The commanding general therefore decided to keep his divisions where they stood and returned to planning for his upcoming campaign.   The men sleeping at Flint Hill and Hunter's Mills would have to wait a while longer before they had the chance to beat Joe Johnston.

Up Next:  Life in the camps at Hunter's Mills and Flint Hill.

Sources
Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); George Grenville Benedict, Vermont in the Civil War, Vol. 1, (1886);  M.D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); A.F. Hill, Our Boys: The Personal Experiences of a Soldier in the Army of the Potomac (1864); George Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1 (1913); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (1864); Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Vermont Historical Society, On-Line Collection of Letters of Dan Mason; Wellsboro Agitator, March 18, 1862; Paul G. Zeller, The Second Vermont Volunteer Infantry Regiment, 1861-1865 (2002).

Farewell to Centreville: Johnston Takes the Army South

Last week I examined the extensive preparations that Gen. Joseph Johnston made to evacuate the Confederate lines around Centreville.  Concerned about enemy activity in the region, and facing a multitude of logistical challenges, Johnston began to transport supplies to Gordonsville on February 22, 1862.  His efforts continued into March.  Johnston was consumed with worry that he might not be able to pull it all off before Gen. George McClellan had the opportunity to strike first, and he made sure that President Jefferson Davis heard about the numerous difficulties that plagued his every move.

Johnston Finally Issues the Order to Withdraw

On March 5, Johnston got word of increased Union activity across the Potomac from Gen. W.H.C. Whiting's division at Dumfries.  This was all that Johnston needed to hear.  The cautious general was convinced that a Union attempt to turn his right flank was a real and imminent possibility.  (In fact, Confederate scouts had merely picked up on movement associated with an aborted plan to attack the Confederate batteries blockading the lower Potomac.) Johnston issued orders for the army to withdraw from Northern Virginia.  As for any stores remaining in Manassas and elsewhere, the commander felt that "the space of fifteen days was time enough in which to subordinate an army to the Commissary Department."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.) 

Johnston directed Whiting to fall back to Fredericksburg on the morning of March 7.  D.H. Hill was to take his brigade from Leesburg on the same day and move south of the Rappahannock River.  The four divisions encamped around Centreville received orders to withdraw on the morning of Saturday, March 8.  Given the large amount of supplies remaining at Manassas Junction, Johnston decided to delay the evacuation so that the army had a little more time to collect as much as possible from the depots before moving out.  The baggage trains were sent ahead of the divisions, and on Sunday evening, March 9, the divisions finally got underway and slipped into the night.  (OR, 1:5, 526-27; Johnston, Narrative, 102-03.)

Despite Johnston's efforts, a large amount of provisions and other supplies remained at Manassas.  The soldiers were given permission to take what they could carry as they moved through the railroad junction.  Many soldiers helped themselves to food and whiskey for the long march ahead.  Civilians were also invited to come in and take what they could before the remainder was destroyed.  

The Confederates Move Out and "Little Mac" Moves In

The divisions of James Longstreet and G.W. Smith moved southwest along the Warrenton Turnpike, while divisions under Richard Ewell and Jubal Early followed the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.  Longstreet's division alone stretched "4 or 5 miles," and the wagon train "was at least three miles in length."  (in Cutrer 82.)

Johnston dispatched Jeb Stuart's cavalry to screen the retreat and act as a rear guard.  The troopers made sure that nothing at Manassas remained for the Union Army.  They wasted no time in torching the storehouses and other railroad buildings.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, wrote home about the losses:

You can form no idea of the amount of stores, etc. that could not be moved back, and which it was necessary to destroy, not only public but private stores.  There was at least one million dollars worth of heavy baggage belonging to the soldiers which it was impossible to get away.

We burned several thousand barrels of flour, a great deal of corn, hay, etc., and at least one million pounds of bacon. . . . (in Cutrer 81.)

Trooper William Blackford, who played a role in destroying the remaining supplies, remembered that "the smell of fried bacon was wafted for twenty miles."  (Blackford 60.)  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia spoke for many men when he lamented that "[o]ur regiment, although it could ill afford the loss, had to give up most of its baggage."  (Warfield 67.)

"Bull Run, Virginia. Ruins of Stone Bridge," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Barnard and James Gibson, who worked for Matthew Brady's studio in Washington, headed to Manassas and Centreville following the Confederate evacuation.  The two men and their assistants have left a priceless photographic record of the destruction associated with the withdrawal.

"Centreville, Virginia. Quaker Gun," by George Barnard, March 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Union forces occupying Centreville after the retreat found that the Confederates had armed some fortifications with wooden cannon.  The story of the so-called "Quaker guns" reached the Northern papers and proved an embarrassment to McClellan.

The Confederate losses were not confined to Centreville and Manassas.  Johnston destroyed a meat packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap whose existence had given him a bit of heartburn as he prepared to evacuate.  The Confederates also blew up the Stone Bridge at Bull Run to delay any Yankees who dared to pursue.  Most significantly, Johnston was forced to abandon the heavy artillery along the lower Potomac.  Many of the guns were destroyed by the retreating Confederates, although the Union Army later managed to salvage some of the pieces.

