Cracking Down on Drinking in the Union Army Around Washington

A few of my recent posts have discussed the role that drinking played in the everyday lives of the soldiers encamped around Washington during the first winter of the war.  While whiskey and other intoxicating beverages helped to alleviate the boredom of camp life, the consumption of alcohol also led to trouble and disciplinary actions.  No less a figure that Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, weighed in on the subject at the start of February 1862. 

As part of his review of a court-martial involving a drunken solider in Gen. Joseph Hooker's Division, McClellan expressed his concern with the level of intoxication:

No one evil agent so much obstructs this army in its progress to that condition which will enable it to accomplish all that true soldiers can, as the degrading vice of drunkenness. It is the cause of by far the greater part of the disorders which are examined by courts-martial. It is impossible to estimate the benefits that would accrue to the service from the adoption of a resolution on the part of officers to set their men an example of total abstinence from intoxicating liquors. It would be worth 50,000 men to the armies of the United States. (Gen. Orders No. 40, Feb. 4, 1862.)

McClellan noted that he was not singling out Hooker's Division for criticism.  Rather, in examining the file, he saw the "evils of intemperance and the terrible consequences of it to the individual soldier."  (Gen. Orders No. 40.)  McClellan hoped that other divisions would also draw lessons from the court-martial and "resolve to contribute their exertions to the cure of this giant evil."  (Gen. Orders No. 40.)

As February got underway, the Union Army around Washington was taking various measures to prevent intoxication in the ranks, at least among enlisted men.  A captain had been stationed at the Long Bridge over the Potomac "to see that no spirituous liquors [were] either carried over that structure or down the river for troops."  (Phila. Press, Feb. 5, 1862.)  On February 4, the steamer Telegraph headed towards Budd's Ferry, Maryland with a cargo of twenty barrels of whiskey.  The army stopped the vessel and seized the liquor.  The newspaper reported, however, that "[o]fficers . . . are at liberty to claim any which may be intended for them, and must appear at the Provost Marshal's office for that purpose."  (Phila. Press, Feb. 5, 1862.) 

"Drunken Soldiers Tied Up for Fighting and Other Unruly Conduct," by A.R. Waud (courtesy of Library of Congress)

A little later in February, Owen McCarty, a grave digger known by the nickname "Old Mortality," was arrested for selling liquor to soldiers of the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves at Camp Pierpont in Langley, Virginia.  The offender "was seated high upon wagon, surrounded by a guard, and wore suspended from his neck a miniature head-board; on which was printed the words; 'Old Morality' digs soldiers' graves; and by selling whiskey, helps to fill them.'"  (Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862.)  The wagon passed through Washington en route to the guard house and caused "considerable excitement among the pedestrians on the side walk."  (Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862.)  Perhaps Old Morality would have been better off working in one of the numerous Washington saloons.

At the end of February, McClellan issued a general order appointing Andrew Porter as Provost Marshal General in the Army of the Potomac and establishing a department under his command.  The commanding general entrusted provost marshals with several duties related to his fight against intoxication, including "suppression of drunkenness, beyond the limits of the camps," "[s]uppression of . . . drinking-houses or bar-rooms," "regulations of . . . taverns," and "[e]nforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers."  (General Orders No. 60, Feb. 21, 1862.)  Despite McClellan's efforts, however, Union soldiers would continue to indulge their fancy for intoxicating liquors.  The fight against drunkenness was a hard one, and certainly not one that McClellan or any other general could ever completely win.

Sources
Army of the Potomac, General Orders and Index to General Orders, 1862 (1863);  David M. Delo, Peddlers and Post Traders: The Army Sutler on the Frontier (1998 ed.); George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (1864); Philadelphia Press, Feb. 5, 1862; Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862; Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (1983 ed.)

McClellan Arrives, Surveys the State of Washington's Defenses, and Takes Action

At the end of July 1861, Major General George B. McClellan, fresh from victories in western Virginia, arrived to take command of the Union Army around Washington.  The recent loss at Manassas was on McClellan's mind.  As he later wrote, "[t]he result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to destroy the morale and organization of our army, and to alarm government and people."  (George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac, p. 44 (1864).)  McClellan saw himself as just the person to save the Union.  In a July 27, 1861 letter to his wife, Mary Ellen, McClellan bragged that "I see already the main causes of our recent failure -- I am sure that I can remedy these & am confident that I can lead these armies of men to victory once more."

Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan (courtesy of Library of Congress)

As the new commander, one of McClellan's first tasks was to survey the existing defenses around Washington.  He told Mary Ellen in the same letter that he would "start tomorrow very early on a tour through the lines on the other side of the river -- it will occupy me all day long & a rather fatiguing ride it will be -- but I will be able to make up my mind on the state of things."  Other such inspections continued into August.  On the second, he informed Mary Ellen that he had "looked at some of the works" in Virginia.

McClellan's inspection of the lines around the nation's capital led him to one conclusion -- "[t]he national capital was in danger. It was necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build works for its defense, strong and capable of being held by a small force."  (Report, p. 44.)  In Virginia, he noted "the troops were stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roach's Mills, Cole's Mill, and in the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, with a detachment at the Theological Seminary."  (Report, p. 50.)  However,  "[t]here were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering the Potomac,—seldom in the best positions for defense, and entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the long line from Fort Corcoran to Alexandria."  (Report, p. 50.)  Things were no better on the Maryland side, where "upon the heights overlooking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose commanders were independent of each other."  (Report, p. 50.)  Moreover, "[t]here were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, or on the roads entering the city from the south."  (Report, p. 50.)  Camps "were located without regard to purposes of defense or instruction" and "the roads were not picketed." (Report, p. 50.)

McClellan recognized the sheer vulnerability of the capital to a Confederate attack:

In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy either in the positions and numbers of the troops, or the number and character of the defensive works. Earthworks in the nature of "tetes-de-pont" looked upon the approaches to the Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, and Alexandria by the Little River Turnpike, and some simple defensive arrangements were made at the Chain Bridge. With the latter exception, not a single defensive work had been commenced on the Maryland side.  (Report, pp. 50-51.)

The new commander worried that "[t]here was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city from heights within easy range, which could be occupied by a hostile column almost without resistance."  (Report, p. 51.)

Photo of John G. Barnard, after promotion to Brigadier General (courtesy of Library of Congress)

McClellan wasted no time in addressing the situation.  He "at once gave the necessary instructions" to his Chief Engineer, Major John G. Barnard, "for the completion of the defenses of the capital."  (Report, p.62.)  Before long, Barnard had soldiers at work on strengthening the Arlington line of defense.  What followed in the coming months and years would make Washington the most heavily fortified city in the Western Hemisphere.  McClellan is often the focus of criticism and downright scorn, but his instrumental role in organizing the defenses of Washington should not be overlooked.

The Confederates Evacuate Alexandria for the Second and Final Time

Today marks the 150th anniversary of the Union occupation of Alexandria, Virginia. (Yes, yet another event to commemorate as part of the Sesquicentennial. . . .)  Probably the best-known story of the invasion is the murder of Col. Elmer E. Ellsworth, who was shot taking down a Confederate flag flying atop the Marshall House.  Ellsworth's death is a pretty familiar topic by now, so rather than go over old ground, I'd like to shed light on another aspect of the Union takeover on May 24, 1861.

As I discussed in a couple of recent posts, Virginia volunteers evacuated Alexandria at the start of May 1861.  (See here and here.)  Readers may recall that Lt. Col. Algernon Taylor lost his job for abandoning the city in disobedience of an order from Brig. Gen. Philip St. George Cocke.  Algernon was replaced by Col. George H. Terrett, a former Marine, who was commander when Virginia voters approved the Ordinance of Secession on May 23.  He would soon have the unenviable task of ordering a retreat that would leave Alexandria in Union hands for the duration of the war. 

Early on the morning of May 24, 1861, three main columns of Federal troops moved quickly to occupy Virginia.  Two of the columns crossed the Potomac at the Aqueduct and Long Bridges.  The 11th New York Fire Zouaves, under Col. Ellsworth, boarded steamers and disembarked at the wharves in Alexandria.  The U.S.S. Pawnee covered the regiment from the river.  After crossing the Potomac at Long Bridge, the First Michigan, under Col. Orlando B. Wilcox, marched down Washington Street towards Alexandria.

Terrett had already put his troops on high alert earlier that morning after learning that a squadron of Union cavalry had entered Virginia across the Chain Bridge.  Around 4:30 a.m., a U.S. Navy officer went ashore from the Pawnee and met with Col. Terrett under a flag of truce.  According to Terrett, the officer "informed me that an overwhelming force was about entering the city of Alexandria, and it would be madness to resist, and that I could have until 9 a. m. to evacuate or surrender."  Terrett wasted no time in organizing an evacuation.  Surrender was not an option.

