Civil War History & Wine -- a Great Combination!

Living in Northern Virginia has its perks. After all, Civil War history surrounds us everywhere. As a added bonus, wineries dot the rolling countryside just beyond the inner suburbs. On Father's Day, my wife and children took me to The Winery at Bull Run, which offers the best of both worlds. Opened in 2012 by Jon and Kim Hickox. the winery sits on land adjacent to the Manassas National Battlefield Park and the famous Stone Bridge.

During the Civil War, the property was the site of Hillwood. The Weir family, who owned the estate at the time, lived at their nearby plantation known as Liberia and left the property in the hands of a tenant or caretaker. (Liberia served as Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard's headquarters around the time of First Manassas.  Gen. Irvin McDowell also did a stint there in 1862.) On July 21, 1861, soldiers under then-Colonels William T. Sherman and Erasmus Keyes marched across Hillwood on their way to ford Bull Run and join the Union attack. Capt. James Carlisle's battery of U.S. artillery also took position on the ridge line at Hillwood. During Second Manassas in August 1862, Confederate troops under A.P. Hill crossed the property en route to link up with the remainder of Stonewall Jackson's wing of the Army of Northern Virginia. As the Union forces retreated across the Stone Bridge following their defeat on August 30, they too passed by Hillwood. In other words, this land is an important piece of the story of both battles.

Following the devastation of the Civil War, the property was returned to family farming and other economic activities. The Hickox family purchased the land in 2008 and set to work on establishing their winery. Today, the winery's two vineyards are planted with Norton and Traminette varieties. The Winery at Bull Run also farms grapes on 115-acres in Rappahannock County, Virginia.

The remains of the Hillwood house (c. 1840s/50s) on the winery grounds. A fire nearly destroyed the historic structure in 1990. In 2008, Jon Hickox took down the damaged walls but preserved the foundation.

The Tasting Room represents two styles of Virginia barns. The darker wood structure built of reclaimed stone and wood is about the same size as the 19th century barn that stood at Hillwood. The white structure is typical of the 1920s dairy barns that were seen across Northern Virginia until the 1950s. 

The Tasting Room at the winery features display cases filled with relics that were found on the property and at other places nearby. Pictured above is a variety of artifacts from a field hospital that was located in front of the Hillwood house.

Additional artifacts in the Tasting Room, including artillery shells, Minie balls, and a State of New York belt buckle.

A view over the vineyard. Both Union and Confederate troops crossed this property at the time of the fighting at Manassas in July 1861 and August 1862. US-29, the Warrenton Turnpike during the war, is beyond the distant treeline.

What I believe to be a reconstructed winter cabin, similar to those used by Confederates in Centreville during the winter of 1861-62. 

One of several historical markers placed on the grounds at the winery. This one has a rather fanciful depiction of Hillwood, the Stone Bridge, and environs, during First Manassas.

The Winery at Bull Run represents a successful marriage of preservation and agricultural tourism. Large swaths of commercial and residential development have largely spoiled this part of Northern Virginia; the Hickoxes ensured that the pastoral and historic landscape of Hillwood would be preserved for generations to come. An outing to the winery is a must for any Civil War enthusiast. And the allure of wine tasting will make it easy for other family members to indulge in your love of history.

Sources & More Information
Local historian Chuck Mauro has written an interesting history of the Hillwood property and winery. The booklet is available for purchase at the winery's Tasting Room.

For more information on visiting The Winery at Bull Run, go to the vineyard's website here.

A Detour to Delaplane, Virginia: The First Bull Run Campaign and the Manassas Gap Railroad

This past weekend I decided to take the family for an outing in the countryside.  On Saturday morning we put the boys in their car seats, jumped into the SUV, and headed to Sky Meadows State Park in Fauquier County.  My wife and I first visited the park back in 2010.  The historic home of Mt. Bleak, located on the grounds of Sky Meadows, has several connections to Mosby's Rangers and the Civil War.  (I wrote a post about my previous visit here.)  Of course, I couldn't resist taking a little detour to another Civil War site on the way to Sky Meadows. 

Near the confluence of Goose Creek and Crooked Run we pulled off Rt. 17 and stopped at Delaplane.  This tiny hamlet, known as Piedmont Station during the Civil War, appears much as it did in the mid-nineteenth century.  The Manassas Gap Railroad reached the area in 1852.  The company decided to place a new station near the point where the railroad crossed the vital transportation link of the Dumfries-Winchester Road (now Rt. 17).  The town grew up around the station, and by the start of the Civil War, had become an important rail center in Fauquier County.  Piedmont Station was renamed Delaplane in 1874 and today is designated as a Historic District on the National Register of Historic Places.

Civil War Trails marker on Delaplane Grade Rd., just to the south of the old Manassas Gap Railroad line.  Today the tracks are part of the Norfolk Southern system. 

Piedmont Station played a key role in the First Bull Run Campaign.  Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate Army of the Shenandoah, received an urgent order on July 18, 1861 to join forces with Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard at Manassas Junction.  The general, worried that his volunteer army would take too long to march to Beauregard's assistance, opted instead to send his army by rail.  Johnston proceeded to Piedmont Station and oversaw preparations for the transportation of his men to Manassas Junction.

Close-up of the Civil War Trails marker.  (More information can be found here on the Historical Marker Database.)  The marker makes the claim that "[h]ere. . . trains were used for the first time in history to move troops to impending battle." 

Meanwhile, Johnston's army was on the move out of the Shenandoah Valley.  Gen. Thomas J. Jackson's brigade left the Winchester area around noon on July 18.  After marching all day and night, they passed through Ashby's Gap and stopped in Paris at two in the morning of July 19.  (Incidentally, I wrote about Paris and Jackson-related sites a few years ago.)  Jackson allowed his men a few hours of rest before they set out to complete the remaining six miles to Piedmont Station. They arrived at six in the morning.  Patriotic civilians greeted Jackson's troops at the station and offered them food and drink.  Jackson's men, likely basking in the glow of admirers, ate their breakfast and then boarded the train of freight and cattle cars for Manassas.  Progress was slow.  The 34-mile trip took an incredible eight hours.  Jackson, of course, would go on to earn the nickname "Stonewall" on the battlefield of Manassas on July 21. 

Two original railroad buildings dating to 1852.  These structures have been used as depots, warehouses, and stores.  The National Register of Historic Places Registration Form for Delaplane notes that "[t]he survival of these two large antebellum brick structures associated with the railroad is a rare occurrence in Virginia since few antebellum brick buildings of this scale can be documented anywhere else in Virginia."  (p. 16.)

