Civil War News and Views: The Advanced Confederate Line, September 1861

Now that the Sesquicentennial is over, I look forward to revisiting the earlier war period in Northern Virginia. As readers may recall, I spent a lot of time a few years ago examining the Confederate advance closer to Washington at the end of August 1861, when forces under Gen. James Longstreet occupied the high ground on Munson's Hill and Mason's Hill. Not long ago I came across the following report from the September 6, 1861 edition of the Richmond Daily Dispatch concerning the new position within sight of Washington:

Confederate States Army, Fairfax Station, Va., Sept. 1 

Last evening I returned from Mason's Hill, seven miles south of Washington, D. C. Mason's Hill derives its name from the gentleman's name (Capt. Mason, now in the Confederate service at Norfolk, Va.,) who is the proprietor. Mason's Hill is a very high and commanding position, and about two miles from Munson's Hill, both of which are now fortified and in possession of the ‘"rebels."’ 

In a straight line from Mason's Hill stands the Capitol at Washington, and which can readily be seen with the naked eye. Whilst beholding the dome of the Capitol, I feel like one looking upon the ‘"promised land,"’ where shortly, I hope, ‘"may our possessions be."’ I had the pleasure of seeing Prof. Lowe's balloon, and am sure his observations were of little account to him. The Yankee experiment of ballooning came near receiving a great ‘"pull back,"’ by the firing upon the balloon spy by the Washington Artillery. Several shots were fired at it, when it immediately ‘"went down."’ Don't suppose, however, ‘"anybody was hurt."’ But, nevertheless. somebody was scared, for the balloon suddenly disappeared and did not come up again.

Camping at Mason's Hill is interesting and exciting — not a day passing away but a few Yankee pickets ‘"bite the dust."’ Whilst I was there, in one day eight were gathered by our boys, who keep a sharp lookout for the chaps, and give them a dead shot on sight — Several prisoners have been sent to General Davis' institution at Richmond for safe keeping. By the way, we will soon have a Yankee army on hand. 

On the morning of the 30th a large Federal camp, about two miles from Alexandria, broke up and retired, thinking, probably, the ‘"rebels"’ were getting too close for comfort.--They built a large fire, the smoke of which served to cover them as they broke up their camp.

Fine views are obtained from both Munson's and Mason's Hills, of the surrounding country, and also of the Potomac. Upon the Potomac, large vessels.

There has been considerable sickness in our camp; but, with the cool weather, the health of all the men is improving, and all will be on their feet soon, with musket in hand. No news at present that I dare tell you. Pen.

N. B.--Envelopes are very scarce. The man who goes into the manufactory of envelopes in the South, will make a fortune P. (courtesy of Perseus Digital Library)

An engraving of the Confederate fortification on Munson's Hill, Illustrated London News, Oct. 5, 1861 (courtesy of Emory University).

Foreign correspondents also took an interest in the advanced Confederate line. A piece in the October 5, 1861 edition of the Illustrated London News, accompanying the above illustration, contained the following account of the Rebel position at Munson's Hill:

 This is the point in Virginia at which the Unionists and the Confederates are nearest each other, and whilst our Artist was making his sketch, crouched beneath the shelter of the foliage, within hailing distance of the enemy's pickets, a continual spattering of bullets fell round the spot. More than halfway up the road towards the hill is a barricade, from behind which a Secessionist sharpshooter is having some pot shots, and, screened by the hedges in the cornfields, others are doing the same. In the foreground are the Union advanced pickets, furnished by the Michigan Regiment, one of whom is in the act of firing at two or three men beyond the barricade. A Michigan soldier just shot lies in the road. The Confederates have some rifled cannon on the earthwork, and whenever they see a number of Federalists together they send in a dose of shells.

