The Fallout from the Raid on Camp Beckwith: Lt. Keays Takes the Heat

Last week I wrote about the surprise Confederate attack on the Federal garrison guarding the contraband farm at Camp Beckwith in Lewinsville, Virginia. During the early morning of October 2, 1863, troopers from the 35th Battalion of Virginia Cavalry under Lt. Col. Elijah V. White pounced on the unsuspecting Union force encamped in and around the main house on the farm. When all was said and done, White rode away with 20 prisoners and 64 horses. The Union suffered casualties of  two dead and three wounded.

A messenger alerted the nearby Federal garrison at Fort Ethan Allen. Col. John C. Tidball of the 4th New York Heavy Artillery sent a contingent of men to investigate. Once Tidball gleaned more details about the raid, he sent word to an assistant adjutant-general with the Department of Washington. Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, the commander of the Department, wasted no time in ordering his own investigation. On October 2, he sent Capt. Carroll H. Potter to "the scene of the [ ] reported surprise." (OR, 1:29:1, 201.) Potter, an assistant adjutant-general, was told "to make a thorough and rigid examination into the circumstances attending" the attack. (OR, 1:29:1, 201.) Heintzelman seemed convinced from the outset that someone was at fault for what had just happened out in the Virginia countryside. He instructed Potter to "specify on whom the blame should fall" in his official report on the matter. (OR, 1:29:1, 201.)

Potter left Washington at 1:30 p.m. that same day with one commissioned officer and 25 men from Scott's Nine Hundred Cavalry (11th N.Y. Cav.). The party arrived at Camp Beckwith around 5:30 p.m. Potter conducted his investigation in short order and left camp the next morning. After reconnoitering for possible guerrilla activity near Vienna and along the Alexandria, Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad, Potter and his men rode through Falls Church, crossed the Aqueduct Bridge, and returned to headquarters at 4:30 in the afternoon.

William Jeremiah Keays, c. 1869 (courtesy of Rod A. MacDonald). Keays was born in Bytown, Upper Canada (now Ottawa, Ontario) on January 24, 1829. He engaged in various business ventures in Goderich, Ontario before moving with his family to Buffalo, New York in 1861. There he served as an agent for the Great Western Railroad. By the end of 1862, Keays had lost his wife, children, and mother. He enlisted in the 16th New York Cavalry in June 1863. After the Civil War, Keays returned to Canada, where he remarried.  Railroad work brought Keays back to the United States in 1881-82. He died in Buffalo on April 24, 1914, at the age of 84. (I'd recommend reading MacDonald's meticulously researched biography of Keays referenced in the sources section below.)

Potter sent his report to Heintzelman on October 3. Faithful to Heintzelman's order, the captain minced no words in laying the blame for the recent mess on 1st Lt. William J. Keays of Co. B, 16th New York Cavalry, who commanded the cavalry detachment at Camp Beckwith. The report described how Keays's handling of cavalry pickets ultimately led to the Confederate victory:

[The attack] was all done in five minutes from the time [White's men] were known to be in the vicinity, and all done without the least show of resistance on the part of our cavalry or infantry, for as far as I could learn, not a shot was fired at them, or a stand of any description made on the part of our forces, happening, no doubt, from the very foolish position given the cavalry pickets, they being very poorly posted within a very short distance from the camp, and each post being in a ravine, with the men dismounted, their horses in camp unsaddled, as were also those of the entire command. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)*

In fact, White's men approached along an old wood road that was entirely unguarded. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.) Moreover, Keays appeared to have ignored recent warnings. Potter learned that "Lieutenant Keays had heard it reported by some of the citizens that these guerrillas were in his vicinity, but did not place reliance enough upon the information to take more than the usual precaution." (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Standard of the 16th New York Cavalry (courtesy of New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center).

Potter observed a deviation in normal security procedures at the time of White's raid. Despite an opportunity to lay the blame elsewhere, the captain made clear that Keays was ultimately responsible for what had occurred:

There was a commissioned officer placed on duty belonging to the cavalry, every night previous to the attack, whose duty it was to look out for the safety of the camp, and see that the picket performed their duty properly; but on the night of the attack, Sergt. S. F. Shaddock, Company B, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, was given this duty to perform. This duty he tried to perform, and would have, had the picket placed out for the safety of the camp been of any use whatever, which was an impossibility arising from the posts given to them, and the manner in which they were posted, i. e., dismounted. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Potter described Shaddock's futile attempt to mount a defense as White's men descended on the garrison:

The moment [Shaddock] heard the enemy advancing, he exerted himself to wake up the officers, who were at the time all in the house and asleep in their blankets; but before he could accomplish his object the enemy were in both of the encampments, taking the men from their beds, and the officers were of no use whatever, their men nearly all having been taken before they were made aware even of the approach of the enemy. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Potter left no doubt that Lt. Keays was to blame. He concluded his already critical report with another stinging indictment:

In my opinion had the pickets been properly posted (even the same number of men used by Lieutenant Keays would have been sufficient), this surprise could not have occurred, and the men in camp could have been formed certainly in time have made some resistance, if not sufficiently strong to drive the enemy entirely away, which I think they could have done had they been prepared to receive them. For this I consider Lieutenant W. J. Keays, Company B, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, entirely to blame. (OR, 1:29:1, 202.)

Heintzelman must have reacted to Potter's findings with a combination of disgust and anger. On October 5, he forwarded Potter's report to the Assistant Adjutant-General of the Union Army with the recommendation that Keays "be summarily dismissed the service of the United States, or tried by general court-martial." (OR, 1:29:1, 203.) On October 8, General-in-Chief Henry Halleck recommended "summary dismissal." (OR, 1:29:1, 203.) Later that same day, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton agreed and ordered Keays's dismissal.

Keays left the army on October 10, but not for long. His commanding officer lobbied to have Keays reinstated, and for whatever reason, the War Department agreed. On December 31, 1863, Keays was restored to duty as a First Lieutenant with his old unit, Company B. The following month he was transferred to Company A. In April 1865, Keays was named captain of Company G and later assigned to the 3rd New York Provisional Cavalry. He was mustered out of service in September 1865.

The attack on Camp Beckwith happened at a time when the Union Army was dealing with bitter partisan warfare throughout Northern Virginia. The brass reacted predictably to Keays's mistakes as commander during the Confederate raid. The Canadian immigrant who had enlisted to fight for his adopted country paid a price for his amateurish handling of the pickets at Camp Beckwith. Luckily, Keays got another chance to prove that he was worthy of the rank on his should straps.

Notes

*According to a modern regimental history, 2nd Lt. Patrick Welch led members of Co. C, 111th New York in a counterattack and drove away White's men. (Husk 87.) This version of events contradicts Potter's account that the Union garrison never had a chance to respond to the raiders.