Despite logistical difficulties, regiments from the brigades of Col. Francis Bartow and Gen. Barnard Bee followed Jackson over the course of the next day or so.  The brigade of Col. Arnold Elzey, under the temporary command of Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith, did not leave Piedmont Station until the early morning hours of July 21.  The men arrived at Manassas mid-day and marched quickly to the sounds of battle.  Elzey's troops smashed into the Federal right on Chinn Ridge and helped to secure the Confederate victory.

Another view of the antebellum railroad buildings, taken from Rokeby Rd.  The railroad line runs in front of the buildings.



Looking west down the old Manassas Gap Railroad tracks from Rokeby Rd. in Delaplane.  A Virginia State Historical Marker on Piedmont Station and First Manassas sits to the right.  (See here for text.)  The white SUV is traveling south on Rt. 17, the old Dumfries-Winchester Rd. 

Today Delaplane sits almost untouched by time.  You'll find no Starbucks, McDonald's, or strip malls there.  It isn't hard to imagine Jackson's troops mounting the rail cars and starting their journey towards Manassas and fame.  Walking next to the tracks, I was reminded of the contribution that this village made to modern military history.  Railroads played an important part in the Civil War, and Johnston's operation at Piedmont Station stood near the very start of it all.  Although the means of transportation proved a little slower than Johnston may have liked, his actions at Piedmont Station demonstrated the value of harnessing railroad technology to military advantage.  That's big stuff for such a small place, and well worth a stop to look around and ponder.

Sources

William C. Davis, Battle at Bull Run (1985 ed.); Bradley M. Gottfried, The Maps of First Bull Run (2009); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Operations (1874); National Register of Historic Places Registration Form, Delaplane Historic District (2003); Ethan Rafuse, A Single Grand Victory: The First Campaign and Battle of Manassas (2002).

The 17th Virginia Gets a New Brigade Commander and Settles Into Camp

This blog has traced the history of the 17th Virginia Infantry throughout the first year of the Civil War.  I have taken a particular interest in this regiment given that it was composed of men from across Northern Virginia, including Fairfax County.  By way of a quick recap, the militia companies that eventually formed the 17th  gathered in Alexandria not long after the Virginia Convention voted to secede on April 17, 1861.  They left town when Union forces invaded Virginia the next month.  Assigned to Gen. James Longstreet's brigade, the 17th Virginia played a leading role at Blackburn's Ford on July 18.  Following First Manassas, the 17th moved forward to Centreville and then Fairfax Court House.  The regiment served with Longstreet's advanced forces around Falls Church and at Mason's and Munson's Hills during August and September.  In  mid-October, the regiment fell back to Centreville as part of a general withdrawal of Confederate troops.

Autumn 1861 brought change at the top for the 17th Virginia.  Even before moving to Centreville, the men of the regiment lost their brigade commander.  In mid-October, Longstreet received a promotion to major general. After drilling his men one final time on October 12, Longstreet said his good-byes, and the soldiers responded with a loud cheer for the general who had led them through the Manassas Campaign and the recent picket war.  (Wallace 23.)  The next day Longstreet issued General Order No. 17, in which he  "express[ed] his sincere thanks to the officers and soldiers of the command for the kindly patience, the soldierly fortitude, and the cheerful obedience which they have invariably exhibited during the many hardships and privations of a long and trying campaign."  (Warfield 61.)  He concluded that "[t]he command of a brigade second to none is well worthy the boast of any general, and even regret may well be felt at promotion which removes it a step, at least, from him." (Warfield 61-62.)

Gen. Charles Clark of Mississippi replaced Longstreet, but his tenure at the top was short-lived.  On October 22, not long after the 17th moved to Centreville, the Confederate War Department organized the Department of Northern Virginia out of the forces currently operating in the area stretching from the mouth of the Potomac River to the Shenandoah Valley. The new department's Potomac District was composed of divisions under the command of Earl Van Dorn, Gustavus W. Smith, Longstreet, and Edmund Kirby Smith.  Longstreet's old brigade, including the 17th Virginia, was placed under Gen. Richard S. Ewell and was eventually assigned to Longstreet's new division.

Gen. Richard S. Ewell, the 17th Virginia's new brigade commander (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The 17th Virginia passed the time in Centreville "drilling, mounting Quaker guns, standing picket duty, and doing our part in the details set to the work of throwing up breastworks," but not all was so uneventful.  (Warfield 63.)  In late October, Virginia Governor John Letcher visited Centreville to present the flags of the Commonwealth to the Virginia regiments encamped there.  As Letcher handed a flag to the 17th, he urged the regiment to "[t]ake it, and when you go into Alexandria drive out the invaders of our soil." (Wallace 24.)   The 17th Virginia's commander, Col. Montgomery Corse, promised to plant the flag "on the ramparts of Ft. Ellsworth" in Alexandria, or "the blood of the Seventeenth shall flow freely in the attempt." (Wallace 24.)  The next day the 17th Virginia participated in a grand review of Virginia troops by the governor as spectators crowded the surrounding hills to catch a glimpse of the spectacle. 

Confederate winter quarters at Centreville, VA (courtesy of Library of Congress).  This photograph was taken in March 1862 after the Confederates had abandoned the area.

According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th, "the night of November 1 we experienced one of the most terrific storms of wind, rain, and hail that we had to contend with during the war."  (Warfield 64.)  Warfield recalled:

The storm continued throughout the night.  Every tent in the camp except two was thrown down and the contents were scattered.  The storm did not cease until the afternoon of the 2nd, and during that time the men were without shelter, thoroughly drenched, and unable to cook their meals.  (Warfield 64.)

Conditions improved by the end of the month, when the 17th began to construct log cabins in preparation for winter.*  The men of the regiment cut trees and brought them to camp in the quartermaster's wagons.  One soldier considered this work "the hardest I ever performed."  (Wallace 24.)  The small log huts, like those pictured above, served as home for the soldiers during the harsh, cold days ahead.

A battle flag of the 17th Virginia, marked with engagements from the 1862 Peninsula Campaign (courtesy of the Fairfax Rifles)

November ended with the presentation of the famed Confederate battle flag to the 17th Virginia and the other regiments at Centreville.  Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, in characteristic bombast, told the men: "Under its untarnished folds, beat back the invader and find nationality, everlasting immunity from an atrocious despotism, and honor and renown for yourselves, or death." (Warfield 65-66.)   But first, the army had to survive the winter weather, and all the misery that camp life could bring.

