The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia: The Path to Gettysburg

This past spring I wrote a four-part series on the return of the Pennsylvania Reserves to Northern Virginia at the start of 1863. This storied division had experienced heavy losses during the previous year's fighting, and after political intervention by top-ranking generals and Pennsylvania's own governor, the Reserves were sent to the defenses of Washington to rest and recruit. As June 1863 began, the division was scattered across Northern Virginia and Washington City. The month would end with two-thirds of the division on the march north to join the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederates.

A New Commander and a Return to the Old Dominion

On June 1, 1863, Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington, named Gen. Samuel W. Crawford to replace Col. Horatio G. Sickel at the head of the First and Third Brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (OR, 1:51:1, 1043.) The Second Brigade was to remain attached to the Military District of Alexandria. Heintzelman ordered Crawford to make his headquarters at Fairfax Station, where the First Brigade was encamped. The Third Brigade, which was performing provost duty in Washington City, was directed to cross the Potomac and proceed to Upton's Hill, not far from Falls Church.*

Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford (courtesy of Library of Congress). Crawford was born in Franklin County, Pennsylvania in 1829. He was the surgeon in charge at Ft. Sumter during the bombardment in April 1861. Crawford joined the Union infantry and rose to brigade command by spring of 1862. He briefly led a Twelfth Corps division at Antietam until being wounded in the thigh. Following his recovery, Crawford was given command of the Pennsylvania Reserves.

On the evening of June 1, the men of the Third Brigade under Col. Joseph W. Fisher marched out of the city "to the sounds of martial music." (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.) The soldiers "were in fine spirits," and "cheered as they passed through [the] streets, glad again to be in the field." (Phila. Press, June 2, 1863.) Spectators along the sidewalk and in hotel windows echoed the soldiers' hurrahs for Ulysses S. Grant, Joseph Hooker, George B. McClellan, William Rosecrans, and other generals. (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.)

Rallying to the Defense of the Keystone State

Events soon took an alarming turn. As talk of a Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania spread, the Reserves grew anxious to leave Northern Virginia and defend their native soil against Lee's army. According to one regimental history, the thought of remaining behind in the defenses of Washington "was rather mortifying." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Officers made entreaties to Washington and Harrisburg to have the Reserves return to the field along with the Army of the Potomac. In one instance, the commander of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves and his fellow officers petitioned Col. William McCandless, head of the First Brigade:

We, the undersigned. . . having learned that our mother State has been invaded by a Confederate force, respectfully ask, that you will, if it be in your power, have us ordered within the borders of our State, for her defence. 

. . . we have more than once met and fought the enemy, when he was at home. We now wish to meet him again where he threatens our homes, our families and our firesides. 

Could our wish in this behalf be realized, we feel confident that we could do some service to the State that sent us to the field, and not diminish, if we could not increase, the lustre that already attaches to our name. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 260.)

McCandless received the petition on June 17 and "forwarded it through the proper channel to Washington." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Meanwhile, Gens. John F. Reynolds and George G. Meade, who had both led the Reserves through the bloody trials of 1862, requested that the War Department transfer the division to their respective army corps. (See, e.g., Sypher 448; Thomson & Rauch 260; Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.)

Col. William McCandless (courtesy of PRVC Historical Society).

At Last! -- Rejoining the Army of the Potomac

The fate of the Reserves became part of the larger question of reinforcing Hooker as he chased down Lee's army. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, worried about keeping the nation's capital safe from a possible Confederate advance, maintained a tight grip on the soldiers belonging to the defenses of Washington. (Coddington 96.) In the end, Halleck relented and agreed to send Hooker around 8,400 infantry reinforcements, including two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (Sears 220.)**

Late on June 23, Hooker directed Crawford "to hold [his] command in readiness to move at very short notice," with ten days' subsistence. (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Pickets were to remain posted "until further orders." (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Less than two days later, Hooker put the Reserves in motion to catch up with the rest of the army, which was already in pursuit of Lee. At 9:30 in the morning on June 25, Crawford was directed to "march with your command to-day, via the Leesburg turnpike, to Edwards Ferry, and, if possible . . . cross the river at that point, should you reach the Ferry in season." (OR, 1:27:3, 309.)