"Manassas, Va. Orange and Alexandria Railroad Wrecked by Retreating Confederates," by George Barnard & James Gibson (courtesy of Library of Congress).  According to photographer Alexander Gardner, the Confederates burned a railroad bridge south of Manassas before two trains were moved to safety.  The Confederates set fire to the trains, and only six cars survived.  This photograph shows one of the damaged locomotives, as well as the remaining cars.   Ruins of various buildings are visible to the left.

Before long, McClellan received news about an alleged Confederate withdrawal and ordered the Army of the Potomac to advance.  Johnston, however, was long gone when the Union Army entered Centreville and Manassas on March 10.  The New York Times reported that the junction "presented a scene of the utmost desolation, a mass of charred and blackened ruins."  (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)  Burned railcars smoldered on the tracks.  Union soldiers found abandoned knives, sabers, clothing, tents, and other equipment.  The Philadelphia Press observed that "[b]etween Centreville and Manassas the road was strewn with hundreds of dead horses, who had evidently died of starvation."  (Phila. Press, March 13, 1862.)  The Confederates were soon replaced by fugitive slaves, who fled in "droves" to the newly established Union lines around Manassas. (N.Y. Times, March 12, 1862.)

Johnston Surprises President Davis

As Union troops occupied Manassas, Johnston's men continued their march unmolested.  Goree told his mother that "we had a great deal of bad weather," but at least the men experienced "very little sickness."  (in Cutrer 82.)  The four divisions that had set out from Centreville finally crossed the Rappahannock on March 11.  Longstreet and Smith pushed on to Culpeper Court House, while Ewell and Early set up camp close to the river on either side of the O&A Railroad.  (Johnston, Narrative, 103-04.)

On March 13, Johnston finally informed Davis of the withdrawal of his army from Centreville.  Perhaps Johnston's tardiness in reporting the date of the evacuation stemmed from his fears about a leak, but his behavior also smacks of passive-aggressiveness.  The news took the Confederate President by surprise.  In fact, on the very day after the evacuation, he had written to Johnston that reinforcements were on the way.  (OR, 1:5, 1096.)  Davis appeared particularly upset by the abandonment of supplies:

'Tis true I have many of alarming reports of great destruction of ammunition, camp equipage, and provisions, indicating precipitate retreat; but, having heard of no cause of such a sudden movement, I was at a loss to believe it. (OR, 1:5, 527.)

Johnston refused to shoulder any of the blame for the supplies that he left behind.  After all, he had warned Richmond about stockpiling massive amounts of provisions at the front.  When all was said and done, out of more than 5 million pounds of provisions, "[a]bout one million pounds . . . was abandoned, and half as much more was spoiled for want of shelter."  (Johnston, B&L, 257.)   In any event, the Confederate government had "collected immediately on the frontier five times the quantity of provisions wanted" and was "responsible for the losses." (Johnston, B&L, 257.)  Goree privately agreed, writing on March 23, 1862 that "the authorities at Richmond are to blame for permitting such a vast amount of stores to accumulate upon us," despite Johnston's protests "time and again."  (in Cutrer 82.)

The Confederate Army's adventures around Washington were finished for now.  At one time, the lines had extended all the way to Munson's Hill, where the advanced outposts could see the unfinished dome of the Capitol.  Johnston pulled his men back once, and then again, where they settled down for a long winter in Centreville.  As spring approached, Johnston left the region altogether, and prepared to defend Richmond from a more feasible location.  The ball was now in Little Mac's court.

Sources
George B. Abdill, Civil War Railroads: A Pictorial Story of the War Between the States, 1861-1865 (1999 ed.); Gary E. Aldeman, Manassas Battlefield Then & Now: Historic Photography at Bull Run (2011); Russel Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan's First Campaign, March-May 1862 (2007); W.W. Blackford, War Years with Jeb Stuart (1993); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas H. Goree (1995); Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run," Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); New York Times, March 12, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 13, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 14, 1862; Philadelphia Press, March 17, 1862; Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campaign (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox (1996): Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993); Mary Alice Wills, The Confederate Blockade of Washington, D.C., 1861-1862 (1975).

Johnston Prepares to Leave Centreville: The Logistical Challenges of Withdrawal

Confederate commander Joseph Johnston was summoned to Richmond to confer with President Jefferson Davis in mid-February 1862.  The Confederate President wanted to discuss "the question of withdrawing the army to a less exposed position."  (Johnston, Narrative, 96.)  Johnston left the Confederate lines at Centreville and traveled to Richmond, where on February 19 (or 20, depending on the account), Johnston joined a meeting of Davis and his Cabinet.  Johnston and Davis agreed that the army should fall back to a more defensible position before Federal commander George McClellan launched his anticipated advance into Virginia.   The general, however, argued that current winter conditions were less than optimal for such a move.  The roads were deep with mud and in no shape to transport men and materiel.  The heavy artillery pieces along the lower Potomac at Evansport and other locations presented particular difficulties.  Johnston also worried about the ability of the Orange & Alexandria (O&A) Railroad to move his vast supplies from Manassas Junction to a safer location.