Notes
*Throughout October and November 1861, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston bickered with the War Department over the provision of assistance in building winter quarters.  Johnston saw the War Department as neglectful of his pleas, while Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin accused Johnston of turning away help.  In the end, the soldiers appear to have taken matters into their own hands.  See OR, 1:5, 891, 896-97, 934, 941-42, 948-49, 951; see also this post at Living in the Past concerning the dispute.

Sources
Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Back to Where They Started After Manassas: Johnston Moves the Army to Centreville

As I wrote in a series of recent posts, the Confederates left their advanced positions in Northern Virginia at the end of September 1861 and fell back to Fairfax Court House.  Commander Joseph Johnston, along with Generals P.G.T. Beauregard and G.W. Smith, had recommended an offensive action to Jefferson Davis on October 1, but the Confederate President nixed any plans for a grand invasion across the Potomac.  Johnston was left to contemplate his next move.

The commanding general recognized the vulnerability of his army's position at Fairfax.  As Johnston recalled in his Narrative after the war, "[t]he semicircular course of the Potomac, and roads converging from different points on it to our position, made it easy for the Federal army to turn either of our flanks without exposing its own communications."  (Johnston 77.)  Johnston worried that the Union Army's growing capabilities rendered the Fairfax line "more hazardous" than before.  (Johnston 77.)

According to Alfred Roman's biography of Beauregard, Johnston first suggested that the army establish a new position at Manassas, but Beauregard, "fearing the bad effect upon the army and the people of a retreat to the point held by us before our late victory, proposed Centreville instead."  (Roman 154.)  Given concerns that Centreville "was somewhat commanded by a succession of heights too distant to be embraced within the Confederate line,"  Beauregard also offered to take charge of establishing defensive positions.  Johnston's Narrative does not discuss Beauregard's role in selecting Centreville, and Roman's book, which is likely Beauregard's ghostwritten autobiography, may give Old Bory too much credit.

Johnston finally issued the order for the army to move to Centreville in mid-October.*  The position was less exposed than Fairfax and sat not far from the critical railroad junction at Manassas.  The divisions of James Longstreet and Earl Van Dorn occupied the ground between Union Mills and Centreville, with the position at Union Mills anchoring the Confederate right.  Gen. Smith's division was sent to the heights above the Warrenton Turnpike near Centreville, while "Stonewall" Jackson's soldiers were held in reserve to the rear of the town.  (Jackson himself would soon take charge of the Valley District of the Department of Northern Virginia and head out to the Shenandoah.)  Gen. Jeb Stuart's cavalry force patrolled the countryside in advance of the Centreville line.

Detail of the Centreville area from an 1862 Union Army map (courtesy of the Library of Congress).  The circle at the top indicates Centreville and the hills to the north of Warrenton Turnpike.  The circle at the bottom shows the location of Union Mills, the right of the Confederate line.  Manassas Junction is at the bottom left of the map.

Johnston immediately set to work on the defenses at Centreville, but not all was as formidable as it appeared:

The engineers were directed to fortify the summit of the hill near this village— that, by holding it, the strongest and salient point of the position, with two or three thousand men, the army itself might be free to manoeuvre. As we had not artillery enough for their works and for the army fighting elsewhere, at the same time, rough wooden imitations of guns were made, and kept near the embrasures, in readiness for exhibition in them. To conceal the absence of carriages, the embrasures were covered with sheds made of bushes. (Johnston 78.)

"Centreville, Va., Fort on heights, with Quaker guns," photograph taken in March 1862 after Union occupation (courtesy of  Library of Congress).

Private Edgar Warfield recalled the withdrawal of the 17th Virginia to Centreville:

It was with real regret that we left Fairfax. We had spent many pleasant hours at the place, and it was so near home for many of us. But such is a soldier's lot. Previous to leaving camp details were named from several regiments to move telegraph wires and take them to Centreville. The next morning [October 17] found us pitching our tents on our new camp grounds on the heights near the village of Centreville. (Warfield 63.)

The Confederates settled in for a long fall and winter.  During the months after First Manassas, many soldiers, including the 17th Virginia, moved eastward to Fairfax Court House and beyond.  This ground had been taken with no real bloodshed, but had also been given up without a fight.  Now, the views of the unfinished Capitol dome from Munson's Hill were but a memory, and the Confederates sat not far from the very battlefield where they had beaten the Union Army back in July. 

Note
*Most accounts indicate that the Confederates fell back sometime between October 16-19.  Johnston and Longstreet, for example, mark the event as occurring on October 19, while an October 18 letter home from Longstreet aide Tom Goree indicates that the army headed to Centreville sometime before the 19th.  Private Edgar Warfield's memoirs state that his regiment received Johnston's order on the night of October 16 and arrived the next morning at Centreville.

Sources
Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 (1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

Jefferson Davis Visits Fairfax, Confers with the Top Brass, and Reviews the Army: Sept. 30-Oct. 3, 1861

As I discussed in a recent post, Confederate commander Joseph E. Johnston wrote to Judah P. Benjamin, the acting Secretary of War in Richmond, urging that Benjamin, a representative, or President Jefferson Davis come to Fairfax Court House to confer about a possible offensive.  Benjamin responded to Johnston on September 29, 1861, telling him it was "extremely difficult. . . to determine whether or not we can furnish you the further means you may deem necessary to assume the active offensive."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  The secretary in part blamed Johnston for the government's inability to assess the situation:  "We have not in the Department a single return from your army of the quantity of ammunition, artillery, means of transportation, or sick in camp or in hospitals, to enable us to form a judgment of what your necessities may be."  (OR, 1:5, 883.)  Benjamin told Johnston that he had "earnestly requested the President to visit your headquarters in person, and to learn on conference with you the true position of your army in all respects, and the possibility of a prompt offensive movement."  Davis "consented to this," and Benjamin hoped that Davis would reach Johnston's camp within a day or two. (OR, 1:5, 883.)

Arrival in Fairfax

The Confederate President boarded the train to Richmond early on September 30 and arrived at Fairfax Station late in the afternoon. Civilians and soldiers lining the route to Fairfax Court House cheered the President as he passed by, and Davis tipped his hat to the admirers. Due to an apparent "misunderstanding," the army never procured a house in Fairfax for the President to use during his visit. (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.) Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard, however, came to the rescue and brought the President to stay at his headquarters. Generals Johnston and Gustavus W. Smith called on Davis that evening to pay their respects, but "no official subjects were alluded to in that interview." (OR, 1:5, 884-85.)