Sources

Aside from the OR, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Rod A. MacDonald, "William Jeremiah Keays" (genealogy website); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 11th Cavalry Infantry Regiment (website); New York State Military Museum & Veterans Research Center, 16th Cavalry Regiment (website); Martin W. Rusk, The 111th New York Volunteer Infantry: A Civil War History (2010); Jerry D. Thompson, Civil War to the Bloody End: The Life & Times of Major General Samuel P. Heintzelman (2006); Adrian Tighe, The Bristoe Campaign: General Lee's Last Strategic Offensive with the Army of Northern Virginia, October 1863 (2011).

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia: The Path to Gettysburg

This past spring I wrote a four-part series on the return of the Pennsylvania Reserves to Northern Virginia at the start of 1863. This storied division had experienced heavy losses during the previous year's fighting, and after political intervention by top-ranking generals and Pennsylvania's own governor, the Reserves were sent to the defenses of Washington to rest and recruit. As June 1863 began, the division was scattered across Northern Virginia and Washington City. The month would end with two-thirds of the division on the march north to join the Army of the Potomac in pursuit of Gen. Robert E. Lee's Confederates.

A New Commander and a Return to the Old Dominion

On June 1, 1863, Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington, named Gen. Samuel W. Crawford to replace Col. Horatio G. Sickel at the head of the First and Third Brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (OR, 1:51:1, 1043.) The Second Brigade was to remain attached to the Military District of Alexandria. Heintzelman ordered Crawford to make his headquarters at Fairfax Station, where the First Brigade was encamped. The Third Brigade, which was performing provost duty in Washington City, was directed to cross the Potomac and proceed to Upton's Hill, not far from Falls Church.*

Brig. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford (courtesy of Library of Congress). Crawford was born in Franklin County, Pennsylvania in 1829. He was the surgeon in charge at Ft. Sumter during the bombardment in April 1861. Crawford joined the Union infantry and rose to brigade command by spring of 1862. He briefly led a Twelfth Corps division at Antietam until being wounded in the thigh. Following his recovery, Crawford was given command of the Pennsylvania Reserves.

On the evening of June 1, the men of the Third Brigade under Col. Joseph W. Fisher marched out of the city "to the sounds of martial music." (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.) The soldiers "were in fine spirits," and "cheered as they passed through [the] streets, glad again to be in the field." (Phila. Press, June 2, 1863.) Spectators along the sidewalk and in hotel windows echoed the soldiers' hurrahs for Ulysses S. Grant, Joseph Hooker, George B. McClellan, William Rosecrans, and other generals. (Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863.)

Rallying to the Defense of the Keystone State

Events soon took an alarming turn. As talk of a Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania spread, the Reserves grew anxious to leave Northern Virginia and defend their native soil against Lee's army. According to one regimental history, the thought of remaining behind in the defenses of Washington "was rather mortifying." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Officers made entreaties to Washington and Harrisburg to have the Reserves return to the field along with the Army of the Potomac. In one instance, the commander of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves and his fellow officers petitioned Col. William McCandless, head of the First Brigade:

We, the undersigned. . . having learned that our mother State has been invaded by a Confederate force, respectfully ask, that you will, if it be in your power, have us ordered within the borders of our State, for her defence. 

. . . we have more than once met and fought the enemy, when he was at home. We now wish to meet him again where he threatens our homes, our families and our firesides. 

Could our wish in this behalf be realized, we feel confident that we could do some service to the State that sent us to the field, and not diminish, if we could not increase, the lustre that already attaches to our name. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 260.)

McCandless received the petition on June 17 and "forwarded it through the proper channel to Washington." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 259.) Meanwhile, Gens. John F. Reynolds and George G. Meade, who had both led the Reserves through the bloody trials of 1862, requested that the War Department transfer the division to their respective army corps. (See, e.g., Sypher 448; Thomson & Rauch 260; Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.)

Col. William McCandless (courtesy of PRVC Historical Society).

At Last! -- Rejoining the Army of the Potomac

The fate of the Reserves became part of the larger question of reinforcing Hooker as he chased down Lee's army. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, worried about keeping the nation's capital safe from a possible Confederate advance, maintained a tight grip on the soldiers belonging to the defenses of Washington. (Coddington 96.) In the end, Halleck relented and agreed to send Hooker around 8,400 infantry reinforcements, including two brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves. (Sears 220.)**

Late on June 23, Hooker directed Crawford "to hold [his] command in readiness to move at very short notice," with ten days' subsistence. (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Pickets were to remain posted "until further orders." (OR, 1:27:3, 273.) Less than two days later, Hooker put the Reserves in motion to catch up with the rest of the army, which was already in pursuit of Lee. At 9:30 in the morning on June 25, Crawford was directed to "march with your command to-day, via the Leesburg turnpike, to Edwards Ferry, and, if possible . . . cross the river at that point, should you reach the Ferry in season." (OR, 1:27:3, 309.)

Not long afterwards, Hooker was shocked to learn from Crawford that John P. Slough, military governor of Alexandria, had detained the Second Brigade of Pennsylvania Reserves. He fired off a note to Halleck, demanding that "General Slough be arrested at once" and promising that "charges will be forwarded as soon as I have time to prepare them." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) Hooker sharply warned Halleck, "You will find, I fear, when it is too late, that the effort to preserve department lines will be fatal to the cause of the country." (OR, 1:27:1, 56.) The General-in-Chief wasted no time in brushing aside Hooker's request:

The Second Brigade, to which you refer in your telegram, forms no part of General Crawford's command, which was placed at your orders. No other troops can be withdrawn from the Defenses of Washington. (OR, 1:27:1, 57.)  

That same day, the First and Third Brigades struck camp and began their march from Fairfax Station and Upton's Hill.*** The soldiers proceeded as far as the area around Vienna, where they bivouacked for the night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143; Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261). Early the next morning the Reserves resumed their march. The Pennsylvanians moved up the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike, past Dranesville, where many of them had first experienced battle.**** A "violent and constant" rainfall turned the roads into "almost knee-deep" mud. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261.) Despite such miserable conditions, the division reached Goose Creek that night. (OR, 1:27:1, 143.) At daylight on June 27, the Reserves headed a short distance to the Potomac and crossed the river at Edwards Ferry via pontoon bridge. (OR, 1:27:3, 353.) The division pushed through Maryland and arrived that night at the mouth of the Monocacy River, "in spite of the heavy roads." (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 261; see also OR, 1:27:1, 143.) Finally, on June 28, the Reserves crossed the Monocacy and marched to Ballinger's Creek near Frederick, where they joined the Fifth Corps. (OR, 1:27:1, 144; Hardin 141.)***** By the time the Reserves caught up with the Fifth Corps, Meade had taken command of the Army of the Potomac, and Gen. George Sykes had replaced him at the head of the corps.