The meeting allegedly lasted around seven hours.  When all was said and done, Johnston left the President's office "with the understanding. . . that the army was to fall back as soon as practicable."  (Johnston, Narrative, 96.)  Davis walked away with a somewhat different interpretation of what was agreed.  He had given Johnston the discretion as to the exact timing of a general withdrawal, but seemed to think that an evacuation of Centreville was not in the works any time soon.  Instead, he felt that Johnston should wait until a withdrawal was "absolutely necessary."  (Symonds 145.)  It later became evident that Davis even imagined that he might find a way to pull together enough reinforcements to enable Johnston to take the offensive.  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Back at his hotel, Johnston ran into an officer who asked him if  he knew that "the cabinet had been discussing that day the question of withdrawing the army from the line then occupied."  (Johnston, Narrative, 97.)  Likewise, during his return trip, Johnston ran into "an acquaintance from the county of Fauquier, too deaf to hear conversation not intended for his ear, who gave me the same information."  (Johnston, Narrative, 97.)  Johnston was alarmed by the leak and likely feared that McClellan would get word of the Confederate plans before he had time to act.

Arriving in Centreville on February 21, Johnston immediately set to work preparing for the evacuation of the Centreville line.  On February 22, he issued orders to "the chiefs of the quartermaster's and subsistence departments to remove the military property in the depots at Manassas Junction and its dependencies, to Gordonsville, as quickly as possible. . . ."  (Johnston, Narrative 97.)  Johnston also directed the president and superintendent of the O&A Railroad to work the network "to its utmost capacity" for the purpose of transporting the army's supplies. (Johnston, Narrative 97.)  At the same time, Johnston informed his divisional commanders to prepare "in a quiet way" for the evacuation.  (Early 53.)

Johnston faced a daunting task.  The Confederates had accumulated mountains of supplies while staying a Centreville.  Johnston only needed around 1.5 million pounds of provisions on hand, enough to feed his army for fifteen days.  He tried throughout January 1862 to limit the food that Richmond was sending his way, but to no avail.  Now he had stores of around 3 million pounds.  The government had also constructed a meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare Gap without Johnston's knowledge.  That facility possessed 2 million pounds of cured meat, as well as extensive herds of cattle and pigs, that were in danger of falling into Union hands if not shipped away or destroyed.   

Aside from Confederate commissary and quartermaster stores, Johnston had to deal with the clothing and provisions that state governments had forwarded to the front at Centreville.  Private baggage presented another difficulty.  As Gen. Jubal Early recalled:

Owing to the fact that our army had remained stationary so long, and the inexperience in campaigning of our troops, there had been a vast accumulation of private baggage by both officers and men. . . .

After the confidential instructions for the evacuation were given, I tried to persuade all my officers to send all their baggage not capable of being easily transported and for which they did not have immediate necessary use, on the railroad to some place in the rear out of all danger, but the most that I could accomplish was to get them to send it to Manassas Junction. This was generally the case with the whole army, and the consequence was that a vast amount of trunks and other private baggage was accumulated at the Junction at the last moment, for which it was impossible to find any transportation. (Early 53.)

Johnston soon vented to Davis about the situation.  On February 25, he wrote:

The accumulation of subsistence stores at Manassas is now a great evil. The Commissary-General was requested more than once to suspend those supplies. A very extensive meat-packing establishment at Thoroughfare is also a great incumbrance. The great quantities of personal property in our camps is a still greater one. Much of both kinds of property must be sacrificed in the contemplated movements.  (OR, 1:5, 1081.)

Davis sent Johnston a pointed response on February 28:

The subsistence stores should, when removed, be placed in position to answer your future wants; those cannot be determined until you have furnished definite information as to your plans, especially the line to which you would remove in the contingency of retiring. The Commissary-General had previously stopped further shipments to your army, and gives satisfactory reasons for the establishment of a packing establishment at Thoroughfare.  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

Given the state of the muddy roads, the rails were the best option for moving the large quantity of supplies from Centreville.  Johnston, however, worried that the railroad was not up to the task.  The commander complained to Davis of the "wretched mismanagement" of the line.  (OR, 1:5, 1083)  By the start of March, Johnston expressed his concern to Davis that "[t]he removal of public property goes on with painful slowness, because, as the officers employed in it report, sufficient number of cars and engines cannot be had."  (OR, 1:5, 1088.)  A.C. Myers, the Quartermaster General, disputed Johnston's claim.  He told Davis that all cars and engines from the O&A Railroad, the Manassas Gap Railroad, and the Virginia Central Railroad were "in use at Manassas," and that "no further increase can be made."  (OR, 1:5, 1093.)  In any event, the system was stretched to capacity, causing innumerable delays, and could not handle much more.