Jefferson Davis, photo by Matthew Brady, c. 1858-60 (courtesy of Library of Congress).

The October 1 Conference

The next day, October 1, Davis "rode many miles visiting the encampments."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  A couple companies of the 16th Mississippi also took Davis on a reconnaissance mission near the Union lines, which now occupied the high ground around Falls Church that the Confederates had just recently abandoned.

The night of October 1, Davis conferred with Generals Johnston, Beauregard, and Smith at headquarters.  Much ink has been spilled on this famous "council of war," at which Davis and the top commanders in Virginia discussed the possibility of assuming the offensive and invading the North.  First and foremost, I counsel readers to check out the entire text of Smith's January 31, 1862 memorandum on the conference in the OR. (See OR, 1:5, 884-87.)  The memorandum was also signed by Beauregard and Johnston. Davis himself claims to have seen this document for the first time in 1880. (Davis 450.)  The accounts by Davis, Johnston, and Roman are also worth reading.  (See the sources below for links.)  Sherman over at Living in the Past has done a great job of describing the meeting and the subsequent controversy between Davis and his generals over the conference.  (See here.) The Civil War Daily Gazette also has a good post on the subject.  (See here.)

At the conference, Smith was the first to broach the subject that had compelled Davis to come to Fairfax in the first place.  He asked, "Mr. President, is it not possible to put this army in condition to assume the active offensive?" (OR, 1:5, 885.)  A discussion ensued.  All those present at the conference agreed that "the military force of the Confederate States was at the highest point it could attain without arms from abroad; that the portion of this particular army present for duty was in the finest fighting condition; that if kept inactive it must retrograde immensely in every respect firing the winter, the effect of which was foreseen and dreaded by us all."   (OR, 1:5, 885.) 

Davis was again asked, "Is it not possible to increase the effective strength of this army, and put us in condition to cross the Potomac and carry the war into the enemy's country? Can you not by stripping other points to the last they will bear, and, even risking defeat at all other places, put us in condition to move forward?"  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  The generals argued that "success here was success everywhere, defeat here defeat everywhere."  (OR, 1:5, 885.)  Gen. Beauregard had been pushing a more aggressive strategy for quite some time now, and most certainly wanted to ensure that Davis accepted his plan to invade Maryland and threaten Washington. 

Davis got to the point.  He wanted to know how many men were needed to take the offensive.  Smith said 50,000; Johnston and Beauregard stated a more conservative 60,000.  The latter two also claimed that the supplies in Northern Virginia were "entirely inadequate for an active campaign in the enemy's country even with our present force."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis opposed the suggestion to transfer soldiers to Virginia. After all, the President was under pressure from all parts of the country to defend the Confederacy.  Davis regretted that he could furnish no reinforcements at the time, and even if he could, he had no weapons to arm them.

The generals seemed resigned that "there was no other course left but to take a defensive position and await the enemy."  (OR, 1:5, 886.)  Davis toyed with the idea of "partial operations" into Maryland to strike a "sudden blow" against Union troops on the lower or upper Potomac.  The generals saw too many risks in such a plan and largely rejected the idea.  However, they threw a bone to Davis, agreeing that "if any opportunity should occur offering reasonable chances of success, the attempt would be made." (OR, 1:5, 887.)  The two-hour conference thus dashed Beauregard's dream of a decisive blow across the Potomac. 

Review of the Army

The Confederate President woke up to rain on October 2.  Davis wrote to his wife that  "if the weather permits, I shall resume my labors and to-morrow hope to return."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  The President also expressed disappointment with what he had seen so far: "The condition of things here is not as good as I expected and the position has nothing but its comfort to recommend it."  (Davis to Varina Davis, Oct. 2, 1861 in Crist & Dix 352.)  I have not yet found a record of what the President did that day, but the rain may have caused a disruption in Davis' schedule.

The next afternoon, the President reviewed the Confederate troops quartered in the area.  Soldiers from several brigades lined the road for about a mile and a half, stretching from Fairfax Court House towards Germantown.  Gen. James Longstreet's men, including the 17th Virgina, participated in the spectacle.  Tom Goree, an aide to Longstreet, described "quite a display" in a letter to his sister a few days later:

The President & Genls Johnston, Beauregard & Smith, with their aids [sic] & escort, road along the line in front, whilst our bands as they passed were discoursing excellent music. The President would salute each flag as he passed it. After he passed the line, he then took a position, and the line formed into column and passed him, the officers saluting as they passed. (in Cutrer 47.)

Following the review, Longstreet  and his staff headed to Beauregard's headquarters to meet with Davis.  According to Goree, the President "spoke of the honorable positions we had occupied in the advance" and "asked if we could give him a view of the Potomac."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Goree, all to aware of the recent evacuation of Munson's and Mason's Hills, replied that "we could have done so, a few days since, but could not now."  (in Cutrer 47.)  Davis, full of bluster, replied that "I hope that in a short time we will force a view of it, at the Long Bridge."  (in Cutrer 47.)  How the Confederate President expected that to happen in light of the conference of October 1, he did not say.

Davis boarded a train that night and returned to Richmond. The President's trip had given Johnston the answer he needed.  The cautious commander had made the right decision after all in withdrawing his men from their advanced position.  Now Johnston would turn to establishing a purely defensive position, and even Fairfax felt a bit too forward for his purposes.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Lynda L. Crist & Mary S. Dix (eds.), The Papers of Jefferson Davis, 1861, Vol. 7 (1991); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Jefferson Davis, The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. 1 (1881); Joseph E. Johnston, Narrative of Military Actions During the Late War Between the States (1874); Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1 1884); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part I

As September 1861 drew to a close, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston pondered his next move.  His line stretched from around Flint Hill through Fairfax Court House and Fairfax Station to Sansgter's Crossroads.  The advanced forces of the Confederate Army sat astride Munson's and Mason's Hills, within a few miles of the Union lines and Washington.  The exposed position of the advanced elements worried Johnston, and only a few weeks before, he had vetoed Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard's suggestion for a general advance closer to the Federal capital. 