Detail of Edwards Ferry, Goose Creek, and vicinity from 1862 Union Army map of Northeastern Virginia (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The Leesburg Turnpike, also visible here, served as the Pennsylvania Reserves main route of march to the crossing at Edwards Ferry.

The Pennsylvania Reserves continued their movement northward through Maryland and into Pennsylvania. The division arrived at Gettysburg on July 2 during the second day of the battle. That evening, the First Brigade drove into the Plum Run Valley and beat back an assault by troops from James Longstreet's corps on the Union left near Little Round Top. Crawford himself seized the colors and led the charge. The division's overall losses at Gettysburg stood at 26 killed, 181 wounded, and 3 missing. (OR, 1:27:1, 180.) The Reserves had proven their mettle once again and made a contribution to the Confederate defeat. Before long, the Pennsylvanians would return with the rest of the army to the familiar soil of the Old Dominion. In this war, there was no staying away.

Notes

*The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves of the Third Brigade were still stationed in Northern Virginia in June, most likely in the vicinity of Vienna or Fairfax Station. (Gibbs 214-15.)

**The other units sent to Hooker from the Department of Washington included a brigade of New Yorkers under Gen. Alexander Hays and the Second Vermont Brigade under Gen. George Stannard. Both brigades would go on to distinguish themselves at Gettysburg. Halleck also agreed to furnish a division of cavalry under Gen. Julius Stahel, as well as artillery units, including the 9th Massachusetts Battery.

***The drive to replenish the ranks of the Reserves while in the defenses of Washington met with little success. (Gibbs 213; Thomson & Rauch 256-57.) The two brigades that set out on June 25 totaled just 3,817 officers and men. (Coddington 98.)

****The Battle of Dranesville took place on December 20, 1861, and pitted a brigade of the Reserves against J.E.B. Stuart's Confederates.

*****The Pennsylvania Reserves officially became the Third Division of the Fifth Corps.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Civil War in the East (on-line database); Edwin B. Coddington, The Gettysburg Campaign: A Study in Command (1979 ed.); Columbia Spy, June 6, 1863; Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Martin D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); Harrisburg Daily Patriot and Union, June 27, 1863; Philadelphia Press, June 2, 1863; Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (2003); Jeffrey F. Sherry, "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Hist. Soc.); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

Additional Reading

An excellent and detailed account of the Pennsylvania Reserves' march from Upton's Hill/Fairfax Station to Edwards Ferry, including maps, can be found here, at Craig Swain's Civil War blog, To the Sound of the Guns. Also be sure to check out Craig's on-going series of posts on the march of the Union army through Loudoun County in the days prior to Gettysburg.

For the full story of the Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg, see "The Terrible Impetuosity: The Pennsylvania Reserves at Gettysburg," by James Sherry in Gettysburg Magazine, Issue No. 16, Jan. 1, 1997.

Contraband Camps Established in Northern Virginia: May-June 1863, Part I

A few months ago when researching events that transpired in the McLean area during 1863, I came across various references to "contraband camps." After some additional digging, I discovered that the Union military established camps for fugitive slaves on land in Northern Virginia at the end of May and start of June 1863. Unlike the Freedman's Village on Robert E. Lee's Arlington Estate, these contraband camps have attracted little attention in accounts of local Civil War history. In today's post I begin an exploration of the contraband camps of Northern Virginia. My research has just started, and I hope to tell more of this compelling story in the months ahead.

As the Civil War progressed, thousands of slaves fled to the nation's capital from surrounding states in search of freedom and opportunity. The abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia in April 1862 led to an even greater migration of slaves to Washington City. The problems of caring for these contrabands mounted as their numbers grew. Northern aid and religious societies provided material donations of necessities like clothing and sent teachers to educate the former slaves, but the chief responsibility for the contrabands rested with the Federal Government.

James Wadsworth, the military governor of Washington, soon recruited help from the outside. In June 1862 he named the Rev. Danforth B. Nichols as the Superintendent of Freedmen.  Nichols was a Methodist minister and member of the American Missionary Association, a society dedicated to abolition, racial equality, the education of blacks, and the spread of Christian values. (NPS, Theodore Roosevelt Island, fn121.) In his new role, Nichols oversaw the distribution of food, blankets, and clothing to ex-slaves; placed them in jobs throughout the city; and handled issues related to contraband housing.

Gen. James S. Wadsworth, commander of the Military District of Washington from March 1862 to September 1862 (courtesy of ExplorePAHistory.com).  Wadsworth faced the challenge of dealing with an influx of contrabands during his time in the nation's capital.

Many contrabands were housed in tenement dwellings along Duff Green's Row on Capitol Hill. In July 1862 smallpox erupted among the contrabands there, and the authorities feared the spread of the deadly disease. Nichols removed the contrabands to abandoned barracks at a more remote location, far from the populated areas of the capital. (The camp sat at 12th and Vermont Avenue, N.W., near today's Logan Circle). Called Camp Barker, this new settlement "became the center of the government's effort to provide relief and employment for former slaves in the District of Columbia," but before long, difficulties also plagued Camp Barker. (Berlin et al. 247.) The contraband population continued to grow, and conditions deteriorated. Diseases like scarlet fever, whooping cough, and measles spread in the overcrowded barracks and killed many of the former slaves. Nichols also worried that the close quarters at Camp Barker were contributing to promiscuity and immorality.

View of Camp Barker (courtesy of Civil War Trust).

The government clearly faced a daunting task as the third year of the war got underway. Lt. Col. Elias Greene, the Chief Quartermaster for the Department of Washington, hatched a plan. In early May 1863, he wrote to Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department. Greene viewed the population of dependent contrabands as a "dead weight on the Government." (Berlin et al. 298.) The Chief Quartermaster reminded Heitzelman that lands abandoned by "rebel owners" in Virginia were "now lying idle." (in Berlin et al. 298.) He observed:

On quite a number of these farms the houses are left standing--of these, there are enough to provide quarters for, from 500 to 750 field hands, with a very small outlay for additions and improvements. (in Berlin et al. 298.)

The Chief Quartermaster suggested:

The force of contrabands, males and females, now idle in this City. . . can be employed to very great advantage in cultivating the above lands, raising corn and millet, cutting Hay . . . for this Department. (in Berlin et al. 298.)

Greene felt that there would be "a decided advantage afforded to [the contrabands] of the salutary effects of good pure country air." (in Berlin et al. 298.) Moreover "a return to their previous healthy avocations as 'field hands' under much happier auspices than heretofore, . . . must prove beneficial to them, and will tend to prevent the increase of diseases now prevalent among them." (in Berlin et al. 298.)