A New York paper thus describes the Confederate position on Munson's-hill:—"Munson's-hill is probably the highest eminence within ten miles of the Potomac, immediately opposite Washington. It is about six miles from the Capitol, the intervening space being covered with a succession of gently rolling hills, crowned principally with forest trees, although here and there dotted with churches, farmhouses, and country villages. The streams are unimportant and the roads dusty. The hill presents its most abrupt side towards the national capital, and, unlike those around, has but few trees on its summit. Many of those which originally existed have no doubt been felled while the intrenchments were in progress. At present an immense Confederate flag—the red, white, and blue stripes in which are at least five feet wide each—is the most prominent object upon the top of the eminence Two of the trees which have been allowed to remain were used as an observatory. The Confederate defences are constructed entirely of earth, fifteen feet being the highest elevation. The sloping hillside in front of the fort is clear of underbrush or trees, and is sufficiently extended to allow 3000 men to parade. The distance from the cover of the woods to the summit of the hill is not so great but that a quick movement would drive the enemy from their guns with very little loss of life. The flank defences of the fort consist of three batteries. It is believed that earthworks have been thrown up on another portion of the hill commanding the road to Fairfax Courthouse. The fort is intended more particularly to command the road leading from Alexandria to Falls Church, the road from Washington to Fairfax, just mentioned, the railroad from Alexandria to Vienna, and the position of Bailey's Cross-roads."

With little to report in the way of large-scale battles, newspapers turned their attention to the Confederate lines within view of the nation's capital. Munson's and Mason's Hills were popular topics. Add in the thrilling ascent of Lowe's balloons or the tension of the picket war, and correspondents had plenty of material to keep their readers interested and entertained. The Confederates abandoned the advanced position by the end of September 1861, and not long afterwards, both sides settled in for a long fall and winter in camp.

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part II

The order came on the evening of September 27, 1861.  Confederate commander Joseph Johnston worried that his current position left his army exposed and vulnerable.  Unless the government in Richmond was prepared to provide the men and materiel for an offensive action, Johnston saw little value in remaining so far forward.  Gen. James Longstreet also reported on the twenty-seventh that he received information that his advanced position would be attacked by "a very strong force in a few days."  (OR, 1:51:2, 317.)  Perhaps this is all Johnston needed to hear.  Rather than risk a possible engagement along the forward line, the commander sent his men packing.  The Confederates occupying Munson's, Mason's, and Upton's Hills, Falls Church, and other advanced positions were told to fall back towards Fairfax Court House.

The withdrawal played out during the course of the night. According to Longstreet's aide, Tom Goree, "before midnight we had abandoned all the splendid positions (Mason's, Munson's & Upton's Hills) . . . which we held in front of the enemy and in sight of the Potomac & Washington."  (in Cutrer 47.)   The Confederate Army had surrendered the high ground without a fight.

The 17th Virginia was doing duty in Falls Church when the order came. The regiment marched about three miles outside of town and camped for the night, only to return the next day. The 17th finally left the town for Camp Harrison in Fairfax Court House on the twenty-ninth. A couple soldiers posted a note on the gate to The Falls Church addressed to prospective Union occupiers:

Having been resident denizens of Falls Church for some time, we to-day reluctantly evacuate, not because you intimidate by your presence, but only in obedience to military dictation. We leave you a fire to cook potatoes, also to warm by, as the nights are now uncomfortable on account of their chilling influence.  (in Wallace 22.)

Goree wrote that the Confederates regretted leaving the advanced positions, "not only on account of being so pleasantly situated, but we all liked the excitement which our proximity to the Yankees produced."  (in Cutrer 47.)   He wrongly speculated that "the move was a strategic one, made to try and induce the Yankees to make an advance on us and give us battle in an open field."  (in Cutrer 47.) 



"General McClellan Occupying the Confederate Position at Munson's Hill," from a period engraving (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery).  The Union commander wasted no time in crossing the Potomac and riding out to the front upon learning that the Confederates had withdrawn from the area around Munson's Hill.