Johnston also remained concerned about his ability to remove the big guns blockading the Potomac and feared that the army would be forced to abandon them in the withdrawal.  Davis was obviously dissatisfied with the commanding general's assessment.  He urged Johnston that "[w]hatever can be should be done to avoid the loss of those guns."  (OR, 1:5, 1084.)

To make matters worse, Johnston's scouts were picking up increased Union activity.  On February 22, he reported to Davis:

The enemy may not allow us much time for changes of position. He has been more active than usual lately. It is reported that a picket of 8 men was captured this morning near Fairfax Court-House. Reconnaissances on the Lower Occoquan and on the Potomac have been frequent, the latter in balloons as well as boats. (OR, 1:5, 1079).

A few days later, on February 28, Johnston learned that "the enemy is in force at Harper's Ferry, having crossed the Potomac on a pontoon bridge."  (OR, 1:5, 1083.)  He warned Davis that "[s]hould they move directly upon Winchester from that point as well as Hancock, our left would be so threatened as to compel the movement you have ordered without further delay."  (OR, 1:5, 1083.)  Johnston's now sensed danger on both his flanks.  As March got underway, the cautious general surely felt the pressure to complete his plans for withdrawal as expeditiously as possible.  If only those pesky logsitics weren't so difficult!

Sources
Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); Joseph E. Johnston, "Responsibilities of the First Bull Run,"  Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. 1 (1887); Stephen W. Sears, To the Gates of Richmond: The Peninsula Campagin (1992); Craig L. Symonds, Joseph E. Johnston: A Civil War Biography (1992); Jeffry Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Soldier (1993).

Winter in the Confederate Camps Around Centreville, Part II: Sickness, Leave, and Reenlistment

Weather was not the only enemy that the Confederate soldiers confronted during the first winter of the war in Centreville.  The cramped, unsanitary conditions in camp were the perfect breeding ground for disease.  The men suffered from measles, mumps, typhoid fever, pneumonia, and other illnesses.  As Tom Goree, an aide to Gen. James Longstreet, wrote to his relatives at the start of January 1862, "[a] great many of our troops are off on sick furlough, many are sick here and not in condition for a fight. . . ."  (in Cutrer 66).  Doctors struggled to treat the large numbers of sick, and disease claimed many lives as the winter progressed.

Because the soldiers usually hailed from rural areas where they were less exposed to germs than those who lived in cities, they had never developed immunity to diseases, and the infection rate was even higher than it might otherwise have been. (Glatthaar 50-51.)  As Gen. John B. Gordon recalled in his memoirs:

There was much sickness in camp. It was amazing to see the large number of country boys who had never had the measles. Indeed, it seemed to me that they ran through the whole catalogue of complaints to which boyhood and even babyhood are subjected. They had everything almost except teething, nettle-rash, and whooping-cough. I rather think some of them were afflicted with this latter disease.  (Gordon 49.)

Gen. John B. Gordon was a lieutenant colonel of the 6th Alabama at the start of 1862 (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Gordon himself dealt with a severe bout of diarrhea throughout February and March 1862.

While sickness diminished the army's effective strength, the Confederates dealt with other threats to their preparedness.  On January 14, 1862, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the commander of the Department of Northern Virginia, wrote to Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin:

Since the supply in the neighborhood was exhausted the Quartermaster's Department has been unable to furnish full forage. Hay and fodder are rarely to be had, consequently our horses are in wretched condition. (OR, 1:5, 1028.)

Goree likewise worried that "many of our horses are very poor, and almost too weak to draw heavy artillery." (in Cutrer 66.)

Given the monotony of camp life, the cold and muddy weather, and the prevalence of disease, it is not surprising that some men decided to take leave without permission.  Soldiers from nearby towns were particularly susceptible to the lure of family and friends back home.  The 8th Virginia, for example, was comprised of men from Leesburg, Virginia, about 25 miles from Centreville.  Several soldiers of the 8th disappeared so that they could spend time in their home town, away from the misery of winter in camp.  The situation apparently became so bad that the regimental commander published an order in the Richmond, Leesburg, and Warrenton papers:

All officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, belonging to the 8th Virginia Regiment, who have not been detailed, by special order emanating from General Headquarters, and who are not actually disabled by sickness for duty, will immediately join this Regiment.

It is an outrage now, become too apparent, that whilst the brave and faithful are suffering all the hardships incident to camp life, the trifling and self-indulgent, are to deselect to their duty, as to absent themselves from their companies, thus throwing all of the work upon the few good soldiers who maintain their posts, to the scandal and disgrace of the fair name of the 8th Virginia Regiment, won on the fields of Manassas and Leesburg.  (Richmond Daily Dispatch, Jan. 25, 1862.)

The Confederate government offered soldiers a legitimate alternative to taking unauthorized leave.  Most men had volunteered for twelve months terms, which would expire in the spring.  Gen. Johnston estimated that about two-thirds of his command was composed of "one year" regiments. (OR, 1:5, 1058.)  Facing a potential manpower crisis, the Confederate Congress passed the so-called Bounty and Furlough Act in December 1861.  The law offered soldiers a fifty dollar bounty and a maximum 60-day furlough, with transportation expenses covered to home and back, if they would reenlist for two additional years, or the duration of the war.  Soldiers could even switch branches of the service, or change companies.