Not long afterwards, Hooker was shocked to learn from Crawford that John P. Slough, military governor of Alexandria, had detained the Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves. He fired off a note to Halleck, demanding that "General Slough be arrested at once" and promising that "charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) Hooker sharply warned Halleck, "You will find, I fear, when it is too late, that the effort to preserve department lines will be fatal to the cause of the country." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) The General-in-Chief wasted no time in brushing aside Hooker's request:

The Second Brigade, to which you refer in your telegram, forms no part of General Crawford's command, which was placed at your orders. No other troops can be withdrawn from the Defenses of Washington. (OR, 1:27:1, 57.)  

That same day, the First and Third Brigades struck camp and began their march from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill.*** The soldiers proceeded as far as the area around Vienna, where they bivouacked for the night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143; Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261). Early the next morning the Reserves resumed their march. The Pennsylvanians moved up the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike, past Dranesville, where many of them had first experienced battle.**** A "violent and constant" rainfall turned the roads into "almost knee-deep" mud. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261.) Despite such miserable conditions, the division reached Goose Creek that night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143.) At daylight on June 27, the Reserves headed a short distance to the Potomac and crossed the river at Edwards Ferry via pontoon bridge. (OR, 1:27:3, 353.) The division pushed through Maryland and arrived that night at the mouth of the Monocacy River, "in spite of the heavy roads." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261; see also OR, 1:27:1, 143.) Finally, on June 28, the Reserves crossed the Monocacy and marched to Ballinger's Creek near Frederick, where they joined the Fifth Corps. (OR, 1:27:1, 144; Hardin 141.)***** By the time the Reserves caught up with the Fifth Corps, Meade had taken command of the Army of the Potomac, and Gen. George Sykes had replaced him at the head of the corps.

Detail of Edwards Ferry, Goose Creek, and vicinity from 1862 Union Army map of Northeastern Virginia (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The Leesburg Turnpike, also visible here, served as the Pennsylvania Reserves main route of march to the crossing at Edwards Ferry.

The Pennsylvania Reserves continued their movement northward through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. The division arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 during the second day of the battle. That evening, the First Brigade drove into the Plum Run Valley and beat back an assault by troops from James Longstreet's corps on the Union left near Little Round Top. Crawford himself seized the colors and led the charge. The division's overall losses at Gettysburg stood at 26 killed, 181 wounded, and 3 missing. (OR, 1:27:1, 180.) The Reserves had proven their mettle once again and made a contribution to the Confederate defeat. Before long, the Pennsylvanians would return with the rest of the army to the familiar soil of the Old Dominion. In this war, there was no staying away.

Notes

*The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves of the Third Brigade were still stationed in Northern Virginia in June, most likely in the vicinity of Vienna or Fairfax Station. (Gibbs 214-15.)

**The other units sent to Hooker from the Department of Washington included a brigade of New Yorkers under Gen. Alexander Hays and the Second Vermont Brigade under Gen. George Stannard. Both brigades would go on to distinguish themselves at Gettysburg. Halleck also agreed to furnish a division of cavalry under Gen. Julius Stahel, as well as artillery units, including the 9th Massachusetts Battery.

***The drive to replenish the ranks of the Reserves while in the defenses of Washington met with little success. (Gibbs 213; Thomson & Rauch 256-57.) The two brigades that set out on June 25 totaled just 3,817 officers and men. (Coddington 98.)

****The Battle of Dranesville took place on December 20, 1861, and pitted a brigade of the Reserves against J.E.B. Stuart's Confederates.

*****The Pennsylvania Reserves officially became the Third Division of the Fifth Corps.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Civil War in the East (on-line database); Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1979 ed.); Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863; Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Martin D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); Harrisburg Daily Patriot and Union, June 27, 1863; Philadelphia Press, June 2, 1863; Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (2003); Jeffrey F. Sherry, "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Hist. Soc.); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

Additional Reading

An excellent and detailed account of the Pennsylvania Reserves' march from Upton's Hill/Fairfax Station to Edwards Ferry, including maps, can be found here, at Craig Swain's Civil War blog, To the Sound of the Guns. Also be sure to check out Craig's on-going series of posts on the march of the Union army through Loudoun County in the days prior to Gettysburg.

For the full story of the Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg, see "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," by James Sherry in Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997.