Goree's boss was not far off the mark as to Union intentions. Around the time the Confederates were marching towards Fairfax, Maj. Gen. George McClellan, commander of the Federal Army of the Potomac, ordered Brig. Gen. Israel Richardson to advance from his position around Bailey's Crossroads and seize Munson's and Upton's Hills from the Confederates. Troops from Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell's division were to support the right flank of Richardson's brigade. On September 28, Federal soldiers stormed the empty Confederate works on Munson's and Upton's Hills without a fight. The capture of Mason's Hill soon followed. As McClellan wrote to his wife on September 29, "The moral effect of this advance will be great & it will have a bad influence on the troops of the enemy. They can no longer say that they are flaunting their dirty little flag in my face, & I hope they have taken their last look at [Washington]." (Sears 104.)  The Confederates, meanwhile, had to determine their next move, but the chances for a fall offensive were not looking so good.

Sources
Russel H. Beatie, Army of the Potomac: McClellan Takes Command: September 1861-February 1862(2002); Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995); Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002); James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896); George B. McClellan, McClellan's Own Story (1887); "Munson's Hill Evacuated by the Rebels," New York Times, Sept. 29, 1861; "The Occupation of Mason's Hill," New York Times, Oct. 2, 1861; Stephen W. Sears (ed.), The Civil War Papers of George B. McClellan: Selected Correspondence 1860-1865 (1989); Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990); Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).

The Confederates Evacuate the Advanced Line, Part I

As September 1861 drew to a close, Confederate Gen. Joseph E. Johnston pondered his next move.  His line stretched from around Flint Hill through Fairfax Court House and Fairfax Station to Sansgter's Crossroads.  The advanced forces of the Confederate Army sat astride Munson's and Mason's Hills, within a few miles of the Union lines and Washington.  The exposed position of the advanced elements worried Johnston, and only a few weeks before, he had vetoed Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard's suggestion for a general advance closer to the Federal capital. 

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston (courtesy of Library of Congress)

On September 26, Johnston wrote to Confederate Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin in Richmond.  The general noted that his objective in occupying his present position in Northern Virginia was "to remove the troops from the unhealthy atmosphere of the valley of Bull Run and to be ready to turn the enemy's position and advance into Maryland whenever the strength of this army would justify it."  (OR, 1:5, 881.)  However, "the numbers and condition of this army have at no time justified our assuming the offensive. To do so would require more men and munitions."  (OR, 1:5, 882.)  Johnston put the choice starkly before the Secretary:

We are not now in a strong defensive position either to fight a battle or to hold the enemy in check. The position was occupied for a different purpose. It is now necessary to decide definitely whether we are to advance or fall back to a more defensible line. There are very grave and serious objections to the latter course, and the idea even should not be entertained until after it is finally determined to be impracticable to place this army in such condition as would justify its taking at an early day the active offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The general took aim at the Confederate government's ability to organize for an advance:

The difficulty of obtaining the means of establishing a battery near Evansport and length of time required for the collection of those means have given me the impression that you cannot at present put this army in condition to assume the offensive. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

Johnston, for all his doubts, gave the Secretary a chance to prove him wrong:

If I am mistaken in this, and you can furnish those means, I think it important that either his excellency the President of the Confederate States, yourself, or some one representing you, should here upon the ground confer with me in regard to this all-important question. (OR, 1:5, 882.)

The response from the War Department could not come soon enough.  Johnston's anxieties about the state of Confederate preparedness troubled him, and it was only a matter of hours before Johnston would take action to deal with his army's vulnerabilities.

Beauregard Writes to Jefferson Davis About the Affair at Lewinsville

The skirmish at Lewinsville was rather small and inconsequential in the scheme of things, but that didn't stop army commanders from putting their own spin on it.  Union Gen. George McClellan certainly took the opportunity to tell his bosses that the victory meant "no more Bull Run affairs."  Likewise, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard wrote to President Jefferson Davis in Richmond on September 13, 1861.  He boasted:

On the 11th instant we had quite a brisk affair d'avant poste at Lewinsville, between about three hundred men and two pieces of artillery on our part, and on that of the enemy three regiments and eight pieces of artillery, which resulted in their complete rout, with the known loss of about one dozen men killed, wounded, and prisoners.  "Nobody hurt" on our side, not even a horse!*

The claim of a "complete rout" was certainly exaggerated.  Gen."Baldy" Smith's men, under Col. Isaac Stevens, were already getting ready to head back to camp when they were attacked by Col. Jeb Stuart, and the Union force's withdrawal from Lewinsville under fire was a pretty orderly affair.

