The Fallout from the Raid on Camp Beckwith: Lt. Keays Takes the Heat

Last week I wrote about the surprise Confederate attack on the Federal garrison guarding the contraband farm at Camp Beckwith in Lewinsville, Virginia. During the early morning of October 2, 1863, troopers from the 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry under Lt. Col. Elijah V. White pounced on the unsuspecting Union force encamped in and around the main house on the farm. When all was said and done, White rode away with 20 prisoners and 64 horses. The Union suffered casualties of  two dead and three wounded.

A messenger alerted the nearby Federal garrison at Fort Ethan Allen. Col. John C. Tidball of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery sent a contingent of men to investigate. Once Tidball gleaned more details about the raid, he sent word to an assistant adjutant-general with the Department of Washington. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, the commander of the Department, wasted no time in ordering his own investigation. On October 2, he sent Capt. Carroll H. Potter to "the scene of the [ ] reported surprise." (OR, 1:29:1, 201.) Potter, an assistant adjutant-general, was told "to make a thorough and rigid examination into the circumstances attending" the attack. (OR, 1:29:1, 201.) Heintzelman seemed convinced from the outset that someone was at fault for what had just happened out in the Virginia countryside. He instructed Potter to "specify on whom the blame should fall" in his official report on the matter. (OR, 1:29:1, 201.)

Potter left Washington at 1:30 p.m. that same day with one commissioned officer and 25 men from Scott's Nine Hundred Cavalry (11th N.Y. Cav.). The party arrived at Camp Beckwith around 5:30 p.m. Potter conducted his investigation in short order and left camp the next morning. After reconnoitering for possible guerrilla activity near Vienna and along the Alexandria, Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad, Potter and his men rode through Falls Church, crossed the Aqueduct Bridge, and returned to headquarters at 4:30 in the afternoon.

William Jeremiah Keays, c. 1869 (courtesy of Rod A. MacDonald). Keays was born in Bytown, Upper Canada (now Ottawa, Ontario) on January 24, 1829. He engaged in various business ventures in Goderich, Ontario before moving with his family to Buffalo, New York in 1861. There he served as an agent for the Great Western Railroad. By the end of 1862, Keays had lost his wife, children, and mother. He enlisted in the 16th New York Cavalry in June 1863. After the Civil War, Keays returned to Canada, where he remarried.  Railroad work brought Keays back to the United States in 1881-82. He died in Buffalo on April 24, 1914, at the age of 84. (I'd recommend reading MacDonald's meticulously researched biography of Keays referenced in the sources section below.)

Potter sent his report to Heintzelman on October 3. Faithful to Heintzelman's order, the captain minced no words in laying the blame for the recent mess on 1st Lt. William J. Keays of Co. B, 16th New York Cavalry, who commanded the cavalry detachment at Camp Beckwith. The report described how Keays's handling of cavalry pickets ultimately led to the Confederate victory:

[The attack] was all done in five minutes from the time [White's men] were known to be in the vicinity, and all done without the least show of resistance on the part of our cavalry or infantry, for as far as I could learn, not a shot was fired at them, or a stand of any description made on the part of our forces, happening, no doubt, from the very foolish position given the cavalry pickets, they being very poorly posted within a very short distance from the camp, and each post being in a ravine, with the men dismounted, their horses in camp unsaddled, as were also those of the entire command. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)*

In fact, White's men approached along an old wood road that was entirely unguarded. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.) Moreover, Keays appeared to have ignored recent warnings. Potter learned that "Lieutenant Keays had heard it reported by some of the citizens that these guerrillas were in his vicinity, but did not place reliance enough upon the information to take more than the usual precaution." (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Standard of the 16th New York Cavalry (courtesy of New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center).

Potter observed a deviation in normal security procedures at the time of White's raid. Despite an opportunity to lay the blame elsewhere, the captain made clear that Keays was ultimately responsible for what had occurred:

There was a commissioned officer placed on duty belonging to the cavalry, every night previous to the attack, whose duty it was to look out for the safety of the camp, and see that the picket performed their duty properly; but on the night of the attack, Sergt. S. F. Shaddock, Company B, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, was given this duty to perform. This duty he tried to perform, and would have, had the picket placed out for the safety of the camp been of any use whatever, which was an impossibility arising from the posts given to them, and the manner in which they were posted, i. e., dismounted. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Potter described Shaddock's futile attempt to mount a defense as White's men descended on the garrison:

The moment [Shaddock] heard the enemy advancing, he exerted himself to wake up the officers, who were at the time all in the house and asleep in their blankets; but before he could accomplish his object the enemy were in both of the encampments, taking the men from their beds, and the officers were of no use whatever, their men nearly all having been taken before they were made aware even of the approach of the enemy. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Potter left no doubt that Lt. Keays was to blame. He concluded his already critical report with another stinging indictment:

In my opinion had the pickets been properly posted (even the same number of men used by Lieutenant Keays would have been sufficient), this surprise could not have occurred, and the men in camp could have been formed certainly in time have made some resistance, if not sufficiently strong to drive the enemy entirely away, which I think they could have done had they been prepared to receive them. For this I consider Lieutenant W. J. Keays, Company B, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, entirely to blame. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Heintzelman must have reacted to Potter's findings with a combination of disgust and anger. On October 5, he forwarded Potter's report to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Union Army with the recommendation that Keays "be summarily dismissed the service of the United States, or tried by general court-martial." (OR, 1:29:1, 203.) On October 8, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck recommended "summary dismissal." (OR, 1:29:1, 203.) Later that same day, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton agreed and ordered Keays's dismissal.

Keays left the army on October 10, but not for long. His commanding officer lobbied to have Keays reinstated, and for whatever reason, the War Department agreed. On December 31, 1863, Keays was restored to duty as a First Lieutenant with his old unit, Company B. The following month he was transferred to Company A. In April 1865, Keays was named captain of Company G and later assigned to the 3rd New York Provisional Cavalry. He was mustered out of service in September 1865.

The attack on Camp Beckwith happened at a time when the Union Army was dealing with bitter partisan warfare throughout Northern Virginia. The brass reacted predictably to Keays's mistakes as commander during the Confederate raid. The Canadian immigrant who had enlisted to fight for his adopted country paid a price for his amateurish handling of the pickets at Camp Beckwith. Luckily, Keays got another chance to prove that he was worthy of the rank on his should straps.

Notes

*According to a modern regimental history, 2nd Lt. Patrick Welch led members of Co. C, 111th New York in a counterattack and drove away White's men. (Husk 87.) This version of events contradicts Potter's account that the Union garrison never had a chance to respond to the raiders.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Rod A. MacDonald, "William Jeremiah Keays" (genealogy website); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 11th Cavalry Infantry Regiment (website); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 16th Cavalry Regiment (website); Martin W. Rusk, The 111th New York Volunteer Infantry: A Civil War History (2010); Jerry D. Thompson, Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life & Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman (2006); Adrian Tighe, The Bristoe Campaign: General Lee's Last Strategic Offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia, October 1863 (2011).

Confederate Attack on the Contraband Camp at Lewinsville, October 2, 1863

Today marks the 150th anniversary of a little-known attack on the Federal garrison at Camp Beckwith in Lewinsville, Virginia. The encounter embarrassed the Union Army, sparked a War Department investigation, and led to the removal of an officer from command. The Confederates, meanwhile, rode away with a score of prisoners and a welcome supply of horses. Although meriting only a few lines in the Alexandria Gazette, the whole affair stood as yet another example of the guerrilla warfare that was plaguing the Union authorities across Northern Virginia.

Lewinsville (present-day McLean) was a relatively quiet place in the early fall of 1863. The village had witnessed a couple minor skirmishes in September 1861. The following month, Union forces occupied Lewinsville and the surrounding countryside. The massive Union presence ended when the Army of the Potomac left for the Peninsula. Union details continued to picket the area given Lewinsville's proximity to Washington and the strategic river crossing at Chain Bridge.

In June 1863, Union authorities established a contraband farm known as Camp Beckwith on abandoned secessionist lands near the crossroads at Lewinsville.* By the start of October, a mixed garrison of cavalry and infantry kept watch over the farm. 1st Lt. William J. Keays of Co. B, 16th New York Cavalry headed a detachment of 40 enlisted men, one second lieutenant, and one acting lieutenant.** Only 30 of the cavalrymen were fit for duty at the time. The infantry guard consisted of 17 men from Co. C, 111th New York under the command of 2nd Lt. Patrick H. Welch.***

Flank marker, 16th N.Y. Cavalry (courtesy of New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center).