The law worried Johnston, who thought that the promise of a furlough would drain his ranks to dangerous levels.  He argued to Benjamin in January that it would "be unsafe to allow any large number of men to leave here; and without sustaining such a loss I do not see how the object of the law can be accomplished."  (OR, 1:5, 1037.)  Benjamin urged Johnston to understand that "the eager desire for a furlough during the inclement season will form the strongest inducement for your men, and thus afford the best guarantee of you having under your orders a large force of veteran troops when active operations recommence." (OR, 1:5, 1045.)  Johnston was told to "go to the extreme verge of prudence in tempting your twelve-month's men by liberal furloughs, and thus secure for yourself a fine body of men for the spring operations." (OR, 1:5, 1045.) 

Excerpt of the Bounty and Furlough Act from The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America (1864) (courtesy of Google Books).

The camps around Centreville were predictably abuzz with talk of reenlistment and the associated inducements.  Some men rushed to reenlist, while others struggled with the decision and decided to wait things out.  In the 1st Maryland, Randolph McKim was apparently the first to sign up again, even though "not many followed his example."  (Howard 65.)  According to messmate McHenry Howard, McKim reenlisted "not for the sake of the furlough, but animated by high patriotic motives."  (Howard 65.)  To hear McKim tell the story, however, the furlough might have had a little something to do with it.  He wrote:

Words cannot express the delight a soldier felt at the prospect of a return to "civilization" for the space of thirty days. To have the opportunity of a daily bath, or at least a daily "wash up"; to change one's clothes; to sleep in a bed; to hear no "reveille" at four in the morning; not to be disturbed in the evening by the inevitable "taps"; to sit down at a table covered with a white cloth; . . . . — yes, to feast on the "fat of the land " before the land had grown lean and hungry, as it did in another twelvemonth; to bask in the smiles of the noble women of the Confederacy; to enjoy once more their delightful society; to be welcomed and feted like a hero wherever you went by the men as well as the women. . . .(McKim 62-63.)

In mid-February, Goree told to his uncle that "[t]he men are re-enlisting much more readily than I supposed they would.  Before spring, I think that the majority of the 12-mo's men will re-enlist."  (in Cutrer 74.)  Johnston, trying to preserve some semblance of military strength, limited the furloughs to the "rate of 20 per cent. of the men present for duty."  (OR, 1:5, 1065.)  Johnston, however, remained concerned that the army was "much weakened by loss of officers from sickness and soldiers on furlough. . . ."  (OR, 1:5, 1075.)  Soon the Confederacy would take another approach to raising and maintaining an army.  Virginia enacted a state draft law in February 1862, followed by the new Confederate Congress' Conscription Act in April.

The Confederates would remain in Centreville until March 1862.  The men endured many hardships, including weather and sickness, although they managed to find some comfort in little things like reading, writing letters, or playing cards.  Whiskey made life a little more tolerable, even if it led to trouble.  More than a few men got to visit home under the new bounty and furlough law, while others decided to take a leave of absence without asking.  The upcoming spring campaign would try the soldiers in battle as many of them had never been tried before.  Perhaps camp life wouldn't seem so bad after all when matched up against the horrors of warfare on the Peninsula and beyond.

For Part I of this series, see here.

Sources

Aside from the OR the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

"Civil Liberties in Virginia during the Civil War," Encyclopedia Virginia; Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Major Thomas J. Goree (1995); "Desertion (Confederate) During the Civil War," Encyclopedia Virginia; Charles L. Dufour, The Gallant Life of Roberdeau Wheat (1985); Ralph Lowell Eckert, John Brown Gordon: Soldier, Southerner, American (1989); Joseph T. Glatthaar, "Confederate Soldiers in Virginia, 1861," in William C. Davis & James I. Robertson, Jr., Virginia at War 1861 (2005); John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (1904); McHenry Howard; Recollections of a Maryland Confederate Soldier and Staff Office Under Johnston, Jackson, and Lee (1914); Robert Howison, "A History of the War," Southern Literary Messenger, Vol. 38, No. 3 (March 1864); John J. Kundahl, Confederate Engineer: Training and Campaigning with John Morris Wampler (2000); Lawrence R. Laboda, From Selma to Appomattox: The History of the Jeff Davis Artillery (1994); James M. Matthews (ed.), The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of America (1864); Randolph H. McKim, A Soldier's Recollections: Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate (1921); Richmond Daily Dispatch, Jan. 25, 1862; Emory Upton, The Military Policy of the United States, 64th Cong., 2nd Session, Senate Doc. No. 329 (1916); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry (1990).