The home that served as Beauregard's headquarters in Fairfax Court House (courtesy of Library of Congress)

Beauregard added that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's report on the skirmish, which was forthcoming, "does so much credit to Colonel Stuart, of the cavalry."  Beauregard praised both Stuart and Gen. James Longstreet as "two very promising officers."  (Stuart, during this time, was operating as part of Longstreet's command in the Munson's Hill/Mason's Hill area.)  Beauregard informed Davis of his intention to move Longstreet's whole brigade to Falls Church and Gen. Richard Ewell's brigade to Annandale, where they could "support, at a moment's notice, the forces at and about Munson's and Mason's hills." Beauregard himself had just moved his headquarters to Fairfax Court House, "so as to be nearer the scene of operations."

Beauregard was expecting a full-scale Union attack, and the recent Union reconnaissance at Lewinsville had done little to disabuse him of such notions. He warned Davis:

I am under the impression, from all I can learn, that the enemy, whenever ready, will make a strong demonstration in our front, and then endeavor to turn this place, either by Dumfries, on the lower Potomac, or by Leesburg, on the upper Potomac; in either case we ought to be prepared to strike him from Camp Pickens [Manassas] as a centre, for which purpose we must have collected at that point a large depot of provisions and ammunition.

Beauregard used the threat of a possible Federal advance to plug his ideas for army reorganization. He wrote that the Confederate Army of the Potomac "ought to be under one head, with also one head to each of the two corps of said army; for the general-in-chief of such a large force has too much to engross his time and attention, to be able to discharge also the important duties of chief of a corps d'armee."   Davis was to give these suggestions "serious and immediate consideration, as I believe no time is to be lost in this matter."

Beauregard finished his letter with a post script to Davis: "General McClellan is said, by the prisoners, to have been present at Lewinsville." The general must surely have cracked a smile at the image of the Union army commander presiding over the rout of his own forces. The reality, of course, was much different, but McClellan did ride out to meet the Union forces as they returned to camp from Lewinsville.

I have not seen a copy of Davis' response to Beauregard's letter, if there ever was one.  In a few short weeks, however, the Confederate President would travel to Fairfax and confer with his leading generals on issues of organization and strategy. In the meantime, the Confederates would continue to wait and watch along the advanced line near Falls Church and Annandale.

Note
*The Union force of 1,800 men consisted of the 79th New York, four companies of the First Regiment U.S. Chasseurs, two companies of the 2nd Vermont, two companies of the 3rd Vermont, five companies of the 19th Indiana, four guns of Captain Charles Griffin's battery, and a detachment of 50 regular cavalry and 40 volunteer cavalry. A section of Captain Thaddeus Mott's battery was also brought to the front and fired on the Confederates.

Source
The official correspondence cited in this post can be found in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1, p. 477-78 (1884).

Beauregard Urges a General Movement Closer to Washington: Not So Fast!

As September 1861 got underway, Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard grew restless.  Some advanced Confederate units were already sitting on the hills outside of Falls Church and Annandale.  But Beauregard, concerned about the vulnerability of the Confederate's forward position and eager to take a more aggressive stance, made a plea to his superior, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.  On September 6, Old Bory wrote a note to Johnston:

I have been reflecting much on our advanced positions since my visit to them, and I think, under the present circumstances, we can neither give them up, nor allow them to be taken from us by a coup de main, or an attack in force, for the effect on the morale of the enemy would be tremendous. From what I saw the other day, our reserves at Fairfax Court-House, and Station (about eight miles back), are too far back to be able to come up in time to the assistance of those advanced positions; hence we must make up our minds, I think, to advance them, for the present at any rate. . . .(in Roman, 476.)