Greene concluded:

The arrangement I propose will not only in my opinion conduce to the sanitary and moral improvements of the contrabands, but will save the Govt an immense amount of money. (in Berlin 298.)

Greene recommended that Nichols, who agreed with the plan, remain as Superintendent. The Chief Quartermaster also asked for a response to his proposal within 48 hours so that farming could start before the imminent end of the planting season.

Heintzelman approved Greene's plan, and Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs added his endorsement. On May 14, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton agreed to the proposed system of contraband camps in Virginia, and a week later, Heintzelman formally issued orders authorizing Greene to execute his plan by relocating dependent contrabands to abandoned secessionist lands in Virginia. (General Orders No. 28, May 22, 1863.) The social experiment across the Potomac would begin in earnest.

Up Next: Nichols establishes five camps throughout Arlington and Fairfax.

Sources
Ira Berlin et al., Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Selected from the Holdings of the National Archives of the United States, Series I, Volume II, The Wartime Genesis of Free Labor: The Upper South (1993); John H. Eicher & David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (2001); Allen C. Guelzo, Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America (2004); Robert Harrison, Washington During Civil War and Reconstruction: Race and Radicalism (2011); National Park Service, "Freedman's Village," Arlington House, The Robert E. Lee Memorial (website); National Park Service, Historic American Landscapes Survey: Theodore Roosevelt Island.

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part III: Military Duties in and Around Washington

Following a brief interlude, I return this week to the story of the Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia during the first half of 1863. The hard-fighting division had suffered heavy losses in the bloodletting of the previous year. Generals and politicians lobbied tirelessly to have the Reserves sent back to the Keystone State to recuperate and fill their ranks with new recruits. (See Part I.) In the end, the Union Army settled on an alternative course of action designed to accomplish the same goals. (See Part II.)

At the start of February 1863, the division's three brigades boarded transports at Belle Plain, Virginia and headed up the Potomac.* The Reserves were slated to join the newly-formed 22nd Corps of the Department of Washington, composed of soldiers who were assigned to the defense of the nation's capital. On February 7, the Pennsylvanians disembarked at the port of Alexandria and marched towards their old campgrounds around Fairfax Seminary.

Orders finally came on February 10. (OR, 1:51:1, 985.) Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington, directed the First Brigade to proceed to Fairfax Courthouse. The Second Brigade was ordered to Upton's Hill, while the Third Brigade was to occupy Minor's Hill.** The Reserves performed a variety of tasks, from the mundane to the downright dangerous.

Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, commander of the Department of Washington and 22nd Corps (courtesy of Wikimedia Commons).

The experience of the 2nd Pennsylvania Reserves was typical of the regiments assigned to the area around Fairfax. The 2nd took the Orange & Alexandria Railroad from Alexandria to Fairfax Station on February 12 and established camp near Fairfax Court House. On February 21 the men received orders to guard the fords across Bull Run. The 2nd's picket line stretched for seven miles. As one regimental historian described duty there:

Our posts at the fords were almost nightly visited by the guerrillas, who exchanged a few shots with the pickets and disappeared. When a shot was fired, not knowing the strength or object of the enemy, the reserve at the post was turned out, and as this occurred several times through the night, the men's sleep was constantly liable to be disturbed. This tour of duty lasted sixteen days, and we were all glad when it was over. (Woodward, Our Campaigns, 254.)

During the night of March 8, the 2nd Reserves proceeded to Union Mills and the next day returned to camp at Fairfax. By March 16, the regiment was on the move again. This time they were assigned to dig rifle pits outside town along the road to Centreville. Finally, on March 28, the 2nd marched four miles to Fairfax Station, where the men established a more permanent camp. As May got underway, the partisan rangers became more active, and the 2nd had to contend with intensified attacks on the picket lines and the railroad around Fairfax.

The Bucktails, also from the First Brigade, proceeded to Fairfax on February 12. Here they engaged in picket and scouting duty, dug rifle trenches, cut trees, and buried dead horses. On the night of March 8, Confederate ranger John Mosby captured Gen. Edwin Stoughton in a raid on Fairfax. Accordingly, "to guard against a repetition of such a humiliating experience, the Bucktails were ordered to move their camp closer to the village." (Thomson & Rauch 47.) A regimental history claims that due to this precautionary measure, "Mosby's Rangers did not again penetrate the Union line in that vicinity" while the Bucktails were in Fairfax. (Thomson & Rauch 247.)

The 4th and 7th Pennsylvania Reserves performed guard duty at Camp Convalescent, a few miles from Alexandria along Four Mile Run.*** This massive facility was home to thousands of soldiers recovering from wounds and illnesses. Camp Convalescent consisted of fifty barracks as well as officers' quarters, dining rooms, cook houses, and hospitals.

Period engraving of Camp Convalescent, outside of Alexandria (courtesy of NYPL Digital Gallery). The camp was new when the Pennsylvania Reserves arrived for guard duty in early 1863. The conditions at the previous camp had become so bad that it earned the nickname, "Camp Misery."

Regiments from the Third Brigade were also detailed to areas outside Minor's Hill. The 11th Pennsylvania Reserves encamped in Vienna near the Alexandria, Loudoun & Hampshire Railroad. Private Lindley H. Addleman described the daily routine in a letter to his sister:

. . .we halve been doing fatigue duty pretty near every day since we came but it is easy [work] Some days we load carrs with cordwood and Some days we on load hay oats and corn and rashions for the cavalry well that is what we halve to do beside camp guarding. (Spelling and grammar as in original.)

The 12th Pennsylvania Reserves were assigned to a spot near the railroad bridge over Bull Run in February and early March. Sergeant Thomas Dick of Company H seemed far from bothered by his routine. As he told his brother in a February 22 letter, "[o]ur duty is not very arduous here." Dick came on duty "about once a week . . .to guard the railroad." The sergeant seemed almost nonchalant about the risks involved:

Have nothing to annoy us but the guerrillas They pop one over occasionally. Major Larimer of the 5th was killed a short time ago while leading a skirmishing party. (Grammar as in original.)

New orders arrived on April 19. Heintzelman directed the Second Brigade, "except the detachment now on duty at the Convalescent Camp," to "report without delay to Brigadier General John P. Slough, military governor of Alexandria." (OR, 1:51:1, 1008.) The commander kept the 11th Pennsylvania Reserves in Vienna, but ordered the remainder of the Third Brigade to report immediately to Gen. J.H. Martindale, the military governor of Washington. The First Brigade remained in Fairfax Court House and environs.