The 17th Virginia Gets a New Brigade Commander and Settles Into Camp

This blog has traced the history of the 17th Virginia Infantry throughout the first year of the Civil War.  I have taken a particular interest in this regiment given that it was composed of men from across Northern Virginia, including Fairfax County.  By way of a quick recap, the militia companies that eventually formed the 17th  gathered in Alexandria not long after the Virginia Convention voted to secede on April 17, 1861.  They left town when Union forces invaded Virginia the next month.  Assigned to Gen. James Longstreet's brigade, the 17th Virginia played a leading role at Blackburn's Ford on July 18.  Following First Manassas, the 17th moved forward to Centreville and then Fairfax Court House.  The regiment served with Longstreet's advanced forces around Falls Church and at Mason's and Munson's Hills during August and September.  In  mid-October, the regiment fell back to Centreville as part of a general withdrawal of Confederate troops.

Autumn 1861 brought change at the top for the 17th Virginia.  Even before moving to Centreville, the men of the regiment lost their brigade commander.  In mid-October, Longstreet received a promotion to major general. After drilling his men one final time on October 12, Longstreet said his good-byes, and the soldiers responded with a loud cheer for the general who had led them through the Manassas Campaign and the recent picket war.  (Wallace 23.)  The next day Longstreet issued General Order No. 17, in which he  "express[ed] his sincere thanks to the officers and soldiers of the command for the kindly patience, the soldierly fortitude, and the cheerful obedience which they have invariably exhibited during the many hardships and privations of a long and trying campaign."  (Warfield 61.)  He concluded that "[t]he command of a brigade second to none is well worthy the boast of any general, and even regret may well be felt at promotion which removes it a step, at least, from him." (Warfield 61-62.)

Gen. Charles Clark of Mississippi replaced Longstreet, but his tenure at the top was short-lived.  On October 22, not long after the 17th moved to Centreville, the Confederate War Department organized the Department of Northern Virginia out of the forces currently operating in the area stretching from the mouth of the Potomac River to the Shenandoah Valley. The new department's Potomac District was composed of divisions under the command of Earl Van Dorn, Gustavus W. Smith, Longstreet, and Edmund Kirby Smith.  Longstreet's old brigade, including the 17th Virginia, was placed under Gen. Richard S. Ewell and was eventually assigned to Longstreet's new division.

Gen. Richard S. Ewell, the 17th Virginia's new brigade commander (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The 17th Virginia passed the time in Centreville "drilling, mounting Quaker guns, standing picket duty, and doing our part in the details set to the work of throwing up breastworks," but not all was so uneventful.  (Warfield 63.)  In late October, Virginia Governor John Letcher visited Centreville to present the flags of the Commonwealth to the Virginia regiments encamped there.  As Letcher handed a flag to the 17th, he urged the regiment to "[t]ake it, and when you go into Alexandria drive out the invaders of our soil." (Wallace 24.)   The 17th Virginia's commander, Col. Montgomery Corse, promised to plant the flag "on the ramparts of Ft. Ellsworth" in Alexandria, or "the blood of the Seventeenth shall flow freely in the attempt." (Wallace 24.)  The next day the 17th Virginia participated in a grand review of Virginia troops by the governor as spectators crowded the surrounding hills to catch a glimpse of the spectacle. 

Confederate winter quarters at Centreville, VA (courtesy of Library of Congress).  This photograph was taken in March 1862 after the Confederates had abandoned the area.

According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th, "the night of November 1 we experienced one of the most terrific storms of wind, rain, and hail that we had to contend with during the war."  (Warfield 64.)  Warfield recalled:

The storm continued throughout the night.  Every tent in the camp except two was thrown down and the contents were scattered.  The storm did not cease until the afternoon of the 2nd, and during that time the men were without shelter, thoroughly drenched, and unable to cook their meals.  (Warfield 64.)

Conditions improved by the end of the month, when the 17th began to construct log cabins in preparation for winter.*  The men of the regiment cut trees and brought them to camp in the quartermaster's wagons.  One soldier considered this work "the hardest I ever performed."  (Wallace 24.)  The small log huts, like those pictured above, served as home for the soldiers during the harsh, cold days ahead.

A battle flag of the 17th Virginia, marked with engagements from the 1862 Peninsula Campaign (courtesy of the Fairfax Rifles)

November ended with the presentation of the famed Confederate battle flag to the 17th Virginia and the other regiments at Centreville.  Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, in characteristic bombast, told the men: "Under its untarnished folds, beat back the invader and find nationality, everlasting immunity from an atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for yourselves, or death." (Warfield 65-66.)   But first, the army had to survive the winter weather, and all the misery that camp life could bring.

Notes
*Throughout October and November 1861, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston bickered with the War Department over the provision of assistance in building winter quarters.  Johnston saw the War Department as neglectful of his pleas, while Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin accused Johnston of turning away help.  In the end, the soldiers appear to have taken matters into their own hands.  See OR, 1:5, 891, 896-97, 934, 941-42, 948-49, 951; see also this post at Living in the Past concerning the dispute.

Sources
Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Back to Where They Started After Manassas: Johnston Moves the Army to Centreville

As I wrote in a series of recent posts, the Confederates left their advanced positions in Northern Virginia at the end of September 1861 and fell back to Fairfax Court House.  Commander Joseph Johnston, along with Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and G.W. Smith, had recommended an offensive action to Jefferson Davis on October 1, but the Confederate President nixed any plans for a grand invasion across the Potomac.  Johnston was left to contemplate his next move.