Beauregard recommended moving several brigades forward from their present positions. Most critically, he suggested that Johnston strengthen the advanced positions along the Confederate line at Munson's and Mason's Hill. As I wrote a couple of weeks ago, these two prominences had been occupied at the end of August with a relatively small force under Gen. James Longstreet and Col. J.E.B. Stuart. Beauregard wanted Longstreet, who was currently encamped at Fairfax Court House, to move his entire brigade to Munson's Hill.  He recommended that one brigade be sent to Mason's Hill and another to a spot between both hills. Beauregard also urged Johnston to send one brigade to a spot near Vienna, two brigades to Falls Church, two brigades to Annandale, and one brigade to Springfield.

The hero of Ft. Sumter made sure to anticipate Johnston's objections.   He recommended that other brigades "might be put at Centreville, Fairfax Court House and Station, as a second reserve. . . ."  (in Roman, 476.)  These soldiers "might occasionally be moved towards the Potomac to keep the enemy constantly alarmed for the safety of Washington, and to cross Maryland should he send off a large force from Washington to any point on the lower Potomac," where Beauregard anticipated a Union attack.  (in Roman, 476.)

Gen. P.G.T. Beauregard (courtesy of Wikipedia).

Sitting at his writing table in Manassas, Johnston dashed off a reply to Beauregard on the same day. Beauregard's plea for a more aggressive stance did not go over well.  He told Beauregard, in no uncertain terms:

I cannot perceive the advantage of placing ourselves so near the enemy's works as you propose (the line of Munson's and Mason's hills, etc.). They seem to me too strong to be attacked by us with our present means.  We can rely upon sufficient supplies neither of ammunition, ordnance, nor provisions. (Roman, 476.)

Johnston worried that an general advance would "bring on a war of outposts and continual skirmishing, which would gradually improve the United States troops, and so diminish the difference now existing in our favor."  (in Roman, 476.)

The commanding general thought that the Confederates had already gone far enough:

The line of Fairfax Court-House seems to me sufficiently forward for our purposes, and on it our troops are more easily supplied than on the other. An approach to Washington must be by crossing tho Potomac above. For that we want the men and artillery I have asked for. That line, even, is too far from Evansport  [on the lower Potomac], which we must be in position to assist. (in Roman, 476-77.)

Johnston finished with a blunt rebuke of the recent forward movement towards Washington:

I confess that I do not like the present arrangement in front, at Munson's and Mason's hills. In authorizing their occupation I did not mean to have such posts—posts of such maguitnde—established, and now nothing but reluctance to withdraw—to go backward—prevents me from abandoning them.  (in Roman, 477.)

Beauregard had his answer.  A general advance towards Washington was out of the question, and even the current positions had not earned Johnston's confidence.  Beauregard would have to remain satisfied with staying put for the time being.

Source:
The official correspondence cited in this post can be found in Alfred Roman, The Military Operations of General Beauregard in the War Between the States, 1861 to 1865, Vol. 1, p. 473 (1884).

A Day in the Life of the War: The 17th Virginia Skirmishes with Soldiers from New Jersey

This summer I have written a few posts tracing the movements of the 17th Virginia across Northern Virginia after the First Battle of Manassas. The regiment, part of General James Longstreet's brigade, marched from Centreville to Fairfax Court House, where the soldiers established Camp Harrison in early August 1861. The men of the 17th performed occasional picket duty along Longstreet's advanced line, which by the end of August extended to Falls Church and Mason's and Munson's Hills. The 17th Virginia got caught up in the endless series of skirmishing that took place along this part of the line, including an encounter with 3rd New Jersey on August 31. Although lasting less than ten minutes, this skirmish has received its fair share of attention, both in the OR and in Confederate memoirs.

Col. George W. Taylor, commander of the 3rd New Jersey (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Taylor would later be promoted to brigadier general and lead the First New Jersey Brigade during the Second Manassas Campaign.  He was mortally wounded on August 27, 1862 as he defended a section of the Orange & Alexandria Railroad.