The 3rd Pennsylvania Reserves, along with other regiments in the Second Brigade, contributed to the defense of Alexandria. Following the Union defeat at Chancellorsville in May, earthworks were erected around the city. The 3rd encamped about a mile from the fortifications. An alarm was raised "a number of times, but no enemy appeared." (Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.) Moreover, "upon several occasions," the regiment acted "as a guard to the railroad trains carrying forage to [Joseph] Hooker's army, they going as far as Warrenton Junction." (Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.)

The regiments of the Third Brigade performed provost duty in Washington. The men maintained order and guarded Confederate prisoners and U.S. Government property. Private Benjamin Addleman of the 10th Pennsylvania Reserves and Lindley's brother, was quartered in barracks on East Capitol Hill. In a May 12 letter to his sister, Benjamin reported that "there has been a great many prisoners fetched to Washington from the army of the Potimack." Just the other day, he "helpt to fetch 795 rebls from the wharf. . . ." (Spelling and grammar as in original.) Thomas Dick of the 12th guarded Old Capitol  Prison at the end of May. As he told his sister, "we are off duty two days and on one: It is very nice duty."

Old Capitol Prison, Washington, DC (courtesy of Wikimedia Commons). The building served as the temporary meeting place for Congress (1815-19) after the British burned the Capitol during the War of 1812. Old Capitol Prison held Confederate sympathizers, spies, and prisoners of war. The Supreme Court now sits on this location east of the U.S. Capitol.  

By the start of June 1863, the three brigades of the Pennsylvania Reserves were scattered across Northern Virginia and Washington. Since arriving in February, the Pennsylvanians had fended off attacks by partisan rangers, built entrenchments, and performed other necessary but mundane tasks. As one history of the Reserves summed up military life during that time, "picket duty here [was] more arduous than it was with the Army of the Potomac, and altogether the duties were no lighter nor the quarters any better than they were in the active army." (Hardin 137; see also Sypher 434; Thomson & Rauch 245; Woodward, The Third Reserve, 226.) Men like Thomas Dick and Lindley Addleman, however, may have begged to differ. Whatever the case, much harder days were only a month away for many of the soldiers.

Notes

*The Pennsylvania Reserves were under the overall command of Col. Horatio G. Sickel. The First Brigade, led by Col. William McCandless, was composed of the 1st, 2nd, 6th, and 13th (Bucktails) Pennsylvania Reserves. The Second Brigade, under Col. Henry C. Bolinger, was composed of the 3rd, 4th, 7th, and 8th Pennsylvania Reserves. The Third Brigade, under Col. Joseph W. Fisher, was composed of the 5th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Pennsylvania Reserves.

**Upton's Hill sits on the Arlington County-Fairfax County boundary. Minor's Hill is a bit farther to the northwest and also straddles the border between the two counties. Both eminences are to the east of Falls Church and northwest of Alexandria. For a period map, see here.

***Camp Convalescent sat on land belonging to the present-day Army-Navy Country Club in Arlington County.

Sources

"Brief History of the 7th Pennsylvania Reserves (36th Infantry)," from Samuel Bates, History of the Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865 (1869-71) (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); "Brief History of Company B, 7th Reserves, 'The Biddle Rifles,'" Perry County in the Civil War (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); James G. Barber, Alexandria in the Civil War (1988); Civil War in the East (on-line database); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Martin D. Hardin, History of the Twelfth Regiment Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps (1890); Ltr. from Benjamin P. Addleman to Sister, May 12, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Lindley H. Addleman to Sister, Apr. 30, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Thomas W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 22, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Thomas W. Dick to Sister, May 31, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Res. Hist. Soc.); Ltr. from Americus Murray to Cousins, Apr. 19, 1863 (courtesy of Pa. Reserves Hist. Soc.); "Other Government Buildings: Old Capitol Prison," Mr. Lincoln's White House (website); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); O.R. Howard Thomson & William H. Rauch, History of the "Bucktails" (1906); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

The Pennsylvania Reserves in Northern Virginia 1863, Part II: Farewell to Hooker's Army

As I wrote in my last post, the Pennsylvania Reserves faced a somewhat uncertain future at the start of 1863.  The division had experienced tremendous losses during the bloody battles of 1862.  Gen. George G. Meade, a former commander of the Reserves, took up his old division's cause and pushed to have the Reserves sent back to Pennsylvania to recruit and reorganize.  Pennsylvania's Governor, Andrew Curtin, likewise urged the Lincoln Administration to allow the Reserves to return temporarily to the Keystone State.  These pleas went unheeded at army headquarters, and the Pennsylvanians soon joined the rest of Ambrose Burnside's men on the ill-fated "Mud March."

A Plan is Hatched

By the end of January, the situation began to look brighter for the hard-fought Pennsylvanians.  Gen. Joseph Hooker, the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck finally agreed on a plan to deal with the manpower problems facing the Reserves.  The division was to be detached from the Army of the Potomac and sent to the defenses of Washington in exchange for a like number of Pennsylvania troops then stationed around the capital.  (OR, 1:25:2, 12.)  The Pennsylvania Reserves would return to the front once they had some time to replenish their ranks and recover from combat duty.  Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, head of the Department of Washington, was less than enthusiastic about the idea.  He worried that the Reserves were ill-equipped for provost duty in Washington given that "some of the companies are commanded by sergeants and corporals."  (OR, 1:25:2, 10.)  Heintzelman told Halleck, "I fear that the exchange cannot be made with any benefit to the service in my command."  (OR, 1:25:2, 10.)  Whatever his objections, however, Heintzelman would have no choice but to accept his superior's decision.

Gen. Joseph Hooker (courtesy of Wikipedia)

Meanwhile, the men in the ranks began to hear rumors about their imminent departure for Washington.  A soldier from Co. H, 6th Pennsylvania Reserves wrote on January 28 to his hometown paper, "[W]e – that is the old regiments of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps of Volunteers – are soon to be relieved from the front (where they have always been found), by the troops now stationed in and about Washington, while we are to take their place."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863.)  He felt that the division was "not in the least dissatisfied with the arrangement, altho’ we wish to have no men see the service that the Reserves have been obliged to."  (Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863.)  Sgt. Thomas W. Dick of Co. H, 12th Pennsylvania Reserves, informed his brother of "reliable information to the effect that we are going back to Washington to rest and recruit."  (Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863.)  Dick  approved of the plan, telling his brother, "its what should have been done before this There is now but a miserable remnant of the gay old division that marched from [Camp] Pierpont last spring."  (Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863) (grammar as in original)

Orders!