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part II: Farewell to Hooker's Army

As I wrote in my last post, the Pennsylvania Reserves faced a somewhat uncertain future at the start of 1863.  The division had experienced tremendous losses during the bloody battles of 1862.  Gen. George G. Meade, a former commander of the Reserves, took up his old division's cause and pushed to have the Reserves sent back to Pennsylvania to recruit and reorganize.  Pennsylvania's Governor, Andrew Curtin, likewise urged the Lincoln Administration to allow the Reserves to return temporarily to the Keystone State.  These pleas went unheeded at army headquarters, and the Pennsylvanians soon joined the rest of Ambrose Burnside's men on the ill-fated "Mud March."

A Plan is Hatched

By the end of January, the situation began to look brighter for the hard-fought Pennsylvanians.  Gen. Joseph Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck finally agreed on a plan to deal with the manpower problems facing the Reserves.  The division was to be detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent to the defenses of Washington in exchange for a like number of Pennsylvania troops then stationed around the capital.  (OR, 1:25:2, 12.)  The Pennsylvania Reserves would return to the front once they had some time to replenish their ranks and recover from combat duty.  Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, head of the Department of Washington, was less than enthusiastic about the idea.  He worried that the Reserves were ill-equipped for provost duty in Washington given that "some of the companies are commanded by sergeants and corporals."  (OR, 1:25:2, 10.)  Heintzelman told Halleck, "I fear that the exchange cannot be made with any benefit to the service in my command."  (OR, 1:25:2, 10.)  Whatever his objections, however, Heintzelman would have no choice but to accept his superior's decision.

Gen. Joseph Hooker (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Meanwhile, the men in the ranks began to hear rumors about their imminent departure for Washington.  A soldier from Co. H, 6th Pennsylvania Reserves wrote on January 28 to his hometown paper, "[W]e – that is the old regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps of Volunteers – are soon to be relieved from the front (where they have always been found), by the troops now stationed in and about Washington, while we are to take their place."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863.)  He felt that the division was "not in the least dissatisfied with the arrangement, altho’ we wish to have no men see the service that the Reserves have been obliged to."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863.)  Sgt. Thomas W. Dick of Co. H, 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, informed his brother of "reliable information to the effect that we are going back to Washington to rest and recruit."  (Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863.)  Dick  approved of the plan, telling his brother, "its what should have been done before this There is now but a miserable remnant of the gay old division that marched from [Camp] Pierpont last spring."  (Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863) (grammar as in original)

Orders!

On February 5, Hooker finally issued orders to transfer the Pennsylvania Reserves.  (OR, 1:25:2, 49-50; 52-53.)  He instructed Gen. John F. Reynolds, head of the First Corps, to send the division to Alexandria with instructions to report to Heintzelman for orders.  Hooker added that "[t]he sick and all the baggage of the troops should be taken with them."  (OR, 1:25:2, 50.)  The chief quartermaster would "furnish the transportation," although Hooker told Reynolds that "[t]he details of the embarkation are left with you, with reliance upon your energy and attention."  (OR, 1:25:2, 50.) 

That same day, Reynolds issued an order directing the Pennsylvania Reserves to embark at Belle Plain for Alexandria, "as soon as transportation is furnished."  (OR, 1:51:1, 981.)  The 121st and 142nd Pennsylvania, who were not part of the original Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, were ordered to remain behind, along with three artillery batteries.  Reynolds informed the men that they would receive three days' cooked rations for the trip north.  He finished his order on a sentimental note:

In separating from the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, with which the commanding general has been so closely allied for the past eighteen months, he cannot but express his deep regrets. They are, however, lessened by the hope that soon their thinned ranks will be filled, and they, once more restored and reorganized, will be returned to the field prepared to add new luster to a name already endeared to our patriotic State.  (OR, 1:51:1, 981-82.) 

Wartime view of Belle Plain, Virginia on Potomac Creek (courtesy of Library of Congress)

The men of the Pennsylvania Reserves received news of their impending move with enthusiasm.  According to one regimental history, "[i]n despite of the cold rain the camp-fires were soon brightly burning, around which the boys gathered and talked of the good times coming until late at night."  (Woodward, Third Reserve, 224.)  The next afternoon, February 6, the division struck camp and marched about four miles to Belle Plain on Potomac Creek. The journey lasted well into the evening due to the wet and muddy conditions.  The First Brigade boarded transports during the night and headed up the Potomac.  The Second and Third Brigades set out for Alexandria in the morning.  As the men arrived at the wharves along the river, they must surely have felt a sense of relief to leave behind life at the front, if only for a little while.