The main house at Camp Beckwith was "used as a headquarters for the officers, and for the workmen on the farm." (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)****  The infantry and cavalry camps for the enlisted men were located a few paces on either side of the dwelling. Welch positioned the camp guard at three picket posts around the house. Dismounted cavalry pickets covered three approaches to the camp: the road to the Alexandria-Leesburg Turnpike (likely today's Lewinsville Rd.); the road to Chain Bridge (current-day Chain Bridge Rd. through the center of McLean); and a wood road leading to the Georgetown-Leesburg Turnpike (modern-day road unknown).  (A map of the camp superimposed on present-day McLean can be found here.) Keays placed two troopers at each location during the day, and three at night. Curiously, the pickets left their horses back at the main camp.

Camp Beckwith was surely a tempting target for the Confederates. After all, the Union military kept and maintained scores of horses on the farm. Local citizens began to report nearby guerrilla activity to Lt. Keays. The cavalry officer, however, took no added measures in response to the warnings.

Lt. Col. Elijah Viers ("Lige") White, commander of the 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry (courtesy of Find-a-Grave). Born near Poolsville, Maryland in 1832, White settled in Loudoun County, Virginia following a stint fighting with pro-slavery forces in Bleeding Kansas. At the outbreak of the Civil War, he served with the Confederate cavalry and was eventually given permission to raise his own command. The 35th Battalion performed regular cavalry service and also participated in partisan activities in Northern Virginia. At the time of the raid on Camp Beckwith, White's men were detached from the Army of Northern Virginia.

Unfortunately for the Union garrison at Camp Beckwith, the civilians had legitimate grounds for concern -- Lt. Col. Elijah V. White, commander of the 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry, had set his sights on the contraband farm at Lewinsville. During the night of October 1, the Confederate partisan led 50 troopers from the direction of Dranesville towards Camp Beckwith.***** They approached in the darkness along an old unguarded pathway through the woods and regrouped on a hill overlooking the enemy encampment. Around 12:40 a.m. on October 2, the troopers dashed towards the Union garrison and descended on the unsuspecting Yankees. A cavalry sergeant on duty tried to wake the officers inside the house, but his efforts came too late to make much of a difference. White overwhelmed the Union force within five minutes. When the attack was over, the Confederate partisans rode away with 20 prisoners and 64 horses, including thirteen work horses used on the farm. (OR, 1:29:1, 203.) Union casualties totaled two dead and three wounded, although White's men escaped without any losses. (OR, 1:29:1, 202; 203.)

Col. John C. Tidball (courtesy of Wikipedia). This picture was taken at Fair Oaks, Virginia in June 1862 when Tidball was a captain.

In the immediate aftermath of the raid, a messenger was dispatched to alert the garrison at Ft. Ethan Allen, about five miles away near Chain Bridge. Upon learning of White's attack at 2:30 a.m., Col. John C. Tidball, commander of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery at the fort, sent 300 men under Lt. Col. Thomas Allcock to assess the situation. At five that morning, Allcock sent additional details about the raid. Tidball dashed off a report to Capt. Thomas Thompson, an assistant adjutant general with the Department of Washington. Tidball concluded his dispatch with a remark about the vulnerability of Camp Beckwith prior to the attack:

The inducement for this raid, as I some time since reported, was so great that I am surprised that the enemy have so long resisted the temptation. (OR, 1:29:1, 201.)

The high command in Washington wasted no time in getting to the root cause of the early morning mishap at the contraband farm.

Up Next

The fallout from the raid on Camp Beckwith and the blame game.

Notes

*I recently wrote about the region's contraband camps, including the possible location of Camp Beckwith. See here, here, and here.

**The troopers of Co. B were mainly from Buffalo.

***The infantrymen of Co. C were recruited in the New York counties of Cayuga and Wayne.

****Based on previous research, the home may have been the Windy Hill farmhouse. (See here.)

*****Although Union reports indicate that White had 150 men, White himself reported a force of only 50. (OR, 1:29:1, 200, 202, 203.)

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Alexandria Gazette, Oct. 6, 1863; Taylor M. Chamberlin & John M. Souders, Between Reb and Yank: A Civil War History of Northern Loudoun County, Virginia (2011); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 16th Cavalry Regiment (website); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 111th Infantry Regiment (website); Martin W. Rusk, The 111th New York Volunteer Infantry: A Civil War History (2010); Jerry D. Thompson, Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life & Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman (2006); Adrian Tighe, The Bristoe Campaign: General Lee's Last Strategic Offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia, October 1863 (2011).