On February 5, Hooker finally issued orders to transfer the Pennsylvania Reserves.  (OR, 1:25:2, 49-50; 52-53.)  He instructed Gen. John F. Reynolds, head of the First Corps, to send the division to Alexandria with instructions to report to Heintzelman for orders.  Hooker added that "[t]he sick and all the baggage of the troops should be taken with them."  (OR, 1:25:2, 50.)  The chief quartermaster would "furnish the transportation," although Hooker told Reynolds that "[t]he details of the embarkation are left with you, with reliance upon your energy and attention."  (OR, 1:25:2, 50.) 

That same day, Reynolds issued an order directing the Pennsylvania Reserves to embark at Belle Plain for Alexandria, "as soon as transportation is furnished."  (OR, 1:51:1, 981.)  The 121st and 142nd Pennsylvania, who were not part of the original Pennsylvania Reserve Volunteer Corps, were ordered to remain behind, along with three artillery batteries.  Reynolds informed the men that they would receive three days' cooked rations for the trip north.  He finished his order on a sentimental note:

In separating from the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, with which the commanding general has been so closely allied for the past eighteen months, he cannot but express his deep regrets. They are, however, lessened by the hope that soon their thinned ranks will be filled, and they, once more restored and reorganized, will be returned to the field prepared to add new luster to a name already endeared to our patriotic State.  (OR, 1:51:1, 981-82.) 

Wartime view of Belle Plain, Virginia on Potomac Creek (courtesy of Library of Congress)

The men of the Pennsylvania Reserves received news of their impending move with enthusiasm.  According to one regimental history, "[i]n despite of the cold rain the camp-fires were soon brightly burning, around which the boys gathered and talked of the good times coming until late at night."  (Woodward, Third Reserve, 224.)  The next afternoon, February 6, the division struck camp and marched about four miles to Belle Plain on Potomac Creek. The journey lasted well into the evening due to the wet and muddy conditions.  The First Brigade boarded transports during the night and headed up the Potomac.  The Second and Third Brigades set out for Alexandria in the morning.  As the men arrived at the wharves along the river, they must surely have felt a sense of relief to leave behind life at the front, if only for a little while.

Postscript

The transfer of the Reserves soon became mired in a dispute between Hooker and Washington.  Gen. Abner Doubleday, who assumed command of the Pennsylvania Reserves for a short while in the middle of January, had gone to the capital to oversee arrangements for the exchange. (OR, 1:51:1, 974.)  After the division arrived in Washington, Doubleday reported to Hooker that "[t]he Pennsylvania regiments given in place of the Reserves do not contain as many men as the latter brought here."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)  He concluded that there was "a deficiency of about 250 men."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)  Hooker fired off a dispatch to Halleck on February 10,  insisting that "this deficiency be made up, and that General Heintzelman be directed to send the full number, according to the understanding, viz, the same number of men as were returned in the Pennsylvania Reserves."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.) Halleck tersely replied that "[r]egiments cannot be broken up in order to exactly equalize."  (OR, 1:25:2, 63.)

Hooker wouldn't let the shortfall go.  He pressed his cause with Heintzelman directly.  (OR, 1:25:2, 69-70.)  The commander of the Washington defenses informed Hooker that he had been told to exchange the Reserves for Pennsylvania troops only and that some of some of the soldiers designated for the Army of the Potomac had been detained in Washington for reasons beyond his control.  He had no more to give.  Heintzelman alleged that "[t]he numbers at my disposal were well understood by General Doubleday when he made the application."  (OR, 1:25:2, 83.)

Hooker next unleashed his wrath on Doubleday, demanding that he "report what agreement was entered into by you with General Heintzelman with regard to the exchange of the Pennsylvania Reserves."  (OR, 1:25:2, 87.)   Doubleday insisted that he had done nothing wrong, claiming that "no special agreement was entered into" between him and Heintzelman.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)   He told Hooker:

It was understood that I was to have an equal number of men with those I furnished. I never supposed I should have a less number until the Reserves had actually arrived in Alexandria, and a report of their number was laid before General Heintzelman. He then informed me that the aggregate would be less than that furnished by some 230 men.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)

Doubleday also took offense at Hooker's accusation that he had not given his personal attention to the matter, explaining that he had "visited General Heintzelman's office every day, and frequently several times a day, in relation to it," and "was also a daily visitor at the Adjutant-General's Office of the General-in-Chief" concerning the exchange.  (OR, 1:25:2, 90.)  Heintzelman received a copy of Doubleday's response, but when all was said and done, Hooker turned his attention to more pressing matters.   Meanwhile, the Reserves prepared for duty on the picket line in front of the capital.

Up Next:  Military duties in front of Washington.

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

John H. Eicher & David J. Eicher, Civil War High Commands (2001); Joseph Gibbs, Three Years in the Bloody Eleventh: The Campaigns of a Pennsylvania Reserves Regiment (2002); Ltr. from T.W. Dick to Brother, Feb. 2 1863 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Historical Society); J.R. Sypher, History of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps (1865); Wellsboro Agitator, Feb. 11, 1863 (courtesy of P.R.V.C. Historical Society); Evan M. Woodward, History of the Third Pennsylvania Reserve (1883); Evan M. Woodward, Our Campaigns (1865).

The Chain Bridge Defenses: A Mysterious Blockhouse

Following a recent trip to the Falls Church Library, I decided to swing by my local Books-A-Million on the way home.  As I was browsing the bargain bin, a Blue & Gray Press reprint of Volume 5 of Francis T. Miller's famous, The Photographic History of The Civil War, caught my eye.  This volume focuses on forts and artillery and includes a chapter on "Defending the National Capital."  A photograph on page 75 entitled, "Blockhouse at the Chain Bridge, Above Georgetown," really peaked my curiosity.  I've read a lot about the Chain Bridge and the Civil War defenses of Washington, but had never come across any mention of a blockhouse being built at the bridgehead.  I was determined to learn more about the subject of this unique photograph. 

Photograph and caption from p. 75 of Miller's The Photographic History of The Civil War, Volume 5: Forts and Artillery (courtesy of Perseus Digital Library, Tufts University)

The caption for the photograph in Miller's Photographic History includes no indication of when it was taken or who took it.  The image depicts a small group of persons gathered at the end of the Chain Bridge below the blockhouse.  At least one woman is standing there, along with a few children.  Given the format of digital reproduction that I found, it is difficult to magnify the photograph on a computer to see more detail. 

Virginia Side or D.C. Side?

During the Civil War, the D.C. side of the Chain Bridge crossed low over the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal before meeting the shore (see photograph below), while the Virginia side passed high over the Potomac River and ended abruptly at a steep bank.  (Barnard 80.)  The bridge in Miller's book appears to hit the shore at the river, or Virginia, end.  A modern photograph of the same location, which has not changed much since the war, supports this conclusion (see below). 