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Library of Congress)

On September 26, Johnston wrote to Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin in Richmond.  The general noted that his objective in occupying his present position in Northern Virginia was "to remove the troops from the unhealthy atmosphere of the valley of Bull Run and to be ready to turn the enemy's position and advance into Maryland whenever the strength of this army would justify it."  (OR, 1:5, 881.)  However, "the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming the offensive. To do so would require more men and munitions."  (OR, 1:5, 882.)  Johnston put the choice starkly before the Secretary:

We are not now in a strong defensive position either to fight a battle or to hold the enemy in check. The position was occupied for a different purpose. It is now necessary to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line. There are very grave and serious objections to the latter course, and the idea even should not be entertained until after it is finally determined to be impracticable to place this army in such condition as would justify its taking at an early day the active offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The general took aim at the Confederate government's ability to organize for an advance:

The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evansport and length of time required for the collection of those means have given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition to assume the offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

Johnston, for all his doubts, gave the Secretary a chance to prove him wrong:

If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it important that either his excellency the President of the Confederate States, yourself, or some one representing you, should here upon the ground confer with me in regard to this all-important question. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The response from the War Department could not come soon enough.  Johnston's anxieties about the state of Confederate preparedness troubled him, and it was only a matter of hours before Johnston would take action to deal with his army's vulnerabilities.

Beauregard Writes to Jefferson Davis About the Affair at Lewinsville

The skirmish at Lewinsville was rather small and inconsequential in the scheme of things, but that didn't stop army commanders from putting their own spin on it.  Union Gen. George McClellan certainly took the opportunity to tell his bosses that the victory meant "no more Bull Run affairs."  Likewise, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard wrote to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond on September 13, 1861.  He boasted:

On the 11th instant we had quite a brisk affair d'avant poste at Lewinsville, between about three hundred men and two pieces of artillery on our part, and on that of the enemy three regiments and eight pieces of artillery, which resulted in their complete rout, with the known loss of about one dozen men killed, wounded, and prisoners.  "Nobody hurt" on our side, not even a horse!*

The claim of a "complete rout" was certainly exaggerated.  Gen."Baldy" Smith's men, under Col. Isaac Stevens, were already getting ready to head back to camp when they were attacked by Col. Jeb Stuart, and the Union force's withdrawal from Lewinsville under fire was a pretty orderly affair.

The home that served as Beauregard's headquarters in Fairfax Court House (courtesy of Library of Congress)

Beauregard added that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's report on the skirmish, which was forthcoming, "does so much credit to Colonel Stuart, of the cavalry."  Beauregard praised both Stuart and Gen. James Longstreet as "two very promising officers."  (Stuart, during this time, was operating as part of Longstreet's command in the Munson's Hill/Mason's Hill area.)  Beauregard informed Davis of his intention to move Longstreet's whole brigade to Falls Church and Gen. Richard Ewell's brigade to Annandale, where they could "support, at a moment's notice, the forces at and about Munson's and Mason's hills." Beauregard himself had just moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court House, "so as to be nearer the scene of operations."

Beauregard was expecting a full-scale Union attack, and the recent Union reconnaissance at Lewinsville had done little to disabuse him of such notions. He warned Davis:

I am under the impression, from all I can learn, that the enemy, whenever ready, will make a strong demonstration in our front, and then endeavor to turn this place, either by Dumfries, on the lower Potomac, or by Leesburg, on the upper Potomac; in either case we ought to be prepared to strike him from Camp Pickens [Manassas] as a centre, for which purpose we must have collected at that point a large depot of provisions and ammunition.

Beauregard used the threat of a possible Federal advance to plug his ideas for army reorganization. He wrote that the Confederate Army of the Potomac "ought to be under one head, with also one head to each of the two corps of said army; for the general-in-chief of such a large force has too much to engross his time and attention, to be able to discharge also the important duties of chief of a corps d'armee."   Davis was to give these suggestions "serious and immediate consideration, as I believe no time is to be lost in this matter."

Beauregard finished his letter with a post script to Davis: "General McClellan is said, by the prisoners, to have been present at Lewinsville." The general must surely have cracked a smile at the image of the Union army commander presiding over the rout of his own forces. The reality, of course, was much different, but McClellan did ride out to meet the Union forces as they returned to camp from Lewinsville.

I have not seen a copy of Davis' response to Beauregard's letter, if there ever was one.  In a few short weeks, however, the Confederate President would travel to Fairfax and confer with his leading generals on issues of organization and strategy. In the meantime, the Confederates would continue to wait and watch along the advanced line near Falls Church and Annandale.

Note
*The Union force of 1,800 men consisted of the 79th New York, four companies of the First Regiment U.S. Chasseurs, two companies of the 2nd Vermont, two companies of the 3rd Vermont, five companies of the 19th Indiana, four guns of Captain Charles Griffin's battery, and a detachment of 50 regular cavalry and 40 volunteer cavalry. A section of Captain Thaddeus Mott's battery was also brought to the front and fired on the Confederates.

Source
The official correspondence cited in this post can be found in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1, p. 477-78 (1884).

Longstreet and the 17th Virginia Advance to Centreville and Fairfax

This spring and summer I have written a number of posts about the17th Virginia Infantry during the early months of the Civil War.  This regiment was composed of men from Fairfax and other areas of Northern Virginia that are familiar to me and many readers of this blog.  I felt that the 17th offered a good way to tell the story of locals who were called to defend the very region where they lived and worked before the war arrived on their doorstep.  Over the next few weeks and months, I will occasionally explore life in the 17th Virginia during the period of relative calm between July 1861 to March 1862.  This narrative will fit nicely with my previous posts about the Union regiments that were quartered around present-day McLean at the same time.

Shortly after the Confederate victory at the Battle of First Manassas, General P.G.T. Beauregard ordered General James Longstreet to advance his brigade to Centreville from its position along Bull Run.  Longstreet's brigade, consisting of the 17th Virginia, as well as the 1st Virginia, 11th Virginia, and 5th North Carolina, established camp near the town.  In a reorganization of the Confederate Army of the Potomac on July 25, Beauregard reassigned the 5th North Carolina to another brigade and sent the 7th Virginia to join the 17th Virginia and the other regiments of Longstreet's brigade.

Longstreet's aide-de-camp, Thomas Goree, seemed pleased with the new surroundings.  He wrote his mother in an August 8 letter that "Centreville is a very high, healthy place, with a plenty of good water. I believe that I never before saw a place so well supplied with good springs."  (in Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree, p. 32 (1995).)    Longstreet, however, may have disputed Goree's description of Centreville as "healthy"-- he spent the last week of July recovering from illness that kept him confined to headquarters.

Centreville during the war.  This photograph was taken in the spring of 1862, after the Confederates had moved out (courtesy of N.Y. Public Library Digital Gallery).