Civil War-era photograph of the Lyceum at 201 S. Washington Street (courtesy of Historic Alexandria).

The Lyceum in Old Town today.

The Virginia troops, including units that would soon form the 17th Virginia Infantry, proceeded to the Lyceum on Washington Street.  From there, Terrett marched them down Duke Street and away from Wilcox's advancing soldiers.  The Old Dominion Rifles narrowly escaped capture, but in the end, managed to join up with the main body of troops.  The retreat was covered by two cavalry units -- Captain Edward Powell's Fairfax Cavalry and Captain Mottrom Dulany Ball's Chesterfield Troop.

Terrett reported that his Virginians "five hundred in number, retreated in good order."  The Union troops were hard on the tail of Terrett's force, whose rear guard was "in sight of and within two hundred yards of the advance guard of the enemy."  Given the apparent aggressiveness of the pursuit, one wonders how sincere of a choice Terrett was given between surrender and evacuation. 

Ball accompanied Terrett and his men as far as Ball's quarters, "a little west of the railroad depot" on the Orange & Alexandria R.R.  The volunteers continued for a half-mile beyond the depot, where they boarded cars for Manassas.  Terrett asked the cavalry to follow in his rear, but for whatever reason, Ball's thirty-five men took too long, and were captured by the Federals.

As the train headed down the tracks, Terrett had his men burn the railroad bridges behind them. A contingent of Union troops "pursued [the Confederates] a short distance, also burning such bridges as they had spared." (Report of Maj. Gen. Samuel P. Heinzelman, July 20, 1863.) Around half past five, Col. Wilcox was able to report to Washington, "Alexandria is ours."

Terrett's force arrived safely in Manassas and joined other Confederate soldiers assembling in the vicinity.  Brig. Gen. Milledge Bonham, commander at Manassas, reported to Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee on May 25:

The Alexandria (Va.) troops are here, without cooking utensils, and many without arms. Please send to the quartermaster of this place cooking utensils and other camp equipage for six hundred men, as destitute men are hourly joining me. Caps, ammunition, and arms greatly needed.

Lucky for Bonham, the Federal advance on Manassas was still a couple months away.

Note on sources
For a complete set of reports associated with the Union occupation of Alexandria, see the Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 37-44. Further information can be found in Alexandria in the Civil War by James G. Barber (1988) and 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series, by Lee A. Wallace, Jr. (1990).

Mansfield Eyes Virginia With Concern

As Virginia prepared for war, Col. Joseph K. Mansfield, Commander of the District of Washington, looked across the Potomac with worry.  Washington felt vulnerable to him, even with the arrival of thousands of Union volunteers from across the North.  Mansfield, a 58 year-old Army Regular, expressed his concern to General-in-Chief  Winfield Scott on May 3, 1861:

We now come to the city and Georgetown and arsenal, exposed to the Virginia shore. Here I must remark that the President's House and Department buildings in its vicinity are but two and a half miles across the river from Arlington high ground, where a battery of bombs and heavy guns, if established, could destroy the city with comparatively a small force after destroying the bridges. The Capitol is only three and a half miles from the same height at Arlington, and at the Aqueduct the summits of the heights on the opposite shore are not over one mile from Georgetown.

Joseph K. Mansfield (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Mansfield then made the following recommendation:

With this view of the condition of our position, it is clear to my mind that the city is liable to be bombarded at the will of an enemy, unless we occupy the ground which he certainly would occupy if he had any such intention. I therefore recommend that the heights above mentioned be seized and secured by at least two strong redoubts, one commanding the Long Bridge and the other the Aqueduct, and that a body of men be there encamped to sustain the redoubts and give battle to the enemy if necessary. I have engineers maturing plans and reconnoitering further. It is quite probable that our troops assembled at Arlington would create much excitement in Virginia, yet, at the same time, if the enemy were to occupy the ground there a greater excitement would take place on our side, and it might be necessary to fight a battle to disadvantage.

Mansfield was unsure of the optimal timing for the movement:

I know not exactly how many troops we have at command. I presume the enemy might bring 10,000 troops into the field in a short time on such an occasion. I would not urge any premature movement in this quarter, yet one taken too late might cause much bloodshed.

Although the Union Army did not act immediately on Mansfield's suggestion, an action-forcing event was fast approaching. In a little over two weeks, on May 23, Virginians would head to the polls to vote on the Ordinance of Secession.