The commanding general recognized the vulnerability of his army's position at Fairfax.  As Johnston recalled in his Narrative after the war, "[t]he semicircular course of the Potomac, and roads converging from different points on it to our position, made it easy for the Federal army to turn either of our flanks without exposing its own communications."  (Johnston 77.)  Johnston worried that the Union Army's growing capabilities rendered the Fairfax line "more hazardous" than before.  (Johnston 77.)

According to Alfred Roman's biography of Beauregard, Johnston first suggested that the army establish a new position at Manassas, but Beauregard, "fearing the bad effect upon the army and the people of a retreat to the point held by us before our late victory, proposed Centreville instead."  (Roman 154.)  Given concerns that Centreville "was somewhat commanded by a succession of heights too distant to be embraced within the Confederate line,"  Beauregard also offered to take charge of establishing defensive positions.  Johnston's Narrative does not discuss Beauregard's role in selecting Centreville, and Roman's book, which is likely Beauregard's ghostwritten autobiography, may give Old Bory too much credit.

Johnston finally issued the order for the army to move to Centreville in mid-October.*  The position was less exposed than Fairfax and sat not far from the critical railroad junction at Manassas.  The divisions of James Longstreet and Earl Van Dorn occupied the ground between Union Mills and Centreville, with the position at Union Mills anchoring the Confederate right.  Gen. Smith's division was sent to the heights above the Warrenton Turnpike near Centreville, while "Stonewall" Jackson's soldiers were held in reserve to the rear of the town.  (Jackson himself would soon take charge of the Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia and head out to the Shenandoah.)  Gen. Jeb Stuart's cavalry force patrolled the countryside in advance of the Centreville line.

Detail of the Centreville area from an 1862 Union Army map (courtesy of the Library of Congress).  The circle at the top indicates Centreville and the hills to the north of Warrenton Turnpike.  The circle at the bottom shows the location of Union Mills, the right of the Confederate line.  Manassas Junction is at the bottom left of the map.

Johnston immediately set to work on the defenses at Centreville, but not all was as formidable as it appeared:

The engineers were directed to fortify the summit of the hill near this village— that, by holding it, the strongest and salient point of the position, with two or three thousand men, the army itself might be free to manoeuvre. As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere, at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. (Johnston 78.)

"Centreville, Va., Fort on heights, with Quaker guns," photograph taken in March 1862 after Union occupation (courtesy of  Library of Congress).

Private Edgar Warfield recalled the withdrawal of the 17th Virginia to Centreville:

It was with real regret that we left Fairfax. We had spent many pleasant hours at the place, and it was so near home for many of us. But such is a soldier's lot. Previous to leaving camp details were named from several regiments to move telegraph wires and take them to Centreville. The next morning [October 17] found us pitching our tents on our new camp grounds on the heights near the village of Centreville. (Warfield 63.)

The Confederates settled in for a long fall and winter.  During the months after First Manassas, many soldiers, including the 17th Virginia, moved eastward to Fairfax Court House and beyond.  This ground had been taken with no real bloodshed, but had also been given up without a fight.  Now, the views of the unfinished Capitol dome from Munson's Hill were but a memory, and the Confederates sat not far from the very battlefield where they had beaten the Union Army back in July. 

Note
*Most accounts indicate that the Confederates fell back sometime between October 16-19.  Johnston and Longstreet, for example, mark the event as occurring on October 19, while an October 18 letter home from Longstreet aide Tom Goree indicates that the army headed to Centreville sometime before the 19th.  Private Edgar Warfield's memoirs state that his regiment received Johnston's order on the night of October 16 and arrived the next morning at Centreville.

Sources
Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Jefferson Davis Visits Fairfax, Confers with the Top Brass, and Reviews the Army: Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1861

As I discussed in a recent post, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston wrote to Judah P. Benjamin, the acting Secretary of War in Richmond, urging that Benjamin, a representative, or President Jefferson Davis come to Fairfax Court House to confer about a possible offensive.  Benjamin responded to Johnston on September 29, 1861, telling him it was "extremely difficult. . . to determine whether or not we can furnish you the further means you may deem necessary to assume the active offensive."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  The secretary in part blamed Johnston for the government's inability to assess the situation:  "We have not in the Department a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  Benjamin told Johnston that he had "earnestly requested the President to visit your headquarters in person, and to learn on conference with you the true position of your army in all respects, and the possibility of a prompt offensive movement."  Davis "consented to this," and Benjamin hoped that Davis would reach Johnston's camp within a day or two. (OR, 1:5, 883.)

Arrival in Fairfax

The Confederate President boarded the train to Richmond early on September 30 and arrived at Fairfax Station late in the afternoon. Civilians and soldiers lining the route to Fairfax Court House cheered the President as he passed by, and Davis tipped his hat to the admirers. Due to an apparent "misunderstanding," the army never procured a house in Fairfax for the President to use during his visit. (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.) Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, however, came to the rescue and brought the President to stay at his headquarters. Generals Johnston and Gustavus W. Smith called on Davis that evening to pay their respects, but "no official subjects were alluded to in that interview." (OR, 1:5, 884-85.)