The 17th and the rest of Longstreet's men spent the days in Centreville drilling.  Goree felt that Longstreet "has about the best Brigade in the service."  The young staff officer told his mother that it was "truly a splendid looking sight to see our brigade out in the evening on drill with our splendid band of music."  The drills frequently "attract[ed] a large crowd of spectators."  Around August 9, the brigade even took part in a grand review for Prince Jerome Napoleon, a cousin of French Emperor Napoleon III, who had passed through the Union lines at Alexandria.  The boys from Fairfax and other rural counties in Northern Virginia surely never could have imagined that one day they would be parading for European royalty on the fields near Centreville. 

The encampment at Centreville was short lived.  On August 10, acting on orders from Beauregard, Longstreet took his brigade to Fairfax Court House, farther to the east.  This movement was part of a general advance that Beauregard ordered "to prevent any coup de main from [Union Gen. George] McClellan."  (Beauregard to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, Aug. 11, 1861, Manassas, VA, in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861-1865, p. 473 (1884).)  The general believed that from his new positions, "we could at any time concentrate our forces for offensive or defensive purposes."  He even suggested to General Joseph E. Johnston, his superior, that "by a bold move, we could capture the enemy's advance forces at Annandale; and, should he come out to their support, give him battle—with all the chances in our favor."  Johnston, always cautious and inclined to remain on the defensive, never endorsed such a plan.

The march to Fairfax from Centreville was relatively short, but the soldiers baked in the summer heat during the ten mile march.  Edgar Warfield, a private from Alexandria with Co. H ("Old Dominion Rifles"), 17th Virgina, remembered later that the regiment "arrived . . . during a heavy downpour of rain." (Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry, p. 58 (1996).)  The 17th Virginia picked a spot to the east and south of Fairfax Court House and established what soon became known as "Camp Harrison."  Longstreet and his staff were quartered in a large house nearby.  The 17th Virginia settled once again into the dull routine of camp life, although not without an occasional moment of excitement. 

Up Next: The 17th Virginia at Fairfax and Falls Church.

A Note on Sources

Aside from the sources cited above, the following books were useful in compiling this post:

Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

McDowell and Civilians in Northern Virginia: Trying to Do the Right Thing (Part I)

Last month I examined Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard's June 1861 proclamation to Northern Virginians.  Attempting to rouse support among the local population, Beauregard accused Union soldiers of seeking "beauty and booty."  While Northern troops were undoubtedly stealing, expropriating, or otherwise destroying civilian property, the Union high command was all too aware that any such excesses would only antagonize the locals and make the Army's job that much more difficult.  The war was not likely going to last all that long, and when it came to Virginia's civilians, conciliation was preferred over vindictiveness.  This policy was put to the test in the days leading up to the Battle of First Bull Run.

On May 29, 1861, Brigadier General Irvin McDowell, commander of the Union Department of Northeastern Virginia, dashed off a communication to the Assistant Adjutant General at Army headquarters in Washington City.  He explained that "[t]here have been rumors of outrages committed by volunteers in Alexandria. Colonel Butterfield, of the Twelfth New York, has reported several cases of trespass, depredations, and attempts at burglary in his vicinity."  Reacting to these transgressions, McDowell opined that "we are not, theoretically speaking, at war with the State of Virginia, and we are not, here, in an enemy's country."  McDowell suggested that "[b]ecause the ordinary courts and officers of the State, against whose peace and dignity it is these acts have been committed, are not in the exercise of their functions, shall not these cases be punished, as similar ones were in Mexico, by military commission?"

General Irvin McDowell (courtesy of Wikipedia)

That same day, McDowell expressed concern over the economic losses being inflicted by the Union Army.  He told the Assistant Adjutant General that "[t]he troops are occupying houses in some cases, and fields, and cutting wood for fuel."  He asked, "[s]hall not rent and compensation be paid?" and recommended that "[i]f so, funds are needed for that purpose."

McDowell was particularly attentive to the sensitivities of at least one prominent local family.  On May 30, McDowell promised Confederate General Robert E. Lee's wife that the Union occupation of the Lee home, Arlington House, "has been done . . . with every regard to the preservation of the place."  He assured her that "it has been and will be my earnest endeavor to have all things so ordered that on your return you will find things as little disturbed as possible."  (This last promise seems a bit naive in hindsight, given that Arlington National Cemetery was established on Lee's property during the war.) 

Arlington House with group of Union soldiers gathered out front (courtesy of Wikipedia)

The commander soon adopted a policy to protect the pecuniary interests of civilians in his department.  On June 2, 1861, McDowell issued General Orders No. 4, in which he required brigade commanders and officers in charge of fortifications around Washington to send him as soon as practicable "[s]tatements of the amount, kind, and value of all private property taken and used for Government purposes, and of the damage done in any way to private property by reason of the occupation of this section of the country by the U. S. troops."  McDowell required that the statements, "as far as possible, give the value of the property taken or of the damage sustained, and the name or names of the owners thereof."  The order allowed citizens who suffered any such loss or damage to "make their claims upon the commanding officers of the troops by whom it was done, or in cases where these troops have moved away, upon the commander nearest them."  Brigade commanders were told to "make this order known to the inhabitants in their vicinity, to the end that all loss or damage may, as nearly as possible, be ascertained, whilst the troops are now here, and by whom or on whose account it has been occasioned, that justice may be done alike to the citizen and the Government."  Unlike the criteria for post-war compensation administered by the Southern Claims Commission, McDowell did not require proof that claimants were loyal to the Union.  The war was still too new, and a conciliationist policy would not allow the imposition of such legal hurdles.

McDowell, ever mindful of residents' civil liberties, issued General Orders No. 5 on June 14, 1861.  The general apparently operated under the assumption that at least some constitutional guarantees still applied to the inhabitants of a state in active rebellion against the United States.  The order prohibited unlawful arrests:

Unless under the special orders in each case of a commander of brigade or superior authority, it is forbidden to any officer of soldier within this department to arrest or attempt to arrest any citizen or citizens under the plea of their being secessionists, or for any cause whatsoever save that of being at the time in arms against the United States.

The order also sought to protect Northern Virginian civilians against unauthorized searches:

Nor will any officer or soldier without the like authority forcibly enter, search, or attempt to search any house or the premises of any peaceable resident or other persons not in arms against the United States. The military or police force will arrest any one found trespassing even on the premises of any citizen without the department.

As McDowell would soon discover, ensuring respect for local residents was easier said than done.  Not long after the announcement of General Orders No. 4, he was already reprimanding his subordinates for failure to enforce the order.  As Whitelaw Reid, editor of the New York Tribune, concluded, "[a]gainst such measures the volunteers, with loose ideas of discipline, or of the rights of non-combatants, but with a vague desire to see Virginia punished and humbled by the sufferings of war, revolted."  (Whitelaw Reid, Ohio in the War: Her Statesmen, Generals, and Soldiers, Vol. 1, pp. 664-65 (1895)).  Things would not get an easier as the Union Army took to the field in the middle of July 1861.