Postscript

The transfer of the Reserves soon became mired in a dispute between Hooker and Washington.  Gen. Abner Doubleday, who assumed command of the Pennsylvania Reserves for a short while in the middle of January, had gone to the capital to oversee arrangements for the exchange. (OR, 1:51:1, 974.)  After the division arrived in Washington, Doubleday reported to Hooker that "[t]he Pennsylvania regiments given in place of the Reserves do not contain as many men as the latter brought here."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)  He concluded that there was "a deficiency of about 250 men."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)  Hooker fired off a dispatch to Halleck on February 10,  insisting that "this deficiency be made up, and that General Heintzelman be directed to send the full number, according to the understanding, viz, the same number of men as were returned in the Pennsylvania Reserves."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.) Halleck tersely replied that "[r]egiments cannot be broken up in order to exactly equalize."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)

Hooker wouldn't let the shortfall go.  He pressed his cause with Heintzelman directly.  (OR, 1:25:2, 69-70.)  The commander of the Washington defenses informed Hooker that he had been told to exchange the Reserves for Pennsylvania troops only and that some of some of the soldiers designated for the Army of the Potomac had been detained in Washington for reasons beyond his control.  He had no more to give.  Heintzelman alleged that "[t]he numbers at my disposal were well understood by General Doubleday when he made the application."  (OR, 1:25:2, 83.)

Hooker next unleashed his wrath on Doubleday, demanding that he "report what agreement was entered into by you with General Heintzelman with regard to the exchange of the Pennsylvania Reserves."  (OR, 1:25:2, 87.)   Doubleday insisted that he had done nothing wrong, claiming that "no special agreement was entered into" between him and Heintzelman.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)   He told Hooker:

It was understood that I was to have an equal number of men with those I furnished. I never supposed I should have a less number until the Reserves had actually arrived in Alexandria, and a report of their number was laid before General Heintzelman. He then informed me that the aggregate would be less than that furnished by some 230 men.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)

Doubleday also took offense at Hooker's accusation that he had not given his personal attention to the matter, explaining that he had "visited General Heintzelman's office every day, and frequently several times a day, in relation to it," and "was also a daily visitor at the Adjutant-General's Office of the General-in-Chief" concerning the exchange.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)  Heintzelman received a copy of Doubleday's response, but when all was said and done, Hooker turned his attention to more pressing matters.   Meanwhile, the Reserves prepared for duty on the picket line in front of the capital.

Up Next:  Military duties in front of Washington.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

John H. Eicher & David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (2001); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Historical Society); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Historical Society); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part I: What to Do with a "Decimated" Division?

This blog has frequently featured stories on the Pennsylvania Reserves.  The division, also known as the Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, was encamped around Langley, Virginia during the first winter of the war.  In spring 1862 the Reserves relocated to Alexandria before marching south to Falmouth.  They eventually joined the Army of the Potomac just in time for the Seven Days Battles on the Peninsula.  The Reserves also saw intense combat at Second Manassas, South Mountain, Antietam, and Fredericksburg.  As the bloody second year of the war drew to a close, the Union Army's high command debated the future of the battered division and finally decided to move the Reserves back to the Washington area.  In the next few posts, I will take a look at the return of the storied Pennsylvania Reserves to Northern Virginia. 

Even before the costly engagements at Antietam and Fredericksburg, brigade commander George G. Meade had begun to worry about the state of the Reserves.  The general wrote to his wife on September 4, 1862 that "[o]ur division, the Reserves, is pretty well used up, and ought, strictly speaking, to be withdrawn, reorganized, filled up with recruits, and put in efficient condition."   (Meade 308.)   Meade led the Reserves through the carnage at Antietam, where the division suffered causalities of around 20 percent. (OR, 1:19:1, 270-71.)  After the battle, Meade discussed the "decimated condition" of the division with George B. McClellan, head of the Army of the Potomac.  As he wrote to his wife:

I. . . told [McClellan] that I had no idea they would ever be filled up by recruiting officers, and the only course I saw to adopt was to send them in a body back to Pennsylvania, and ask the Governor and State to fill them up within a specified time; but if it could not be done, they were to be mustered out of service.  (Meade 315.)