A wartime view of the Georgetown/D.C. end of the Chain Bridge (courtesy of Library of Congress).  Note the Chesapeake & Ohio Canal immediately below the bridge.



Contemporary view of the Chain Bridge and the Potomac at the Virginia shoreline, looking south (courtesy of Wikipedia).  The curve in the river and the shape of the palisades on the Virginia side appear to match the same features in the photograph from Miller's Photographic History.

At the time of the war, the ruins of an industrial brick building (or buildings) stood on the south side of the Virginia end of the bridge.  A lone chimney also rose above the Chain Bridge around the same area (see the series of photographs below).  Both of these features appear to be missing from the photograph in Miller's classic work.  The ruins were likely situated farther down the road, outside the frame of the photograph.  At some point when I have more time I'd like to hike around the site to get a better idea of where the blockhouse and ruins were possibly located in relation to the old bridge.

Ruins of an old manufacturing building on the Virginia side of the Chain Bridge (courtesy of Library of Congress).

Another view of ruins near the head of the bridge on the Virginia side (courtesy of Wikipedia).



View from heights above the bridge, showing the ruins of a brick chimney (courtesy of Library of Congress).  The remnants of the brick industrial building are visible below, to the right of the Chain Bridge.

A Blockhouse?

During the war, the Chain Bridge was one of three strategic crossings of the Potomac River near Washington.  As Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief Engineer for the Department of Washington, recalled, "The possession of the Chain Bridge communication with the opposite shore of the Potomac, incidentally important in a defensive point of view, was essential to our operations in Virginia and to the prestige of our arms."  (Barnard 47.)  Accordingly, the Union Army constructed several works on both sides of the Potomac to protect this vital link between Washington and Virginia.  In the Old Dominion, Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen, along with a system of rifle trenches and batteries, served as the main defensive works.  On the D.C. side, a battery of field guns sat at the end of the bridge; Battery Martin Scott occupied the heights above.  Batteries Vermont, Kemble, Parrott, and Cameron also swept the land around Chain Bridge in Virginia from their dominant positions on the other side of the river.*

The Union Army constructed several blockhouses around the nation's capital, but commonly-consulted sources on the defenses of Washington do not list a blockhouse as part of the works at the Chain Bridge.  Three blockhouses were erected on the Virginia side of the Aqueduct Bridge (near today's Key Bridge).  Blockhouses were also built near Alexandria at Hunting Creek and on the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike around Ft. Ward.  In November 1864, the Union Army began to erect a series of picket posts, including blockhouses, that stretched from Prospect Hill on the Leesburg-Georgetown Turnpike (a few miles from the Chain Bridge) to Vienna, Fairfax Courthouse, and Fairfax Station.  

A wartime report on Washington's defenses offers a clue as to the construction of a blockhouse at the Chain Bridge.  On October 25, 1862, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton appointed a Commission to examine the adequacy of Washington's defenses.  Barnard served on the Commission along with other military experts, including Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs and the Chief of Engineers, Gen. John G. Totten.  In December 1862, the Commission offered its recommendations.  After reviewing the state of the defenses around the Chain Bridge, the Commission concluded:

[S]ome defensive arrangements are necessary immediately about the head of the bridge; probably two or three small works, or, perhaps, block-houses would suffice.  (OR, 1:21, 909.)

Several months later, on May 22, 1863, Barnard complained to the head of the Department of Washington, Gen. Samuel P. Heintzelman, that he was running low on funds to hire workers for the improvements recommended by the Commission.  As to the Chain Bridge, he explained:

. . . there remains much to be done, and I will continue a force of mechanics, with some laborers, provided I can have the assistance of the troops.  (OR, 1:25:2, 513.)

However, a few weeks later, on July 7, 1863, Barnard reported to Col. J.C. Kelton, the Assistant Adjutant-General:

The work has been prosecuted with all the vigor the means at my disposal would admit. Although the winter season was most unfavorable for such work, and with the limited amount of money available, as well as with regard to economy, it was not deemed advisable to employ very large gangs of hired laborers, yet, by aid of the troops, working whenever the weather and state of the ground would permit, the most essential works recommended by the commission, such as . . . the additional works at the Chain Bridge. . . were all pressed forward, so as to be in a condition, if not complete, at least of efficiency, for their uses, with the return of the season, when active field operations might throw Washington upon its defenses.  (OR, 1:27:3, 596.)

Barnard's correspondence indicates that despite resource constraints, the Union Army completed or made substantial progress on the recommended works at the Chain Bridge -- which possibly included one or more blockhouses -- by mid-summer of 1863.  However, in his post-war report on the defenses of Washington Barnard elaborated on the fate of the blockhouses at the Chain Bridge:

It has been seen that the Commission recommended that some defensive arrangements should be made immediately about the head of the bridge, suggesting two or three small works or block-houses.  This recommendation, though always contemplated, was never complied with. Doubtless, however, this interior and limited inclosure of the bridge-head is a necessary and important part of all extensive "tetes de pont." (Barnard 47.)

So, is Barnard wrong about the blockhouse?  After all, pictures presumably don't lie.  His report was published several years after the close of the war, and his memory may have grown a bit cloudy, particularly if the blockhouse was built following his departure from the Department of Washington in 1864.  Alternatively, the U.S. Army may have constructed the blockhouse at some point during the post-war period, and Miller's Photographic History may have erroneously classified the image as a Civil War-era one.  If that is the case, then for what defensive purposes was the blockhouse built?  After all, an active rebellion no longer threatened the river crossing at the Chain Bridge.  Another possibility is that Miller's book misidentified the photograph, and that it actually depicts another bridge and another blockhouse somewhere else that bears an uncanny resemblance to the area around the Chain Bridge.  Whatever the theory, one thing is certain -- the complete story behind the "blockhouse at the Chain Bridge" remains a mystery.

Notes

*A sub-caption to the photograph in Miller's Photographic History explains that "[the Chain Bridge] approach was defended by Forts Ethan Allen and Marcy on the Virginia side, and by Batteries Martin Scott, Vermont, and Kemble on the Maryland side of the Potomac."  (Miller, Vol. 5, 75.)

Sources

Aside from the Official Records, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

John G. Barnard, A Report on the Defenses of Washington (1871); Benjamin Franklin Cooling III & Walton H. Owen II, Mr. Lincoln's Forts: A Guide to the Civil War Defenses of Washington (2010 ed.); Historical Marker Database, "Pimmit Run and Chain Bridge"; Francis T. Miller & E.O. Hunt (eds.), The Photographic History of the Civil War in Ten Volumes, Volume 5: Forts and Artillery (1911); National Park Service, A Historic Resources Study: The Civil War Defenses of Washington, Parts I & II (2004).