Jefferson Davis, photo by Matthew Brady, c. 1858-60 (courtesy of Library of Congress).

The October 1 Conference

The next day, October 1, Davis "rode many miles visiting the encampments."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  A couple companies of the 16th Mississippi also took Davis on a reconnaissance mission near the Union lines, which now occupied the high ground around Falls Church that the Confederates had just recently abandoned.

The night of October 1, Davis conferred with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at headquarters.  Much ink has been spilled on this famous "council of war," at which Davis and the top commanders in Virginia discussed the possibility of assuming the offensive and invading the North.  First and foremost, I counsel readers to check out the entire text of Smith's January 31, 1862 memorandum on the conference in the OR. (See OR, 1:5, 884-87.)  The memorandum was also signed by Beauregard and Johnston. Davis himself claims to have seen this document for the first time in 1880. (Davis 450.)  The accounts by Davis, Johnston, and Roman are also worth reading.  (See the sources below for links.)  Sherman over at Living in the Past has done a great job of describing the meeting and the subsequent controversy between Davis and his generals over the conference.  (See here.) The Civil War Daily Gazette also has a good post on the subject.  (See here.)

At the conference, Smith was the first to broach the subject that had compelled Davis to come to Fairfax in the first place.  He asked, "Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive?" (OR, 1:5, 885.)  A discussion ensued.  All those present at the conference agreed that "the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad; that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition; that if kept inactive it must retrograde immensely in every respect firing the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all."   (OR, 1:5, 885.) 

Davis was again asked, "Is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy's country? Can you not by stripping other points to the last they will bear, and, even risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition to move forward?"  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  The generals argued that "success here was success everywhere, defeat here defeat everywhere."  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  Gen. Beauregard had been pushing a more aggressive strategy for quite some time now, and most certainly wanted to ensure that Davis accepted his plan to invade Maryland and threaten Washington. 

Davis got to the point.  He wanted to know how many men were needed to take the offensive.  Smith said 50,000; Johnston and Beauregard stated a more conservative 60,000.  The latter two also claimed that the supplies in Northern Virginia were "entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis opposed the suggestion to transfer soldiers to Virginia. After all, the President was under pressure from all parts of the country to defend the Confederacy.  Davis regretted that he could furnish no reinforcements at the time, and even if he could, he had no weapons to arm them.

The generals seemed resigned that "there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the enemy."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis toyed with the idea of "partial operations" into Maryland to strike a "sudden blow" against Union troops on the lower or upper Potomac.  The generals saw too many risks in such a plan and largely rejected the idea.  However, they threw a bone to Davis, agreeing that "if any opportunity should occur offering reasonable chances of success, the attempt would be made." (OR, 1:5, 887.)  The two-hour conference thus dashed Beauregard's dream of a decisive blow across the Potomac. 

Review of the Army

The Confederate President woke up to rain on October 2.  Davis wrote to his wife that  "if the weather permits, I shall resume my labors and to-morrow hope to return."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  The President also expressed disappointment with what he had seen so far: "The condition of things here is not as good as I expected and the position has nothing but its comfort to recommend it."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  I have not yet found a record of what the President did that day, but the rain may have caused a disruption in Davis' schedule.

The next afternoon, the President reviewed the Confederate troops quartered in the area.  Soldiers from several brigades lined the road for about a mile and a half, stretching from Fairfax Court House towards Germantown.  Gen. James Longstreet's men, including the 17th Virgina, participated in the spectacle.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, described "quite a display" in a letter to his sister a few days later:

The President & Genls Johnston, Beauregard & Smith, with their aids [sic] & escort, road along the line in front, whilst our bands as they passed were discoursing excellent music. The President would salute each flag as he passed it. After he passed the line, he then took a position, and the line formed into column and passed him, the officers saluting as they passed. (in Cutrer 47.)

Following the review, Longstreet  and his staff headed to Beauregard's headquarters to meet with Davis.  According to Goree, the President "spoke of the honorable positions we had occupied in the advance" and "asked if we could give him a view of the Potomac."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Goree, all to aware of the recent evacuation of Munson's and Mason's Hills, replied that "we could have done so, a few days since, but could not now."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Davis, full of bluster, replied that "I hope that in a short time we will force a view of it, at the Long Bridge."  (in Cutrer 47.)  How the Confederate President expected that to happen in light of the conference of October 1, he did not say.

Davis boarded a train that night and returned to Richmond. The President's trip had given Johnston the answer he needed.  The cautious commander had made the right decision after all in withdrawing his men from their advanced position.  Now Johnston would turn to establishing a purely defensive position, and even Fairfax felt a bit too forward for his purposes.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Lynda L. Crist & Mary S. Dix (eds.), The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1861, Vol. 7 (1991); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1 (1881); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).