Early in the morning of August 31, Col. George W. Taylor of the 3rd New Jersey set off with about 40 men to cut off the Confederate pickets who had been "extremely annoying to our outposts on the Little River turnpike and on the road leading from thence to Chestnut [Mason's] Hill." (OR, 1:5:1, 121.)* Taylor's men were forced to "cross a fence and a narrow cornfield." (OR, 1:5:1, 121.) A company of the 17th Virginia, however, was prepared and waiting. As Taylor reported to his commander, Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny:

While in the corn we were suddenly opened upon by a rapid and sharp fire, which our men, whenever they got sight of the enemy, returned with much spirit. Scarce two minutes elapsed when I found 3 men close to me had been shot down. The enemy being mostly hid, I deemed it prudent to order my men to fall back to the woods, distant about 30 yards, which I did. At the same time I ordered enough to remain with me to carry off the wounded, but they did not hear or heed my order except two. With these we got all off, as I supposed (the corn being thick), but Corporal Hand, Company I, who, when I turned him over, appeared to be dying. I took his musket, also the musket of one of the wounded, and returned to the woods to rally the men. I regret to say that none of them could be found, nor did I meet them until I reached the blacksmith-shop, three-quarters of a mile distant. (OR, 1:5:1, 121-22.)

Taylor was determined to retrieve his missing men from the cornfield. He quickly reinforced the part of his command under Capt. Leonard Regur with twenty-five soldiers from the picket line and sent the men to gather whatever dead and wounded they could find. Approaching the scene of the recent skirmish, Regur worried that the Confederate force had grown larger and turned his men around rather than enter the cornfield. In his report to Kearny, Taylor defended Regur's decision as "justified." (OR, 1:5:1, 122.)

The sentiment in the Confederate camp was one of victory.  Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia remembered the skirmish as a "brisk fight."  (Warfield, 61.)  He noted that the 3rd New Jersey was repulsed "with some little loss" to the Union side.  (Warfield, 61.)  In the meantime, General Jubal Early had arrived in the area with the 5th North Carolina and 24th Virginia to relieve the 17th Virginia.**  Early dubbed the the skirmish "a very sharp fight" in which a company of the 17th Virginia had "repulsed the enemy and inflicted a severe punishment on him."  (Early, 48.)

General Kearny, the Union brigade commander, apparently had a hard time just leaving the soldiers who had fallen near Mason's Hill.  Some time after the skirmish ended and Early's pickets had taken the place of the 17th Virginia, Early was told that "a flag of truce had appeared at the outside picket, where the fight had taken place in the early morning." Early rode to a home near the site of the skirmish.  As he recalled:

I . . . had the person bearing the flag brought to me blindfolded. He proved to be a Dr. Coxe, surgeon of the New Jersey regiment, a detachment of which had been engaged in the above named affair. He stated that he came on the part of Colonel Tyler [sic] of the 3rd New Jersey to get the bodies of several men who were missing, and that he was informed that General Kearney [sic], who commanded on that part of the line, had directed Colonel Tyler [sic] to send the party with the flag.  (Early, 49.)***

Early was at first unsure of what to do.  He informed the doctor "of the irregularity of the proceeding."  (Early, 49.)  However, "after some conversation in which I endeavored to leave him under the impression that we had a large force in the vicinity, I gave him permission to carry off the dead bodies, two of which he had picked up outside of my picket, and two others having been brought in to the picket before his arrival."  (Early, 49.)****  The burial party then arrived and retrieved the Union soldiers who had died in the morning's skirmish. 

This story reminded me of how small events in a big war can still leave a very lasting impression on participants. Of all the skirmishes Early and Warfield experienced in one way or another, they never seem to have forgotten the brief firefight around Mason's Hill and the efforts that the Union Army made to ensure that the 3rd New Jersey's dead received a proper burial. It is these seemingly inconsequential actions that marked time 150 years ago this month in Northern Virginia.