The Chain Bridge Defenses During the Maryland Campaign, Part II: Sigel Adjusts His Line While the Confederates Demonstrate at Pimmit Run

Last week I examined the withdrawal of John Pope's defeated Union force following Second Manassas.  Franz Sigel's First Corps of the Army of Virginia, along with the corps of Edwin V. Sumner and Fitz John Porter, moved from Fairfax Court House to Langley.  By September 3, 1862, Sigel's men occupied the ground closest to the strategic crossing at Chain Bridge.  Porter sat not far away, around Hall's Hill, while Sumner crossed the Potomac and took up a position at Tennallytown.

As Gen. George B. McClellan divined Robert E. Lee's next move, he sent instructions through his chief of staff, Randolph B. Marcy, to ensure the adequate safeguarding of Washington's defenses.  On the morning of September 4, Sigel was told to "draw in the main line of his forces. . . so as to run from Ft. Ethan Allen toward [Porter's] right."  (OR, 1:51:1, 789.)  This shift would shorten Sigel's line and close any gaps between the two corps.  (OR, 1:51:1, 785, 789.)  

That same day, a small fight erupted about a half a dozen miles from Sigel's force near Chain Bridge.  As Lee prepared his army to invade Maryland by crossing the Potomac near Leesburg, Confederate cavalry was ordered to make a demonstration in front of the Federal lines near Washington.  On the morning of September 4,  Gen. Beverly Robertson led the 7th and 12th Virginia Cavalry and three guns from Capt. R. Preston Chew's horse artillery down the Leesburg-Alexandria Turnpike towards Falls Church.  Between Vienna and Lewinsville, the Confederates ran into Union pickets from Gen. Alfred Pleasonton's cavalry command and drove them back "after a brisk skirmish."  (OR, 1:19:1, 828.)  Robertson sent one gun and part of his cavalry to a point "near Lewinsville to prevent surprise" and proceeded with the rest of his force to a hill above Pimmit Run along the pike.  (OR, 1:19:1, 828; see also OR, 1:19:2, 176.)*  Two of Chew's guns opened on the Union troops, and the Federals soon returned fire with two guns of their own.  Around six that evening, Marcy alerted Sigel to the attack and cautioned him:

Your pickets should be on the alert, and your command at once drawn into the new position indicated to you this morning.  (OR, 1:51:1, 785.) 

Robertson's fight with the Union troops lasted until about sundown, when the Confederates spotted several regiments advancing from the direction of Falls Church.  Robertson deemed "the object of the reconnaissance. . . fully accomplished" and withdrew his men "at dark."  (OR, 1:19:1, 828; see also OR, 1:19:1, 814; OR, 1:19:2, 176-78; Harsh 67.)  Pleasonton dismissed the action as a mere "show of force to conceal [Lee's] movements on the Upper Potomac," and McClellan agreed.  (OR, 1:19:2, 178; OR, 1:51:1, 785.)

Gen. Beverly Robertson (courtesy of Wikipedia).  The cavalry commander had few fans among the top brass of the Army of Northern Virginia and was transferred to North Carolina soon after the skirmish of September 4.

Armed with intelligence on Lee's intentions, McClellan set his army in motion to pursue the Confederates in Maryland.  His entire force, however, would not go with him.  The Lincoln Administration wanted assurances that Washington would remain sufficiently protected.  For the time being, Sigel's corps would have the chief responsibility for guarding the key approaches to Chain Bridge. 

Late on the afternoon of September 6, Marcy sent an order to Sigel at Ft. Ethan Allen:

The commanding general directs that you at once place your corps in position to occupy the line extending from Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen to the vicinity of Fort De Kalb. General F. J. Porter's corps will occupy the line from Fort De Kalb to Hunting Creek, and General [Samuel P.] Heintzelman the line from Hunting Creek to the river below Fort Lyon. . . .  You will please post your pickets well out so as to give timely information of the approach of the enemy.** (OR, 1:51:793.)

Marcy emphasized in a postscript: "Forts Marcy and Ethan Allen will be intrusted to your charge, and you will please connect your pickets with those of General Porter."  (OR, 1:51:1, 793.)  The admonishment about tightening the line likely stemmed from complaints by Porter, who a few days earlier had advised Marcy to send "a staff officer along our lines, to establish the picket lines and the proper connections between corps."  (OR, 1:19:2, 179.)  Not long after Marcy sent the order to Sigel, he reassured Porter that "General Sigel will hold the forts at the Chain Bridge and connect with you."  (OR, 1:51:1, 791.)

Detail from 1862 Union Army map of Northeastern Virginia showing the area of Sigel's line from Ft. Marcy and Ft. Ethan Allen near Chain Bridge to the vicinity of Ft. DeKalb (courtesy of Library of Congress).  For a modern view of the same area, see here.

That night, the area around Chain Bridge buzzed with activity.  McClellan ordered the Sixth Corps under Gen. William B. Franklin to cross the bridge and march to Rockville via Tennallytown.  (OR, 1:51:1, 793; OR, 1:19:1, 38.).   Gen. George Sykes's division from Porter's corps was likewise instructed to proceed to Tennallytown.  (OR, 1:51:1, 791; OR, 1:19:1, 38.)  As the day dawned on September 7, the bulk of McClellan's army sat across the Potomac from Virginia.  Little Mac was on the move, and Sigel's men may have started to wonder when their turn would come.

Notes

*This fight likely occurred near the current-day location of the Whole Foods supermarket along Leesburg Pike (Rt. 7)  (See here for a map). 

**Ft. Marcy and Ft. Ethan Allen guarded the immediate approaches to Chain Bridge on the Virginia side of the Potomac above Georgetown.  For more on the two forts, see here and here.  Ft. DeKalb sat near current-day US-29 (Lee Highway) between N. Adams and N. Vance Streets in Arlington, Virginia.  It was later renamed Ft. Strong.  Hunting Creek is a tributary stream of the Potomac located to the south of Alexandria, Virginia near the present-day Woodrow Wilson Bridge.   Ft. Lyon was located beyond Hunting Creek to the southwest of Alexandria.  For a complete map of the defenses of Washington from the OR, see here.

Sources

Aside from the citations to the Official Records above, the following sources were useful in compiling this post:

Samuel P. Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-1865, Vol. I (1869); Benjamin Franklin Cooling III & Walton H. Owen II, Mr. Lincoln's Forts: A Guide to the Civil War Defenses of Washington (2010 ed.); Stephen D. Engle, Yankee Dutchman: The Life of Franz Sigel (1993); Bradley Gottfried, The Maps of Antietam (2012); Joseph L. Harsh, Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee & Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862 (1999); George Michael Neese, Three Years in the Confederate Horse Artillery (1911); Stephen W. Sears, Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam (1983).