A Note on Sources
The full text of McDowell's communications and orders can be found in the Official Records, Series 1, Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 653-55, 659; Series 1, Vol. 51, Part 1, p. 400.

The Yankee War Cry is "Beauty and Bounty": Beauregard's Proclamation to Northern Virginians

Taking command of the Confederates around Manassas at the start of June 1861, General P.G.T. Beauregard wasted no time in reacting to the inadequate condition of his army.  He needed reinforcements and supplies, and apart from entreaties to Richmond, he decided to call upon the local populace for help.  On June 5, 1861, Beauregard issued an inflammatory proclamation to the "good People of the Counties of Loudoun, Fairfax, and Prince William."  The proclamation read:

A reckless and unprincipled tyrant has invaded your soil. Abraham Lincoln, regardless of all moral, legal, and constitutional restraints, has thrown his abolition hosts among you, who are murdering and imprisoning your citizens, confiscating and destroying your property, and committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to humanity to be enumerated. All rules of civilized warfare are abandoned, and they proclaim by their acts, if not on their banners, that their war-cry is "Beauty and booty." All that is dear to man, your honor, and that of your wives and daughters, your fortunes, and your lives, are involved in this momentous contest.

In the name, therefore, of the constituted authorities of the Confederate States,in the sacred cause of constitutional liberty and self-government, for which we are contending, in behalf of civilization and humanity itself, I. G. T. Beauregard, brigadier-general of the Confederate States, commanding at Camp Pickens, Manassas Junction, do make this my proclamation, and invite and rejoin you by every consideration dear to the hearts of freemen and patriots, by the name and memory of your revolutionary fathers, and by the purity and sanctity of your domestic firesides, to rally to the standard of your State and country, and by every means in your power compatible with honorable warfare to drive back and expel the invaders from your land. I conjure you to be true and loyal country and her legal and constitutional authorities, and especially to be vigilant of the movements and acts of the enemy, so as to enable you to give the earliest authentic information to these headquarters or to the officers under my command. I desire to assure you that the utmost protection in my power will be extended to you all.

As a propaganda piece, this proclamation takes the cake.  Beauregard relied upon exaggerated imagery of invading and plundering hoards to enlist the support of locals in the war effort.  He even appealed to male residents' sense of manhood by insinuating that the Yankee occupiers were on the prowl for local women.  Beauregard, in decrying the "abolition hosts," may also have hoped to rouse Virginians who viewed the North as a threat to the very existence of slavery.  (Here is evidence once again that slavery was on the minds of Southern leaders at the conflict's outset, even if Union war aims had not yet caught up.)

General P.G.T. Beauregard, from sheet music (courtesy of Library of Congress)

The proclamation must surely have riled Unionists across Northern Virginia, such as residents of Lewinsville, Lydecker's, and Accotink, who had recently voted against the Ordinance of Secession.  Northern newspapers also caught wind of the proclamation and reacted accordingly.   The June 18, 1861 edition of the New York Times shot back:

If anything were wanting to establish the truth of the statement that the Southern troops are an ignorant mob, it would certainly be found in the last proclamation of Gen. BEAUREGARD. Such a document could only be addressed to men who know nothing of daily events, and certainly its author can but feel contempt for those to whom such declarations can be safely addressed.

On June 19th, the Times ran this commentary:

In Gen. BEAUREGARD'S famous proclamation he says that the Federal troops "proclaim by their acts, if not by their banners, that their war-cry is beauty and booty." We submit that by sending his wife to Massachusetts, when the South had determined on war, where she still remains, Gen. BEAUREGARD has left the world to infer one of two things; either that he thought in his lady's want of personal charms and penury, she had immunity from violence and outrage, or else that when he penned those words in his proclamation he knew he was gasconading. We trust for the lady's reputation that his veracity may suffer rather than her personal appearance.*

Beauregard had unleashed a war of words with his over-the-top proclamation.  But offending Northern sensibilities was no bother to a commander who had a war to fight.

Footnote
*I have been unable to verify whether Beauregard's wife in fact was sent to Massachusetts as the Times alleged.

Alexandria's Delegate: Unionist for All the Wrong Reasons

Alexandria County sent Unionist George William Brent to the Virginia Convention on February 4, 1861. As the Convention met and debated in Richmond, Brent sought a compromise to keep the Union together and avoid civil war. A resolution he introduced on February 20, 1861 called on the Convention to support the Crittenden Compromise or "any other plan of conciliation equivalent thereto, which has been, or may be hereafter offered, by which harmony may be restored between the people of the different States, and the Union perpetuated." Brent's opposition to secession was not based on any deep-seated concerns over the constitutionality of leaving the Union. In fact, by his own admission, Brent firmly believed in the right of states to secede. However, Brent saw secession as folly mainly because it would lead to the demise of slavery. In his view, preservation of the Union was the best way to ensure the preservation of slavery.

George William Brent (courtesy of findagrave.com)

In a lengthy speech to the Convention on March 8, 1861, Brent laid out the reasoning behind his position. He first challenged the assumption that slavery was the main driver of South Carolina's decision to secede. As he alleged:

[I]t has been more a desire to relieve herself of this system of protective tariffs than for protection of the institution of slavery, which has animated her in her political course.

Brent believed that upon a closer examination, arguments for secession based on slavery could not withstand scrutiny. He disputed that the perceived Republican threat to the extension of slavery into U.S. territories was much of a threat at all:

The constitutional right [to own slaves] is valuable and ought to be maintained, but I would ask how far is it available as a question of practical statesmanship? The absolute right is one thing, but the practicability of its exercise is another. In that view I take the ground that it has little real, practical value.

We have in the first place no territory belonging to the United States into which slave labor can profitably go. It will never go into any Territory where it is not profitable

Brent also doubted that the South had the reserve of slaves to spare for the expansion westward:

The truth is, that the South has no slaves to go there. The South has yet vast and valuable cotton lands unoccupied, and the demand upon the slave labor of the South is so great that it is inadequate to meet it.