Notes

*The OR records the skirmish as taking place "at Munson's Hill, on Little River Turnpike, Va."  However, Munson's Hill was located next to the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike, not the Little River Turnpike.  Mason's Hill sat astride the Columbia Turnpike, which intersected with the Little River Turnpike farther to the south.  Mason's Hill was also known as "Chestnut Hill."  Given the description of the roads in Taylor's report, and his use of the name "Chestnut Hill," it appears that the OR misnamed the skirmish.  Confederate sources cited in this post confirm the location of the action as near Mason's Hill.

**Early stated that his regiments arrived "before light on the morning of the 31st of August," while Warfield remembered that the 17th Virginia was relieved by the two regiments  "[d]uring the night of August 31."  (Early, 48; Warfield, 61.)  Perhaps this discrepancy is due to a lapse in time before Early's men actually moved into position to relieve the 17th.  Alternatively, Warfield may have remembered the early morning darkness of the 31st as the night.

*** Warfield also recalled that the 3rd New Jersey "sent over a flag of truce for the purpose of getting their dead."  (Warfield, 61.) 

****The OR states that the nominal list of Union casualties "shows 2 killed and 3 wounded."  (OR, 1:5:1, 122.)

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Jubal Anderson Early & R.H. Early (ed.), Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912); Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

Longstreet Advances Closer to Washington: The Occupation of Mason's Hill & Munson's Hill

As I have discussed in previous posts, General James Longstreet stood at the vanguard of the Confederate advance through Northern Virginia in late summer of 1861.  During the end of August, Longstreet pushed a force of infantry beyond his picket line at Falls Church, Virginia and closer to the Union capital.*  Assisted by Col. J.E.B. Stuart's 1st Virginia Cavalry, the soldiers drove in Federal pickets and seized two prominences that dominated the surrounding countryside -- Mason's Hill and Munson's Hill.  The newly captured territory was only a handful of miles from the nation's capital.  As Longstreet later recalled, "[w]e were provokingly near Washington, with orders not to attempt to advance even to Alexandria."  (Longstreet, 59.)  From their new position, the Confederates had a full view of Washington, including the unfinished Capitol dome rising in the distance.  They also could observe the Union lines in Northern Virginia as far as Alexandria.

The soldiers set to work digging earthworks on Mason's and Munson's Hills. The heights swept the plains around Bailey's Crossroads, where the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike met the Colombia Turnpike.** As long as the Confederate forces were dug in atop these two hills, the Union Army dare not occupy territory closer to Falls Church and Annandale.

A view of Mason's Hill and Munson's Hill from an 1862 Union Army map, showing their proximity to Falls Church and Bailey's Crossroads (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Washington sits to the northeast (upper right of the map), about nine miles away.  The Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike runs past Munson's Hill to Falls Church and beyond.  At the time this map was drawn, the Union was in control of this area and had erected forts, which are shown here. Today, historical markers are located near the site of  the Confederate positions on Mason's and Munson's Hills (see here and here).

The position at Mason's and Munson's Hills was normally held by a couple regiments of infantry, a battery, and Stuart's cavalry.  The infantry and artillery units rotated every few days, but Stuart's men remained a permanent fixture.  Longstreet remembered in his memoirs that because "the authorities allowed me but one battery. . . we collected a number of old wagon-wheels and mounted on them stove-pipes of different calibre, till we had formidable-looking batteries, some large enough of calibre to threaten Alexandria, and even the National Capitol and Executive Mansion."  (Longstreet, 60.)  According to Private Edgar Warfield of the 17th Virginia, Co.H, the soldiers had some fun with the stovepipe gun at the Union Army's expense.  As he related in his memoirs, "[i]t was a favorite trick to run it out into the center of the road and go through the motions of loading a gun and pointing it at the enemy, who promptly stampeded, under the impression that we had a piece of artillery with us." (Warfield, 60.)