Around the same time, Pennsylvania Governor Andrew Curtin attempted to enlist political support for the reorganization of the Reserves.  In a September 30 letter to President Abraham Lincoln, Curtin suggested that the heavily depleted division be returned temporarily to the Keystone State.  The governor explained to the President:

The brilliant history of the Reserve Corps in the war, and the State pride which has followed them since they entered the service, together with the circumstances surrounding their organization, would, I have no doubt, prove such incentives to enlistment that the Corps could be filled to the maximum in a short space of time. (in Sypher 398.) 

Lincoln forwarded Curtin's letter to General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton for consideration.  The General-in-Chief "entirely disapprov[ed] of withdrawing regiments in the field" for purposes of filling the ranks with new recruits.  (OR, 3:2, 625.)  Curtin also wrote to McClellan, who "thought favorably of the plan, but having immediate use for the troops, was unwilling to retire them at that time."  (Sypher 398; OR, 1:21, 878.)   The division would stay at the front for now.

Gen. George G. Meade (courtesy of Civil War Wiki.Net)

After the fight at Fredericksburg in December, Meade tried once again to deal with the poor condition of the Pennsylvania Reserves.  On December 23, he sent a report on the state of the unit to Gen. William B. Franklin, commander of the Left Grand Division.  As Meade told Franklin, only 195 officers and 4,249 enlisted men were present for duty.  Another 159 officers and 3,740 men were absent with permission.  Meade noted that "to fill these regiments to the maximum authorized, will require 153 officers and 4,864 men."  (OR, 1:21, 877-78.)   However, he cautioned that "of the number reported as absent, a very large proportion are the wounded, most of whom are so maimed and disabled that no expectation need be formed of their returning to active duty."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  Meade felt that in reality a reorganization of the Pennsylvania Reserves "required the appointment of over 200 officers and the enlistment of over 7,000 men."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)

The general proposed a course of action to revitalize the Reserves.  Recruiters had gone to Pennsylvania three different times to fill the ranks, but their efforts had met little success.  Meade recognized that the Army could "consolidate the existing force into a number of regiments equal to the officers and men for duty."  He disliked this plan, since it would "destroy[] the organization, and the prestige which the good conduct of the corps has acquired for it."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  Instead, Meade recommended that the Reserves be withdrawn temporarily from the field and sent to Pennsylvania for two or three months, "where, it is believed, from the great reputation the corps has acquired, the pride the State takes in it, and the enthusiasm its return would create, that in a short time its ranks would be filled, after pruning them of all useless members."  (OR, 1:21, 878.)

Gen. John F. Reynolds, head of the First Corps and a former commander of the Reserves, forwarded Meade's proposal to Franklin on January 10, 1863.  Reynolds "concur[red] most heartily" in Meade's recommendation to send the division back home to recover and recruit.  (OR, 1:21, 878.)  The next day, Franklin sent Meade's plan to Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, commander of the Army of the Potomac.  Complimenting the Reserves on their "excellent service," Franklin endorsed Meade's proposal.  (OR, 1:21, 878-79.)

Col. Horatio G. Sickel, who assumed command of the Pennsylvania Reserves upon Meade's promotion at the end of 1862, soon weighed in on the future of the division.  The colonel hoped to enlist Governor Curtin's support in reorganizing the Pennsylvania Reserves.  Sickel sent a copy of Meade's report to Curtin and got the desired response.  The governor readily took up his old cause and forwarded Sickel's correspondence to the War Department.  Secretary of War Stanton, however, had no appetite for Meade's proposal.  According to a history of the Reserves, the Secretary informed Curtin "that numerous similar applications were on file from other States, that all could not be granted without greatly reducing the strength of the army, and that therefore all must be refused."  (Sypher 436.)

The Pennsylvania Reserves had the misfortune of remaining at the front long enough to take part in Burnside's disastrous "Mud March."  But change was in the air by the end of January.  Joseph Hooker took command of the Army of the Potomac and worked with General-in-Chief Halleck to effect a transfer of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The division, however, was far from homeward bound.