Brent saved his harshest criticism for those who saw secession as a means to deal with the fugitive slave issue. He observed that the states of the Deep South had little to worry about in the first place, given the buffer of border states like Virginia that could prevent escaped slaves from easily reaching free soil. He then explored the fallacy of the argument linking secession to a resolution of the fugitive slave problem:

But we are told that secession will remedy the escape of our slaves. In what manner? What is the remedy proposed? We have been told. . . that we could establish along the border, a cordon of military posts to intercept the fugitive. Mr. President, the remedy is worse than the disease. You would establish in the midst of the border States, within their very heart a standing army dangerous to the liberties and freedom of the people, and which would entail upon us for its support and maintenance a cost far greater than the value of the slaves lost. Such a policy would invite the establishment of corresponding military posts along the line of the free border States, and strifes and collisions would inevitably ensue. And, finally, Mr. President, the remedy would be ineffectual, for experience has demonstrated that in all countries where no natural barriers intervene, large standing armies have proved ineffectual to resist the escape of fugitives from justice, or the operations of the smuggler. But what would be the effect of secession upon the escape of fugitive slaves? Secession would relieve the Northern States from all constitutional obligations of duty to return our fugitive slaves. It would relieve the negro-stealer from all legal and constitutional restraints, and it would give a secure and safe asylum upon our borders for the escape of the fugitive. As has been well said by some member upon this floor, it would bring Canada down to our very doors. . . .

I think, then, that the evil in the matter of escaped fugitive negroes will be aggravated by secession rather than diminished. (emphasis added.)

Brent rightly predicted that secession would lead to bloodshed and the end of slavery:

I, for one, believe that a peaceful separation of these States cannot be effected. The interests are too great and too pervading to be snapped suddenly asunder without causing irritation, bitterness, strife and civil war. . . . 

If this Union is to be involved in war, the institution of slavery will vanish from our midst. The perpetuity of that institution depends upon peace and upon repose. Let civil war once sound its horrid tocsin in this land, and slavery is at once ended. (emphasis added.)

Brent, hearkening back to his own resolution, called on the delegates to find a solution to the current crisis:

Let, then, Virginia, Mr. President, strive vigorously to remove all causes of discontent between the two sections of the country. . . .

Let her . . . call a conference of the border States. Let them determine upon such amendments to the Constitution as may be deemed necessary for the protection of the South. I care not whether they are the Crittenden amendments, or any other amendments equivalent to them. Let her propose them as the ultimatum upon which the settlement of the questions at issue between the two sections is to be adjusted.

But Brent then warned that:

. . . no attempt should be made, on the part of the Federal Government, to coerce and subjugate the States that have seceded from the Union. Recognizing, as I have always done, the right of a State to secede, to judge of the violation of its rights, and to appeal to its own mode for redress, I could not uphold the Federal Government in any attempt to coerce the seceded States to bring them back into the Union.

Brent concluded by declaring his ultimate allegiance to his state, above all else:

My lot is cast with that of Virginia; come weal, come woe. Beneath her soil repose the remains of those who gave me existence, and of my children, and when my own journey of life shall have been run, my prayer will be that I too may rest in her bosom.

Brent’s Unionist views are disconcerting given their reliance on a pro-slavery rationale. Among Southerners, however, he was in a minority. Those who supported secession distrusted Lincoln and the Federal government to protect the existence of slavery. In their minds, the only way to ensure the protection of their “property” was to leave the Union altogether. Brent did not buy this argument and trusted that the Union and Constitution would function to protect the “peculiar institution.”

In the end, Brent’s speech failed to convince the delegates, who approved an Ordinance of Secession on April 17. Brent voted against the Ordinance, but remained loyal to Virginia, just as he said he would. Brent was soon commissioned as an officer of the 17th Virginia and would later go on to serve Generals Braxton Bragg and P.G.T. Beauregard in the Western Theater.

J.E.B. Stuart Makes a Name for Himself

Since starting this blog, I have written a few times about the "Battle of Lewinsville" on September 11, 1861.  (See here, here and here.)  This small skirmish interests me for a number of reasons.  The clash at Lewinsville took place right in the middle of present-day McLean, not far from my home, but is hardly known to local residents.  Lewinsville also involves a cast of characters who became prominent figures during the Civil War, including J.E.B. Stuart, Charles Griffin, and "Baldy" Smith.  In fact, one of the best stories to come out of Lewinsville  involves then-Colonel J.E.B. Stuart, commander of Confederate forces, whose performance led to recognition and promotion.

General J.E.B. Stuart (courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)

On the afternoon of September 11, as the recall was sounded and the Union reconnaissance force of around 1,800 assembled to return to camp near Chain Bridge, Stuart led over 300 men of the 1st Virginia Cavalry, the 13th Virgina Infantry, and the Washington Artillery of Louisiana in a surprise attack.  The skirmish mostly involved an exchange of artillery fire, and the Union retreat was orderly and involved few casualties.  However limited the engagement, Stuart impressed his superiors with his conduct during the fight.  In forwarding Stuart's official report of the skirmish to General Joseph E. Johnston, commander of the Confederate Army of the Potomac, General James Longstreet, wrote:

The affair of yesterday was handsomely conducted and well executed. . . .  Colonel Stuart has, I think, fairly won his claim to brigadier, and I hope the commanding generals will unite with me in recommending him for that promotion.



General James Longstreet, Stuart's immediate commander based at Falls Church, VA (courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)



General Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)



General Johnston and General P.G.T. Beauregard, the other top Southern commander in Northern Virginia, endorsed Longstreet's recommendation, and added:



We think with Brigadier-General Longstreet that Colonel Stuart's laborious and valuable services, unintermitted since the war began on this frontier, entitle him to a brigadier generally. His calm and daring courage, sagacity, zeal, and activity qualify him admirably for the command of our three regiments of cavalry, by which the outpost duty of the Army is performed. The Government would gain greatly by promoting him.

Johnston wrote separately to General Samuel Cooper, Adjutant General and Inspector General of the Confederate Army in Richmond:

Connected with this communication and these reports is a recommendation form General Longstreet, General Beauregard, and myself for forming a cavalry brigade and putting Colonel Stuart at is head. A new organization of the cavalry arm of our service is greatly needed, and greater strength as well as an effective organization.



General P.G.T. Beauregard (courtesy of Wikipedia Commons)

Immediately after Lewinsville, Johnston and Beauregard had considered Stuart's use of the artillery overly brash; he had put the guns too close to the Union lines and risked capture of precious weaponry.  Longstreet came to Stuart's defense, and obviously won the day.  In the end, Stuart was made a brigadier general and given an independent command of cavalry.  Lewinsville had helped to put Stuart on the road to fame as the head of one of the best-known cavalry commands of the entire Civil War.