The Confederates, taking full advantage of their position on the high ground, erected signal stations on Mason's and Munson's Hills. Officers from General Wade Hampton's Legion sent messages at night from across the Potomac to Munson's Hill. The Confederates also hatched a clever scheme to relay messages to Munson's Hill from Washington. An ex-Maryland legislator, E. Pliny Bryan, was sent to rent a room in Washington from which Munson's Hill could be seen. As described by E.P. Alexander, who at the time was active in Confederate intelligence gathering and signal work:

[Bryan] was to take the bearing of the hill by compass from his window, and communicate it to us by an agreed-upon advertisement in a daily paper, which we received regularly. This would give us the bearing on which to turn our powerful telescope, loaned for the purpose by a Charleston gentleman, and in position on Munson's Hill. Then we would identify his window by finding a coffee-pot in it, and by motions of the coffee-pot, and opening and shutting the blinds, etc., he would send his messages, and we would reply, if necessary, by a large flag and by firing guns. (Cummins 93.)

The plan was on the verge of being executed in September 1861, when the Confederates abandoned their advanced positions.

Looking at the Confederate earthworks on Munson's Hill down the Leesburg & Alexandria Turnpike from Bailey's Crossroads, September 1861 (courtesy of Virginia Historical Society).  The Confederate flag atop Munson's Hill was seen from as far away as Washington.  This sketch was drawn by Union soldier Robert Knox Sneden. 

At the end of August, the Confederates raised the Stars and Bars on Munson's Hill.  The New York Times informed its readers that the large flag "was visible with a glass from the top of the shiphouse at the Navy-yard" in Washington.  A similar flag was raised from Mason's Hill.  The presence of the Confederates so close to Washington, flying their flag defiantly and in plain view from the capital, caused consternation among Washingtonians and in the Union ranks. 

In September 1861, Longstreet moved the headquarters of his advanced forces to Home Hill  in Falls Church.  At the time of the Civil War, Home Hill was owned by John Bartlett, a transplant from New York.  The property is now called the Lawton House and is located on Lawton Street, just off of VA-7.  The photograph above shows Home Hill today.

Historical marker in front of Home Hill, recalling Longstreet's stay at the property. 

During this time, the Union Army relied on aerial reconnaissance by Professor Thaddeus S.C. Lowe, who ascended in his balloon from Ft. Corcoran, Ball's Cross Roads, and Chain Bridge to observe the Confederate positions on the two hills.  According to Confederate General Jubal Early, Lowe kept a balloon up "almost constantly." (Early, 49.)  Confederate gunners atop Munson's Hill found Lowe an inviting target and fired shots at his balloon. Luckily for Lowe, they missed their mark. 

With the armies so close to one another, and tensions running high, fighting was bound to erupt in the no-man's land between the lines. In the next installment, I examine the skirmishing that took place around Munson's Hill and Bailey's Crossroads at the end of August and start of September 1861.

Notes

*According to an August 29, 1861 letter from Longstreet's aid, Tom Goree, to his uncle and sister, this advance likely took place around August 27.
**Bailey's Crossroads was spelled "Bailey's Cross Roads" at the time of the Civil War.

Sources

Edmund H. Cummins, "The Signal Corps in the Confederate States Army," Southern Historical Society Papers, Vol. XVI, at 93 (1888).

Thomas W. Cutrer, Longstreet's Aide: The Civil War Letters of Thomas J. Goree (1995).

Jubal Anderson Early & R.H. Early (ed.), Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between the States (1912).

Bradley E. Gernand, A Virginia Village Goes to War: Falls Church During the Civil War (2002).

Frederick Stansbury Haydon, Military Ballooning During the Early Civil War (1941).

James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox (1896).

Charles P. Poland, Jr., The Glories of War: Small Battles and Early Heroes of 1861 (2004).

"Special Dispatch from Washington," dated Aug. 31, 1861, New York Times, Sept. 1, 1861 edition.

Lee A. Wallace, Jr., 17th Virginia Infantry, from the Virginia Regimental History Series (1990).

Edgar Warfield, Manassas to Appomattox: The Civil War Memoirs of Pvt. Edgar Warfield, 17th Virginia Infantry (1996 ed.).

Jeffry D. Wert, General James Longstreet: The Confederacy's Most Controversial Solider (1994).