Up Next: The Pennsylvania Reserves bid farewell to Hooker's army and board transports for Alexandria.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

John H. Eicher & David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (2001); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); George G. Meade, The Life and Letters of George Gordon Meade, Vol. 1 (1913); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865).

Cracking Down on Drinking in the Union Army Around Washington

A few of my recent posts have discussed the role that drinking played in the everyday lives of the soldiers encamped around Washington during the first winter of the war.  While whiskey and other intoxicating beverages helped to alleviate the boredom of camp life, the consumption of alcohol also led to trouble and disciplinary actions.  No less a figure that Gen. George B. McClellan, commander of the Army of the Potomac, weighed in on the subject at the start of February 1862. 

As part of his review of a court-martial involving a drunken solider in Gen. Joseph Hooker's Division, McClellan expressed his concern with the level of intoxication:

No one evil agent so much obstructs this army in its progress to that condition which will enable it to accomplish all that true soldiers can, as the degrading vice of drunkenness. It is the cause of by far the greater part of the disorders which are examined by courts-martial. It is impossible to estimate the benefits that would accrue to the service from the adoption of a resolution on the part of officers to set their men an example of total abstinence from intoxicating liquors. It would be worth 50,000 men to the armies of the United States. (Gen. Orders No. 40, Feb. 4, 1862.)

McClellan noted that he was not singling out Hooker's Division for criticism.  Rather, in examining the file, he saw the "evils of intemperance and the terrible consequences of it to the individual soldier."  (Gen. Orders No. 40.)  McClellan hoped that other divisions would also draw lessons from the court-martial and "resolve to contribute their exertions to the cure of this giant evil."  (Gen. Orders No. 40.)

As February got underway, the Union Army around Washington was taking various measures to prevent intoxication in the ranks, at least among enlisted men.  A captain had been stationed at the Long Bridge over the Potomac "to see that no spirituous liquors [were] either carried over that structure or down the river for troops."  (Phila. Press, Feb. 5, 1862.)  On February 4, the steamer Telegraph headed towards Budd's Ferry, Maryland with a cargo of twenty barrels of whiskey.  The army stopped the vessel and seized the liquor.  The newspaper reported, however, that "[o]fficers . . . are at liberty to claim any which may be intended for them, and must appear at the Provost Marshal's office for that purpose."  (Phila. Press, Feb. 5, 1862.) 

"Drunken Soldiers Tied Up for Fighting and Other Unruly Conduct," by A.R. Waud (courtesy of Library of Congress)

A little later in February, Owen McCarty, a grave digger known by the nickname "Old Mortality," was arrested for selling liquor to soldiers of the 1st Pennsylvania Reserves at Camp Pierpont in Langley, Virginia.  The offender "was seated high upon wagon, surrounded by a guard, and wore suspended from his neck a miniature head-board; on which was printed the words; 'Old Morality' digs soldiers' graves; and by selling whiskey, helps to fill them.'"  (Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862.)  The wagon passed through Washington en route to the guard house and caused "considerable excitement among the pedestrians on the side walk."  (Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862.)  Perhaps Old Morality would have been better off working in one of the numerous Washington saloons.

At the end of February, McClellan issued a general order appointing Andrew Porter as Provost Marshal General in the Army of the Potomac and establishing a department under his command.  The commanding general entrusted provost marshals with several duties related to his fight against intoxication, including "suppression of drunkenness, beyond the limits of the camps," "[s]uppression of . . . drinking-houses or bar-rooms," "regulations of . . . taverns," and "[e]nforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers."  (General Orders No. 60, Feb. 21, 1862.)  Despite McClellan's efforts, however, Union soldiers would continue to indulge their fancy for intoxicating liquors.  The fight against drunkenness was a hard one, and certainly not one that McClellan or any other general could ever completely win.

Sources
Army of the Potomac, General Orders and Index to General Orders, 1862 (1863);  David M. Delo, Peddlers and Post Traders: The Army Sutler on the Frontier (1998 ed.); George B. McClellan, Report on the Organization and Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac (1864); Philadelphia Press, Feb. 5, 1862; Weekly Mariettian, Feb. 15, 1862; Bell I. Wiley, The Life of Billy Yank (1983 ed.)